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The evaluation of past experience is influenced both by the strength of retrieved 
memories and factors in the immediate retrieval environment, including emphasised 
goals and cued expectations. However, the laboratory study of episodic memory has 
neglected such environmental influences, despite their overt contribution to real-
world decision outcomes. The aim of this PhD thesis was to rectify this neglect, and 
clarify the interaction of memory evidence and environmental strategies in the 
service of strategic memory control. A related aim was to investigate whether control 
processes identified in the isolated domain of episodic memory in fact performed a 
more general or “cross-domain” function.  
An initial series of behavioural experiments (Experiments 1-3) elucidated an 
overlooked source of strategic bias in the standard recognition environment – implicit 
goal emphasis imparted by question format. Experiment 4 investigated whether the 
question bias was commonly enacted across different domains of evaluation, 
yielding modest evidence in favour of this underlying cross-domain function. 
Experiment 5 instantiated more explicit manipulation of goal emphasis and cued 
expectation, and recovered independent and opposing strategic effects of these two 
environmental factors, emerging across episodic and non-episodic domains. 
Experiment 6 employed a simultaneous EEG-fMRI approach to elucidate the neural 
correlates of memory control, identifying a modulation of the late positive event-
related potential during the resolution of mnemonic conflict, which was sourced to 
BOLD variation in regions of the rostral cingulate zone and intraparietal sulcus. 
Experiment 7 used pupillometry to examine pupil-linked autonomic systems that 
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have also been implicated in memory control, and isolated two distinct components 
of the dilation response evoked during environmental conflict – an “early amplitude” 
unexpected familiarity effect and a “trailing slope” uncertainty effect. The findings 
illuminate the cross-domain underpinnings of an adaptive memory control system, 
evidenced in behaviour and across different functional neuroimaging modalities, and 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1. Environmental influences on real-world memory evaluation  
Our evaluations of the past are made against a changing milieu of real-world 
environments, each bringing with them different influences on the evaluative process 
and consequent behaviour. In assimilating these variable influences, it is likely that 
episodic memory overlaps with other cognitive systems in having evolved the 
capacity to adaptively regulate its core mnemonic processing in light of immediate 
environmental demands. Nevertheless, laboratory memory testing environments are 
typically static and impoverished, reflecting the field’s predominant focus on 
‘memory-specific’ processes, involved in encoding and retrieval, and the related 
neglect of the constraints imposed on these domain-specific processes by factors 
within the test environment. This neglect not only instantiates a significant ecological 
disparity between real-world and laboratory memory use, but also serves to 
undermine the conception of memory retrieval as an evaluative process, wherein 
final memory decisions emerge from the interaction  of memory-specific and 
adaptive environmental processes at the time of test. To demonstrate this, two 
notable aspects of the test environment that influence overt memory evaluation 
outcomes in the real world will presently be outlined, namely cued expectations and 
perceived goals.  
Environmental factors that cue expectations of what is likely to be remembered serve 
as an additional source of diagnostic information beyond the assessed strength of 
the retrieved memories. To emphasise the contribution of expectation to memory 
evaluation outcomes, consider the following real-world testing scenarios (modified 
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from Mandler, 1980) in which an observer travelling on a bus evaluates whether 
different co-passengers have been encountered previously (i.e. deemed ‘old’) or not 
(i.e. deemed ‘new’; see Figure 1.1. for an accompanying schematic). Firstly, consider 
“passenger A” – an individual who evokes in the observer a vague sense of prior 
encounter without specific details that would enable the definitive placement of that 
individual in a particular episode. This subjective memory state has formerly been 
characterised as reflective of two independent episodic memory systems i.e. a 
feeling of “familiarity” in the absence of explicit “recollection” of encoding details 
(Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 2002), and alternatively as reflective of weak levels of a 
single underlying memory strength continuum (Stretch & Wixted, 1998b; Squire, 
Wixted & Clark, 2007). Demurring from the long-standing debate over which of these 
processing accounts best characterises the observer’s retrieval state, it should be 
apparent that the available memory evidence is only weakly diagnostic of the correct 
memory decision to be made for passenger A. Furthermore, this weak memory 
evidence is coupled with the lack of any prior expectations of encountering 
passenger A in the specific environmental setting of the bus. Hence, weak memory 
strength and the lack of a cued expectation collectively inform an uncertain, possibly 
inaccurate memory decision.  
Compare this with the observer’s evaluation of “passenger B” – a close friend 
evoking a high level of memory strength derived from repeated prior encounters.  
Additionally, this close friend regularly travels on the same bus as the observer, 
enforcing an environmentally cued expectation of encountering him/her on the bus. 
Hence, the strong memory strength and strong cued expectation combine to elicit 
the quick and accurate recognition of passenger B (i.e. a certain ‘old’ decision). 
Consider now the observer’s evaluation of “passenger C” – another friend evoking a 
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similarly high level of memory strength as passenger B, albeit one who rarely 
catches the same bus as the observer. Despite the absence of an expectation of 
encountering this individual on the bus, the high memory strength available is 
sufficiently diagnostic of the identity of passenger C. The high memory strength 
therefore acts to countermand the unexpectedness of passenger C and leads to an 
‘old’ recognition decision. Finally, consider the observer’s evaluation of “passenger 
D” – an individual who evokes an equivalently indeterminate level of memory 
evidence as passenger A, but who is distinguished by wearing a bus conductor 
uniform. This uniformed identity serves to instil a strong environmentally cued 
expectation for passenger D, given that it is entirely reasonable to expect a bus 
conductor on a bus. Hence, this memory evaluation unfolds in an inverted fashion to 
that involving passenger C, such that the strong expectation overrides the weak 
memory strength evidence to enable the accurate recognition of passenger D. The 
outlined scenarios should highlight the significance of environmentally cued 
expectations in dynamically interacting with retrieved memory evidence to provide 
the diagnostic evidence for reaching memory decisions.  
A second notable way in which the test environment influences memory evaluation is 
by emphasising the wider goals of the evaluative event, and relatedly conveying the 
anticipated reward and punishments of particular decision outcomes. These 
emphasised goals impose higher-order constraints on the evaluative process in light 
of what is most adaptively relevant in the immediate environment. To demonstrate 
this, consider again an observer evaluating memory in two different testing scenarios 
(see Figure 1.2. for a companion schematic). In scenario 1 (Figure 1.2a), the 
observer is evaluating whether someone spotted whilst shopping in a supermarket is 
a previously met acquaintance. In scenario 2 (Figure 1.2b), the observer is 
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evaluating whether a member of a line-up of suspects is the perpetrator of a crime to 
which he/she was an eyewitness. These two scenarios share the same underlying 
recognition memory process (i.e. adjudicating between a recognised ‘old’ and an 
unrecognised ‘new’ decision, as in the cued expectation examples above) but differ 
markedly in the environment in which the engagement of this process occurs. If we 
assume that the individuals under scrutiny in each scenario evoke the identical level 
of memory strength, it is likely that these differing environments will provoke very 
different memory decision outcomes.  
In the supermarket scenario, all conceivable evaluative outcomes present a limited 
opportunity for reward or punishment – the worst consequence of an incorrect 
recognition decision is some degree of social embarrassment. Hence, the observer 
might require a fairly weak level of memory evidence to recognise the potential 
acquaintance as ‘old’, and this increases the likelihood of them making an ‘old’ 
decision. Contrast this with anticipated behaviour in the eyewitness scenario, in 
which the repercussions of an incorrect recognition decision are substantial, in 
potentially leading to the wrongful conviction of an innocent person. Hence, the 
eyewitness observer might demand a fairly strong level of memory evidence to 
recognise the suspect as ‘old’, and this deters them from making an ‘old’ decision. 
The shift in overt behavioural tendencies between these two scenarios reflects how 
environmentally emphasised goals regulate the use of available memory evidence to 
ensure adaptive decisions.  
The above examples should illustrate the formative influences of cued expectations 
and emphasised goals on the evaluation of memory in the real world. However, the 
laboratory study of memory has somewhat neglected these environmental influences 
and it was the overall aim of my PhD to rectify this neglect. This entailed the use of 
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existing laboratory paradigms, and the development of new ones where necessary, 
to systematically manipulate aspects of the test environment in which memory 
evaluation is engaged. Behavioural and functional neuroimaging methods as applied 
in these paradigms aimed to isolate the effects of expectations and goals on memory 
evaluation, and piece together the dynamic interactions of these processes, both 
exogenously with memory strength processes as well as endogenously with each 
other, in determining evaluative outcomes. This implied interactive property raises a 
related aim – to treat the “immediate environment” as an important cognitive factor in 
its own right and interrogate the processing of environmental influences on 
evaluation in cognitive domains beyond memory. Evidence of an overarching system 
that mediates environmental modulations of core evidence processing across 
different cognitive domains would have fundamental implications for wider 
theorisations of cognition and consciousness. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter will discuss findings of behavioural and 
functional neuroimaging research that are relevant to the outlined aims. I will firstly 
present a review of a conceptual framework that was adopted in targeting the 
primary objectives of my PhD – cognitive control. In the brief overview of the control 
literature that follows, the utility of applying this goal-driven, adaptive framework to 
the study of memory evaluation should be made apparent, especially as pertains to 







Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of the bus scenario used to demonstrate the influence 
of environmentally cued expectations on real-world memory evaluation. The passenger in 
light blue is evaluating recognised ‘old’ or unrecognised ‘new’ decisions for passengers A, B, 
C and D; each of whom is associated with a different combination of evoked memory 
strength and the presence/absence of expectations of making ‘old’ decisions, with both 





Figure 1.2. Schematic representation of the two scenarios used to demonstrate the 
influence of environmentally emphasised goals on real world memory evaluation. a. 
Supermarket scenario in which the scope for reward and punishment is reduced (i.e. low 
goal emphasis). b. Eyewitness scenario in which the scope for reward and punishment is 
increased (i.e. high goal emphasis). In both scenarios, a light blue observer is evaluating a 
recognised ‘old’ or unrecognised ‘new’ decision for an individual in red for whom available 
memory evidence is equivalently weak. The variation in goal emphasis information across 
the two scenarios disposes the observer to different decision outcomes – an increased 
likelihood of responding ‘old’ in the supermarket scenario (‘liberal ‘old’ bias’) and a reduced 
likelihood of responding ‘old’ in the eyewitness scenario (‘conservative ‘old’ bias’).  
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1.2. Introducing cognitive control and its relevance to memory 
Cognitive control refers to the ability to flexibly adjust thought, emotions and 
behaviour in accordance with perceived goals and anticipated reward (Baddeley & 
Della Salla, 1996; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986).  This construct is 
central to goal-directed cognition and encompasses a number of sub-processes, 
including working memory maintenance (Fuster, 1985; Koechlin, Basso, Pietrini, 
Panzer & Grafman, 1999), selective attention (Banich et al., 2000; Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995) and action selection (Kerns et al., 2004; Passingham, 1993). The 
engagement of this panoply of processes is critically dependent on the experience of 
conflict and subjective uncertainty in the attainment of specified goals (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter & Cohen, 2001; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), as well as 
changes to the goals themselves (Monsell, 2003; Kouneiher, Charron & Koechlin, 
2009). This is contrasted with conditions of reduced conflict and static goals, wherein 
pre-potent, reflexive mechanisms of cognition and action dominate (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
A number of laboratory paradigms have been used to instantiate conflict between 
possible response options, including the Stroop task (in which participants respond 
to the relevant perceptual or semantic category of presented stimuli and inhibit the 
irrelevant one; Stroop, 1935), Flanker task (make a button-press dependent on the 
direction of a ‘target’ arrow and inhibit the incongruent/interfering direction suggested 
by other ‘flanker’ arrows in the same array; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), go/no-go task 
(respond on the basis of a frequent/expected cue and inhibit a response for an 
infrequent/unexpected one; Brutkowski, 1964) and oddball task (respond to 
infrequent/unexpected ‘target’ stimuli and inhibit a response to frequent/expected 
‘lures’; Squires, Squires & Hillyard, 1975). Changes in goal state have also been 
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manipulated in the laboratory (albeit less frequently than response conflict) in 
paradigms involving rule-learning such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (in which 
participants sort pictorial cards based on changing rules; Grant & Berg, 1948), task-
switching (switch performance between different tasks on the basis of anticipatory 
cues; Sudevan & Taylor, 1987) and incentivised decision-making (make decisions 
under variable reward conditions; Damasio, 1994; Small et al., 2005). By engaging 
under both conditions of response conflict and changes to goal state, control 
therefore represents an overarching cognitive faculty that integrates variable 
environmental influences in ongoing decision-making. 
At the neural level, it has been suggested that both forms of environmentally-induced 
control impact via the common instilment of a ‘top-down bias’, which imposes goal-
relevant constraints on ongoing processing (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). Neurophysiological research in non-human primates has localized 
this bias to neuronal populations of prefrontal cortex (PFC; Fuster, 1980; Goldman-
Rakic, 1987; Duncan & Desimone, 1995), with added functional significance 
imparted to interactions of PFC and downstream parietal cortex, with which it shares 
dense anatomical interconnections (Cavada & Goldman-Rakic, 1989; Chaffee & 
Goldman-Rakic, 1998; Chaffee & Goldman-Rakic, 2000). Evidence from functional 
neuroimaging research in humans also supports prominent roles for these regions in 
mediating cognitive control. The use of electroencephalography (EEG) and analysis 
of the event-related potential (ERP) has delineated temporally precise ERP markers 
of cognitive control that have been sourced to prefrontal and parietal scalp 
generators, including the N2 (Näätänen & Gaillard, 1983) and P3 complex (Sutton et 
al., 1965; Donchin, 1981).  
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Research involving functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has also yielded 
control activations in prefrontal and parietal regions, which have benefited from the 
method’s greater spatial resolution to enable localisation to more precise sub-
regions. fMRI activations underlying response conflict have been observed in medial 
PFC (mPFC; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), cingulate 
cortex (including the anterior cingulate cortex and the rostral cingulate zone, ACC 
and RCZ respectively; Botvinick, Cohen & Carter, 2004; Braver, Barch, Gray, 
Molfese & Snyder, 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), lateral PFC (lPFC; Koechlin, Ody 
& Kouneiher, 2003; Kouneiher, Charron & Koechlin, 2009), and the regions of the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL; Bunge, Hazeltine, Scanlon, Rosen & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002). Similar prefrontal regions 
have also been linked with controlled processing in response to changes to goal 
state and anticipated reward, including mPFC (Kouneiher et al., 2009), ACC/RCZ 
(Botvinick, 2007; Bush et al., 2002) and lPFC (Macdonald, Cohen, Stenger & Carter, 
2000). Further, the spatial affordances of fMRI have enabled the identification of sub-
cortical brain regions involved in control including the thalamus, which has been 
linked with the engagement of control under conflict (Aron, Behrens, Smith, Frank & 
Poldrack, 2007; Macdonald et al., 2000), and the dorsal striatum, which has been 
linked with the regulation of control under varying goals and associated reward 
(Delgado, Stenger & Fiez, 2004; Elliott, Friston & Dolan, 2000; Knutson, Fong, 
Adams, Varner & Hommer, 2001). The highlighted regions often engage in parallel to 
implement control (e.g. Hazeltine, Poldrack & Gabrieli, 2000; Kerns et al., 2004), and 
this implied network-level engagement has recently been formalised by functional 
connectivity methods recovering a distributed fronto-parietal control network 
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(Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle & Buckner, 2008) that has been highlighted as one 
of the core, independent functional networks of the human brain (Power et al., 2011). 
It should be noted that the provided overview of the cognitive control literature is 
general, and has therefore obviated some of the conceptual nuances surrounding 
the precise engagement of control (e.g. the proposed segregation of control between 
‘early’ conflict detection and ‘late’ control allocation sub-processes; Botvinick et al., 
2001) and functional neuroimaging attempts at dissociating the sub-components of 
the associated neural response, both in the EEG (e.g. the proposed early/late 
segregation of the N2 into the N2b and N2c components, Folstein & van Petten, 
2008; as well as the early/late segregation of the P3 into the P3a and P3b; Polich, 
2007) and fMRI literatures (with mPFC and cingulate regions linked with conflict 
detection, and lPFC and IPL linked with control allocation; Macdonald et al., 2000; 
Bunge et al., 2002; Brass & von Cramon, 2005). Nevertheless, the summarised 
literature should convey the significance of the core construct of cognitive control, in 
recruiting a dedicated neural system across different task contexts to promote 
flexible and adaptive interactions with the environment. 
The preceding overview should therefore allude to the utility of applying a cognitive 
control framework to the study of environmental influences on episodic memory 
evaluation - the primary focus of my PhD. Indeed, both environmental influences 
highlighted in the introductory section, namely cued expectations and emphasised 
goals, are readily accommodated within a control framework. To emphasise this, 
consider again the previously described bus scenario, wherein the absence of 
environmentally cued expectations at the time of evaluating passengers A and C led 
to uncertainty as to the correct memory decisions to be made. This uncertainty could 
be characterised as a mnemonic form of the response conflict investigated in the 
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control literature, serving to heighten the control with which available memory 
evidence is evaluated. This controlled memory processing was unsuccessful in 
diagnosing the identity of passenger A, whereas it was successful in diagnosing the 
identity of passenger C. Conflict was also instantiated in the evaluation of passenger 
D (the bus conductor), albeit in inverse fashion, with the lack of diagnostic memory 
evidence driving the subsequent controlled assessment of the environment. These 
effortful evaluations under conflict are contrasted with passenger B, for whom high 
levels of memory strength and strong cued expectations precluded the need for 
control.  
Now also reconsider the second real-world example, involving memory evaluations 
made in two environments with marked differences in emphasised goals – a 
supermarket and a suspect line-up. It should be apparent that the described 
behavioural adjustment in the eyewitness scenario, reflecting the demand for greater 
memory evidence under a situation of greater goal emphasis and projected 
consequences, parallels the recruitment of cognitive control in variations to the goal 
state (especially those contrived in incentivised decision-making). As in other forms 
of decision-making, memory decision outcomes that carry a greater propensity for 
reward or punishment are likely to be evaluated more rigorously and this is reflected 
in control recruitment. The reassessment of the previous real-world examples should 
emphasise that unexpected events generate response conflict and goal-emphasised 
events induce changes to goal state, with both processes heightening the cognitive 
control over memory evaluation. 
Attempts to draw such direct parallels with findings and perspectives in the field of 
cognitive control have been lacking in episodic memory research. Rather, the 
primary focus of the majority of existing memory models is on characterising the 
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nature and strength of retrieved memories, with a comparative neglect of the 
environmental constraints imposed in the evaluation of this output. Such ‘retrieval 
output’ frameworks include global matching models (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; 
Hintzman, 1988), threshold models (Johnson, Kounios & Reeder, 1994) and both 
single process (Stretch & Wixted, 1998b) and dual process variants of the signal 
detection model (Yonelinas, 2002). However, a growing body of research 
interrogating the higher-order strategies engaged at retrieval, both within the 
confines of the above retrieval output models and in bespoke models centring on 
strategic processes, implicate similar underlying processes to those emergent from 
the cognitive control literature. These ‘memory control’ frameworks are summarised 
below. 
1.3. Memory models that implicate aspects of control 
One of the first attempts at characterising controlled aspects of memory evaluation 
was provided by the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993). The model originally sought to explain how memories are attributed to their 
previously encoded ‘source’ and relatedly how mistaken source attributions arise of 
the type reported in fallacious eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1996; Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1989). Central to the model is a parcellation of the subjective experience of 
memory evaluations between ‘automated’ attributions, driven by retrieved source 
details of sufficient quality, and ‘controlled’ attributions, driven by an effortful 
construction of source details (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Subsequent iterations have 
expanded beyond source memory to encompass all instances when retrieval is 
subjectively characterised as effortful and constructive, which includes old/new 
recognition decisions (Johnson et al., 1993). Empirical research has shown that the 
efficacy of source monitoring is to a large extent determined by aspects of encoding, 
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as demonstrated by the difficulties in source monitoring observed for encoding 
sources that are perceptually similar (Ferguson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1992). 
Notably, source monitoring has also been shown to be sensitive to aspects of the 
retrieval environment, with source accuracy improving with a longer response 
window (facilitating adequate completion of effortful processing; Johnson, Kounios & 
Reeder, 1994) and with full compared to divided attention at test (consistent with the 
need to expend focused effort; Jacoby, 1991). 
The importance of these environmental influences is further emphasised by 
application of the source monitoring framework to the Loftus suggestibility procedure 
– a laboratory analogue of eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1996). In the task, 
participants are first shown visual stimuli (e.g. a film of a car crash) and are later 
presented with a memory test, with verbal questions about the event framed in either 
‘neutral’ (e.g. “Did you see a headlight?”) or ‘suggestible’ terms (e.g. “Did you see 
the headlight?”). In a second and final memory test, the suggestible condition has 
been found to increase the likelihood of falsely recognising stimuli that were not 
presented in the original film. Lindsay and Johnson (1989) demonstrated that the 
suggestibility effect was removed when the format of the final memory test was 
framed as a source monitoring task (i.e. a “source?” prompt accompanied by 
“visual”, “verbal” or “both” response options), whereas it was preserved if the test 
was framed as standard old/new recognition. Participants were hence prompted by 
the source memory format to heighten their control over retrieval, and this parallels 
behaviour in the real-world eyewitness test scenario described previously, in which 
greater memory evidence was demanded in the eyewitness environment that framed 
more prominent goals and decision consequences. 
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Research conducted under the source monitoring framework has therefore been 
valuable in highlighting impacts of the test environment on the strategies adopted by 
memory evaluators to reach final decisions. Further, the implied effortful qualities can 
be extended to capture the previously described engagement of control in response 
to greater emphasis on goals and reward/punishment-related information in the test 
environment, as well as when cued expectations conflict with memory evidence. 
However, a limitation of this framework lies in its broad scope and associated lack of 
explanatory specificity. Although encoding and retrieval factors that generate the 
subjective experience of effort are accommodated in the framework, precisely how 
these experiences arise from either memory-specific retrieval processes or wider 
goal-driven processes is unclear. 
Indeed, Jacoby, Kelley & McElree (1999) elaborated on the source monitoring 
framework with the aim of more precisely delineating its constituent control 
mechanisms. This model more clearly situates itself within the dual process signal 
detection model of retrieval output (Yonelinas, 2002) to address the above noted 
ambiguity as to how control precisely operates in source monitoring. Automated 
processes are now assumed to operate through ‘familiarity’ and effortful processes 
through ‘recollection’, and it is by prioritising the retrieval of recollected content (and 
associated high levels of memory strength) as the diagnostic basis for making 
memory decisions that memory control is primarily exerted. Support for this dual 
process control framework comes from variations of the process dissociation 
procedure (Jacoby, 1991), wherein participants are asked to either respond ‘old’ 
irrespective of encoded source (‘inclusion’), or respond ‘old’ only for items from a 
specific source (‘exclusion’). Correct performance in the inclusion condition is 
assumed to reflect the contributions of both familiarity and recollection, whereas 
27 
 
performance in the exclusion condition reflects recollection alone (given the need to 
retrieve source details), and modelling the difference in performance between these 
conditions yields quantifiable estimates of familiarity and recollection. Empirical 
findings from the process dissociation procedure have confirmed that test 
manipulations which interfere with source monitoring processes, such as response 
speeding and dividing attention, impact by selectively reducing recollection estimates 
(Jacoby, 1991; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993). Conversely, manipulations that 
enhance automated processing selectively increase levels of familiarity, as 
demonstrated by the ‘false fame’ effect (wherein faces that have been repeated to 
enhance familiarity are more likely to be mistakenly recognised as famous; Jacoby, 
Kelley, Brown & Jasechko, 1989) and manipulations of perceptual fluency (wherein 
the ease or fluency with which test items are perceived increases the likelihood of 
their false recognition; LeCompte, 1995).  
Jacoby et al.’s (1999) model therefore makes valuable formalisations of the memory 
control mechanisms hinted at in the source monitoring framework. In emphasising 
the role of strategically monitoring for recollection and associatively high memory 
strength, the model provides valuable insight into precisely how memory evidence is 
constrained by immediate goals. Indeed, the model goes further in outlining two 
methods by which this recollective source monitoring strategy can be implemented, 
either as the ‘late correction’ of false feelings of familiarity or by the ‘early selection’ 
of recollected content at retrieval (also referred to as ‘source-constrained retrieval’; 
Jacoby, Shimizu, Daniels & Rhodes, 2005). By inference, late correction is putatively 
involved in the ‘reactive’ heightening of control under response conflict, and early 
selection is the likely mechanism underlying the ‘proactive’ heightening of control 
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under goal emphasis, and this reactive/proactive control framework has direct 
descendants in the cognitive control literature (Braver, 2012).  
However, in assuming that memory control impacts exclusively by prioritising the 
recovery of recollection, Jacoby et al.’s framework fails to accommodate decision-
making under conditions wherein recollection is not successfully engaged in the 
service of control. In the precipitant cases of low memory strength and associated 
uncertainty, environmentally-cued expectations and emphasised goals are likely to 
introduce a more direct influence on decision outcomes, as illustrated by the 
expectation-driven identification of the episodically unfamiliar conductor in the earlier 
bus scenario (see Section 1.1.; see Figure 1.1.). Indeed, control mechanisms in both 
the Jacoby et al. framework and the original Johnson et al. (1993) source monitoring 
framework, are more precisely aimed at characterising the control over retrieval 
output, ‘retrieval control’, rather than the control over how this retrieval output is used 
to reach decision outcomes, ‘decision control’. This latter specification necessitates a 
wider understanding of precisely how the environment drives the heightening of 
memory control, which requires greater appreciation of the adaptive constraints 
applied to the entire evaluative process beyond the mere output of memory 
evidence. 
In an attempt to venture beyond the confines of the dual process framework and 
interrogate these wider constraints, Koriat & Goldsmith (1996) proposed a model in 
which memory control is mediated by an overarching system with ‘metacognitive’ 
properties. This metacognitive system is further deconstructed as comprising a 
‘monitoring’ function, which assesses the quality of retrieval output and associated 
memory strength, and a ‘control’ function, which determines whether this memory 
evidence is acted upon in light of immediate environmental goals. The monitoring 
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component is assumed to underlie the assessment of the strength of retrieved 
memories, with this information outputted as a probability that the assessment is 
accurate. This characterisation blurs as to the precise processes contributing to the 
assessed memory strength (e.g. the relative involvement of familiarity and 
recollection) and instead emphasises how accurate the overall assessment is in 
diagnosing decision outcomes (termed ‘monitoring effectiveness’). Monitoring 
effectiveness has been substantiated by empirical dissociation of the accuracy of 
memory decisions and the subjective confidence in them, with the disparity between 
the two performance measures enhanced by ‘deceptive’ stimuli that elicit false 
memory experiences (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). This effect is not anticipated by 
extant models of retrieval output (including the both variants of the signal detection 
model) wherein confidence is considered a fine-grained analogue of memory 
strength and the relationship between retrieval and memory strength is direct.  
The second ‘control’ component of the metacognitive system drives the final decision 
to act or withhold from acting on the basis of both the monitored memory strength 
and the wider goals constraining the evaluative event. These goals are indexed by a 
criterion measure that is adjustable according to the level of memory strength 
needed to diagnose decisions. The stipulation that control is the critical determinant 
of action is one of the core features of the Koriat & Goldsmith model, one that 
captures an ecological disparity between real-world instances wherein memory users 
have the opportunity to withhold from acting, and the majority of laboratory test 
formats that force participants to make either an ‘old’ or ‘new’ decision. In support of 
this, empirical findings have highlighted how the provision of a ‘withhold’ option in 
‘free report’ memory task formats (as opposed to ‘forced report’ formats that lack this 
option) can dramatically influence decision outcomes, by improving the accuracy of 
30 
 
memory decisions at the expense of their frequency (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). 
Further, this tendency to improve memory quality at the expense of quantity has 
been shown to increase under conditions of higher incentives (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996), and is seemingly a reliable behavioural index of memory control. Indeed, 
similar overt caution was outlined in the earlier eyewitness real-world scenario, 
wherein heightened goal emphasis led to a similar quality-oriented strategy (see 
Section 1.1.; see Figure 1.2.). 
Koriat & Goldsmith’s framework therefore illumines a number of important features of 
memory control. In highlighting the tendency for research predicated on the various 
retrieval output models to focus on retrieval quantity rather than quality, the authors 
illustrate a notable ecological disparity in the laboratory study of memory and the 
real-world (wherein quality is often the overarching goal; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994). 
The demonstration of a reliable behavioural correlate of memory control – namely an 
increase in memory accuracy combined with a reduction in quantity – is also 
significant and a mechanistic account of this effect will be delineated in the next 
section. Collectively, the metacognitive framework emphasises the influence of 
aspects of the environment (namely task format and incentives) in impacting on 
memory evaluation, belying their common treatment as nuisance variables in the 
majority of episodic memory research (Nelson & Narens, 1994; Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). The model also formalises the previously alluded to distinction between 
control enacted directly on retrieval (the monitoring sub-function i.e. retrieval control) 
and control enacted on the output of retrieval (the control sub-function i.e. decision 
control), with a particular emphasis on the formative influence of the latter form of 
control. One limitation of the framework is its inadequate delineation of how control is 
engaged under response conflict (contrasting the considerable detail afforded to goal 
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emphasis). Additionally, empirical substantiations of the model rely on an atypical 
memory task involving tests of general knowledge, which might recruit a semantic 
rather than episodic memory system (Tulving, 1972). Nevertheless, aspects of this 
framework will bear centrally on the remaining introduction and ensuing experimental 
chapters. 
Koriat & Goldsmith’s control framework was elaborated upon in two later models, 
both of which adapted aspects of the original model for investigation in the standard 
recognition memory task format. Whittlesea’s selective construction and preservation 
of experience model (SCAPE: Whittlesea, 2002) posits a simplified account of 
memory control, in which the ‘direct products’ of memory are subjected to a central 
‘evaluation’ function, which both monitors for the strength of the memory products 
and the wider environmental context. SCAPE shares a similar obviation of the 
precise mechanisms of retrieval output as the Koriat and Goldsmith model, although 
it collapses across the monitoring and control sub-functions in favour of a unified 
central evaluative function. Empirical evidence for this model rests on one 
experimental paradigm in which expectations cued by aspects of the recognition test 
environment influence are shown to influence overt behaviour. Specifically, 
participants make ‘old’ or ‘new’ decisions for sentence stems whose potential 
completing word is either semantically constrained (e.g. “After the accident he was 
covered in…” generates only a few candidate completing words) or semantically 
differentiated (e.g. “It was his job to clean out the…” generates a number of 
candidate completions; Whittlesea, 2002; Whittlesea, 2004). Constrained sentences 
set up strong expectations of the status of the completing word, which appear 
embedded in the sentence after a short delay. Expectations instilled by the 
constrained sentence stems were found to increase the likelihood of recognising the 
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completing word as ‘old’ (relative to unconstrained sentences) regardless of whether 
this word was actually previously encountered, with this effect attributed to the 
erroneous evaluation of the subjective ‘sense’ of the semantic expectation as 
indicative of episodic familiarity.  
The expectation effect described by Whittlesea is therefore not entirely reconcilable 
with those outlined previously in the real-world bus scenario, in that the former effect 
putatively impacts via retrieval control mechanisms (i.e. on retrieval directly) whereas 
the latter impacts via decision control mechanisms (i.e. on the products of retrieval). 
Despite the ambiguous treatment of these two control sub-processes, the conception 
of the evaluative function as a centralised system that makes attributions across 
different forms of memory raises intriguing notions of ‘cross-domain’ controlled 
processing. Exploring the cross-domain aspects of observed memory control 
processes served as a salient avenue for my PhD research and will be introduced 
more fully in a dedicated section (see Section 1.6). 
Benjamin (2007) proposed a similar centralised control node in his model of memory 
control, wherein decision outcomes emerge from the interaction of a ‘simple’ memory 
system (underlying retrieval output) and a ‘complex’ higher-level system sensitive to 
varying aspects of control. Unlike the frameworks presented above, Benjamin’s 
control construct is more pervasive in also mediating goal-driven strategies adopted 
at encoding, as demonstrated empirically by participants’ observed ability to 
strategically increase study time for items perceived as difficult to encode (Son & 
Metcalfe, 2000) and those items associated with higher reward (Castel, Benjamin, 
Craik & Watkins, 2002). A control system that constrains both encoding and retrieval 
processing in light of immediate goals is consistent with the overarching function 
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suggested by the dedicated cognitive control literature (Miller & Cohen, 2001; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
Further, the influence of this higher-level control system on retrieval is 
operationalised in analogous fashion to the retrieval control and decision control 
process dichotomy outlined earlier. Indeed, Benjamin’s model coalesces with Koriat 
& Goldsmith’s model in placing particular emphasis on decision control processes as 
the crucial means by which environmental goals impact on behaviour (unlike retrieval 
control which is posited to be determined to a large degree by aspects of encoding). 
A pivotal role is given to the presence of low or non-diagnostic memory strength in 
driving the need for control, resulting in either a decision to disincline from acting (as 
proposed by Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) or to recruit non-episodic inferential 
strategies as an alternative basis for acting (Reder & Wible, 1984). This latter finding 
parallels behaviour in the bus real-world scenario in which the identity of ‘unfamiliar’ 
passenger D was inferred from his bus conductor uniform to generate the 
environmentally-cued expectation. Overall, Benjamin’s model adds to the emerging 
emphasis placed on decision control rather than retrieval control as the crucial 
medium by which adaptive constraints are introduced on memory evaluation. The 
model also formalises the important role of environmental factors in driving the need 
for memory control, which was only hinted at by the original Koriat & Goldsmith 
framework.  
In summary, the models outlined above highlight a number of features of memory 
control that are pertinent to my research aims. Johnson et al.’s (1993) source 
monitoring framework makes the important distinction between subjective 
experiences of memory evaluation as being either automated/reflexive or 
effortful/controlled. Jacoby et al. (1999) illustrate the prioritisation of highly diagnostic 
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memory evidence as a significant method by which control is heightened over 
memory evaluation. Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) highlight the goal-driven 
prioritisation of memory quality over quantity as another memory control mechanism, 
and formalise the important distinction between control processes acting directly on 
retrieval (defined here as retrieval control) and those that act on the output of 
retrieval (defined as decision control). Whittlesea (2004) posits a centralised control 
function, one which putatively overlaps (to some degree) between retrieval and 
decision control, and is potentially capable of modulating processing in episodic and 
non-episodic domains. Finally, Benjamin (2007) emphasises the role of the 
environment in mediating the pervasive involvement of control at both encoding and 
retrieval in the service of task goals. These extant models therefore provide an 
equivalent conception of control to that emerging from the dedicated cognitive 
control literature i.e. that of a cognitive faculty exerting goal- and reward-related 
modulations of ongoing processing. However, the utility of drawing more direct 
parallels between these largely separated episodic memory and cognitive control 
literatures still remains, in that the above models variously focus on explaining 
mechanisms of control under either expectation-driven conflict or variations in goal 
state. Added reference to the cognitive control literature can accommodate both 
these control engagements in a unified adaptive framework, in which impediments in 
attaining task goals (under expectation-driven conflict) and changes to task goals 
themselves (variations in goal state) both lead to the heightening of a common 
cognitive control process.  
Aspects of the above memory control models that will bear centrally on the 
remaining introduction and ensuing experimental chapters are worth highlighting. 
Firstly, a corollary of the emergent distinction between retrieval control and decision 
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control suggests that the latter process is perhaps most amenable to adaptive 
environmental constraints. In support of this, prior research has highlighted the limits 
of retrieval control as the observed inability of participants to increase the quantity of 
memories generated at test under incentives (Nilsson, 1987). The inability to 
generate more memory evidence in response to test incentives is consistent with the 
notion that even the subjectively experienced constructive/effortful features of 
retrieval control are crucially predicated by processes engaged at encoding. 
Conversely, test incentives can affect the quality of endorsed memory evidence 
dramatically, by influencing participants’ decision to act or withhold from acting on 
the basis of their retrieval output (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). This pattern of results 
suggests that control enacted at test is limited in its ability to improve the 
diagnosticity of memory evidence, but impacts more tangibly on behaviour by 
regulating how the available memory evidence is used to make adaptive decisions. 
Decision control is therefore most sensitive to goal-related information imparted by 
the immediate test environment and exerts a more pronounced influence on 
behaviour than retrieval control. 
 The highlighted importance of these decision control processes, combined with their 
relative neglect in the study of episodic memory, motivated a primary focus on 
decision control for my PhD research. In this endeavour, I adopted a similar 
conception of ‘memory-specific’ retrieval processes as in Koriat and Goldsmith’s 
model (and later adopted by Benjamin), in outputting an assessed level of memory 
strength that varies in its diagnosticity for ensuing memory decisions. The relative 
contributions of familiarity or recollection to that assessment was therefore not of 
primary interest. This strategy conveys the aims of my PhD in not only seeking 
insights into memory via a greater scrutiny of cognitive control, but also a reciprocal 
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insight into cognitive control via closer scrutiny of memory. Specifically, 
environmental factors that impact on decision control in the service of episodic 
memory putatively exert similar influences on decision-making in other domains. 
Hence, a reliance on memory-specific concepts such as familiarity and recollection in 
characterising these memory control mechanisms might serve to detract from their 
potentially wider influence in domains beyond episodic memory. 
The conceptual review provided above will now be complemented by a review of 
empirical findings from behavioural and functional neuroimaging investigations of 
memory control. The ensuing sections should therefore raise more tangible 
predictions for behavioural and functional neuroimaging correlates of memory 
control, which were targeted in my experimental chapters.  
 
1.4. Behavioural correlates of memory control 
Research interrogating the behavioural signifiers of memory control has typically 
employed the single item recognition paradigm, in which participants perform an 
initial ‘study’ phase to facilitate encoding of presented stimuli (typically words or 
images), followed by a ‘test’ phase in which they decide if stimuli now being 
presented are ‘old’ i.e. encountered before at study, or ‘new’ i.e. not encountered 
during the experiment. The prevalence of single item recognition in the field of 
episodic memory rests on its simple task format, which affords taut experimental 
control over aspects of encoding and retrieval. Indeed, empirical findings from this 
paradigm have formed the basis for the majority of the retrieval output models 
alluded to in the previous section. The most dominant of these – the signal detection 
theory model of recognition (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 
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2005) – has been suggested to accommodate aspects of memory control and is 
hence worthy of more detailed description.  
SDT models an individual’s memory evaluation as a process of detecting an old-item 
recognition ‘signal’ embedded against a background of new-item ‘noise’ (see Figure 
1.3.). This detection process is predicated on the existence of an underlying 
continuum of memory strength, upon which the memory strength evoked by old and 
new items is separately and normally distributed. The distance between the two 
distributions reflects the individual’s sensitivity in discriminating between old and new 
items, and is denoted by the parameter d′. This is calculated as follows: 
d′ = z(H) – z(FA)     (1) 
where z(H) is the normalised hit rate (the proportion of old items correctly recognised 
as ‘old’) and z(FA) is the normalised false alarm rate (the proportion of new items 
incorrectly recognised as ‘old’). Increasingly positive d′ values therefore denote a 
greater separation between the overall levels of memory strength evoked for old and 
new items respectively, leading to greater sensitivity in discriminating between them. 
Bearing out this association with memory strength, prior recognition research has 
demonstrated that d′ is largely determined by aspects of encoding. For instance, 
improved sensitivity has been linked to the inherent memorability characteristics of 
presented stimuli, such as low frequency (Glanzer & Adams, 1985), high 
concreteness (Groninger, 1976), high imageability (Moeser, 1974) and high 
orthographic distinctiveness (Zechmeister, 1972). Decreasing the number of stimuli 
in the study list to effectuate easier encoding episodes has also been shown to 
improve d′ (Ohrt & Gronlund, 1999). Sensitivity also tracks the levels-of-processing 
achieved by participants at encoding (LOP; Craik & Lockhart, 1972), as illustrated by 
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the increase in d′ when study items are processed under ‘deep’ relative to ‘shallow’ 
LOP conditions (Lockhart, Craik & Jacoby, 1976; Maddox & Estes, 1997). The 
evidenced adjustment of d′ following various encoding manipulations supports a role 
for this parameter in indexing the levels of memory strength available at test. 
Referring back to the retrieval control/decision control dichotomy emerging from the 
previously summarised memory control models, factors contributing to the 
assessment of memory strength and the exertion of ‘retrieval control’ over this 
assessment have been shown to be relatively impervious to test environment 
manipulations of cognitive control (Nilsson, 1987). Rather it is in the strategic 
regulation of how the available memory evidence is used in the service of decision 
control that the test environment most tangibly impacts on behaviour (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). Hence, the link between d′ and memory strength processes render 
it unlikely as an index of the decision control processes of primary interest to my PhD 
aims1. 
However, SDT operationalises a second parameter that is more closely linked with 
aspects of decision control – response criterion or c. Criterion acts as a threshold for 
the amount of memory strength demanded to diagnose an ‘old’ decision, and is 
calculated as follows: 
                                            
1
 It is worthwhile mentioning the treatment of old item variance (σ) in different versions of the SDT 
model. In the simplest version (the equal variance SDT model; Green & Swets, 1966), the variance of 
old and new item distributions is assumed equal. Subsequent models have modified this assumption 
so as to provide better fits to recognition data that includes ratings of subjective confidence 
(Yonelinas, Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal & King, 1996). The ‘unequal variance’ SDT model fixes the 
new item variance at 1 and estimates the variance of the old item distribution as a freely varying 
parameter (Stretch & Wixted, 1998b). Conversely, the dual process SDT model maintains the equal 
variance assumption and instead includes an additional estimated parameter R, which reflects the 
proportion of old items identified with high confidence on the assumed basis of recollection (Yonelinas 
et al., 1996). The differential treatment of old item variance in these two models lies at the centre of 
the single vs. dual process debate on the nature of retrieval output. As has been highlighted 
previously, this debate does not bear centrally on the investigation of decision control processes that 
are the primary focus of my PhD. Hence, to more adequately address this focus, the ensuing 
experimental chapters will primarily focus on the simplest equal variance SDT model, and focus on 




c = -0.5 * [z(H) + z(FA)]    (2) 
 
When criterion is placed at the intersection of the old and new item distributions, 
memory evaluation is considered to be statistically ‘optimal’ and unbiased by the 
influence of higher-order strategies. Strategies are herein defined as any source of 
information beyond the assessed strength of the available memory evidence that 
actively contributes to decision outcomes. The adoption of strategies is reflected by 
criterion shifts away from optimal placement, such that positive shifts indicate a 
reduced likelihood of responding ‘old’ (commonly referred to as a ‘conservative’ 
response strategy) and negative shifts indicate an increased likelihood of responding 
‘old’ (a ‘liberal’ response strategy; see Figure 1.3.). Hence, memory evaluations 
under the SDT model are assumed to emerge from the interaction of memory 
strength and strategic processes, as reflected in estimates of d′ sensitivity and 
criterion bias respectively. 
Early recognition research conducted under the SDT model treated criterion as a 
nuisance variable relative to memory strength processes of primary interest (e.g. 
Peterson, Birdsall & Fox, 1954; Blackwell, 1963). However, subsequent research 
has highlighted the functional significance of this parameter in indexing various 
higher-order strategies that contribute significantly to decision outcomes. For 
instance, Hirshman (1995) found that subjects adjusted their criterion at test in 
accordance with the inferred strength of encoding achieved in the prior study phase. 
The experiment involved two study-test recognition phases: one in which greater 
time was afforded to encode items (encouraging the perception of ‘strong’ encoding) 
and one in which lesser encoding time was afforded (encouraging the perception of 
‘weak’ encoding). Criterion placement at test was more liberal following the 
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perceived weak compared to the perceived strong encoding phase, reflecting a 
strategic enhancement of the tendency to respond ‘old’ to counteract the inferred 
weakness of the preceding encoding phase. Criterion adjustment has also been 
linked with inferential strategies emerging solely in the test phase, such as those 
instilled by manipulations of the base rate proportion of old to new items in the test 
list. For example, Ratcliff, Sheu and Grondlund (1992) varied the base rate to affect 
a selective overabundance of old items or new items in separate recognition test 
phases, and observed shifts in criterion that reflected efforts to make the 
overabundant response more often. Adjustments in criterion can therefore serve as a 






Figure 1.3. Schematic depiction of the signal detection model of retrieval output, with new 
and old item normal distributions overlaid on an underlying continuum of memory strength. d′ 
= discrimination sensitivity, as indexed by the distance between the two item distributions. 
copt = optimal i.e. unbiased criterion placement at the intersection of the two item 
distributions; -clib = negative i.e. liberal criterion placement, increasing the likelihood of 
responding ‘old’; +ccon = positive i.e. conservative criterion placement, reducing the likelihood 





Other studies that have failed to elicit strategic criterion shifts serve to emphasise the 
important mediating influence of participants’ willingness to adopt higher-order 
strategies in their memory evaluations. This willingness depends on the precise 
nature of the manipulations enacted, in terms of the perceived effort required in 
attending to them as higher-order sources of information and the perceived utility in 
doing so to improve recognition performance. For instance, follow-up studies to 
Hirshman’s (1995) encoding strength effect have found that intermixing the strength 
manipulations within the same test block (as opposed to Hirshman’s blockwise 
manipulation) fails to induce shifts in response criterion, even when differentially 
strengthened items are explicitly cued by different presentation colours at test (e.g. 
red presentation colour suggests strongly encoded test items, and green 
presentation colour denotes weakly encoded test items; Stretch & Wixted, 1998a; 
Morell, Gaitan & Wixted, 2002). This null effect is partially attributable to the high 
cognitive effort required to attend to perceived strength as a source of strategic 
information on a trial-by-trial as opposed to a blockwise basis.  
Equivocal effects of base rate manipulations on criterion placement have also been 
linked to differences in how aware subjects are made to these manipulations. For 
instance, base rate manipulations act to shift criterion only when the actual 
proportion of old to new items is explicitly provided to participants (Ratcliff et al., 
1992), with vague mention of the manipulation that lacks explication of the precise 
proportions found to be ineffective (Herron, Quayle & Rugg, 2003). Estes and 
Maddox (1995) highlighted performance feedback as another means of heightening 
strategic awareness, by observing criterion shifts in response to base rate 
manipulations only in the presence of trial-by-trial feedback. Similar criterion shifts 
have been evidenced following feedback that bears no relation to actual 
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performance (i.e. false feedback; Han & Dobbins, 2009). Both the mediating effects 
of the inferred effort and utility in strategically shifting response criterion are 
accommodated by the metacognitive aspects of the previous memory control models 
(e.g. Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). Specifically, if subjects perceive the use of higher-
order strategies as difficult or extraneous to the overarching goal of making quick 
and accurate memory decisions, then they will revert to the assessed memory 
strength as the sole source of diagnostic evidence. 
Indeed, participants are more willing to adopt higher-order strategies if these are 
more explicitly suggested by aspects of the test environment and therefore require 
less of an inferential process when being integrated into memory evaluation. Re-
examining Stretch and Wixted’s (1998a) inability to shift criterion despite providing 
coloured cues at test, it should be apparent that a high degree of inference was 
required to utilise these cues effectively, given that they in of themselves only 
probabilistically suggest the strength of encoding for the old items presented in that 
colour, and therefore have to be further translated into a usable likelihood of 
encountering old or new items to guide performance. Subsequent research has 
shown that cues which more directly denote the likely old/new status of presented 
test items can lead to reliable criterion shifts even on a trial-by-trial basis and in the 
absence of feedback.  
For example, Rhodes and Jacoby (2007) provided old/new likelihood information in 
the form of probabilistic associations between presentation location and old/new 
status. Participants were informed that test items appearing on the left side of the 
screen had a 67% chance of being old, whereas those appearing on the right side of 
the screen had a 67% chance of being new. These explicit cues set up expectations 
of encountering old and new items on the left and right sides of the screen 
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respectively, which were reflected in opposing criterion shifts for each presentation 
location condition that acted to maximise endorsement of the expected response (i.e. 
negative criterion placement to maximise ‘old’ responding for words presented on the 
left and a positive criterion to maximise ‘new’ responding for words presented on the 
right). The explicit cueing of old/new status has been shown to shift criterion across a 
number of cue types, such as presentation colour (e.g. ‘red words are likely old’; 
Aminoff et al., 2012), affiliation to particular semantic categories (e.g. ‘insect-related 
words are likely old’; Benjamin & Bawa, 2004) and anticipatory text cues (e.g. ‘likely 
old’ presented prior to the appearance of test items; O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 
2010; Jaeger, Cox & Dobbins, 2012).These latter findings highlight a link between 
criterion placement and cued expectation - the first key environmental influence on 
memory evaluation highlighted in the opening section. Indeed, the summarised 
laboratory effects of explicit cueing manipulations on criterion hint at a mechanistic 
explanation for behaviour in the real-world bus scenario presented earlier, in which 
environmentally cued expectations were used strategically to guide memory 
evaluation outcomes.  
A link between criterion placement and the second key environmental influence – 
variations in goal and reward-related information – is suggested by studies that 
provided monetary incentives based on aspects of recognition performance. 
However, incentives in recognition research have thus far been primarily employed 
to affect extreme criterion via asymmetric payoffs, such that selectively incentivising 
correct ‘old’ or correct ‘new’ decisions leads to extreme criterion biases that 
maximise endorsements of the incentivised response. These extreme biases have 
been instilled primarily to adjudicate between the predictions of differing retrieval 
output models (Healy & Kubovy, 1978; van Zandt, 2000), and their wider relevance 
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in clarifying the influence of testing environments on real-world memory evaluation 
has been overlooked. Further, whilst memory evaluation scenarios involving such 
extreme reward contingencies sometimes present in the real world, it is more 
common to confront subtler forms of goal and reward-related information, such as 
the goal-driven caution highlighted in the eyewitness real-world scenario (Section 
1.1.; see Figure 1.2.). To revisit the scenario, the greater consequences associated 
with making incorrect memory decisions in the eyewitness compared to the 
supermarket recognition scenarios led to greater caution when making an ‘old’ 
decision in the former setting. Whether this heightened caution is reflected in 
strategic adjustments to criterion placement is an important empirical question for my 
PhD research. 
A related question is whether similar goal-driven mechanisms operate in the 
absence of explicit mention of reward in the test environment. The tendency for 
participants to infer goals from aspects of the test environment has been alluded to 
by both the source monitoring (Johnson et al., 1993) and metacognitive (Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996) memory control frameworks. Indeed, subtle variations of test 
format have been demonstrated to introduce pronounced effects on memory 
evaluation. As mentioned previously, Lindsay and Johnson (1989) found that framing 
memory evaluation as a source monitoring task led to more accurate performance 
than a standard old/new recognition task format. Further, Koriat and Goldsmith 
(1996) demonstrated marked differences in performance between free and forced 
report recognition test formats. Hicks and Marsh (1999) explicitly linked test format 
influences with the adoption of strategic biases, reporting an increase in the 
tendency to respond ‘old’ in a recognition test phase comprising three response 
options with two ‘old’ subcategories (‘remember old’/‘know old’/‘new’), compared to a 
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more standard test phase with two equally weighted response options (‘old’/’new’, 
followed by “remember”/“know”). The pattern of findings suggests that test format 
can bear pronounced influences on memory evaluation, and might be underpinned 
by the differential recruitment of higher-order strategies. A limitation of the above 
studies is the reliance on raw proportion measures that conflate sensitivity and 
criterion bias (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). Hence, whether such subtle test format 
influences are reflected in SDT criterion placement served as another important 
avenue for my PhD research. 
The behavioural findings presented thus far favour a functional role for SDT criterion 
in indexing the influence of higher-order strategies over memory evaluation. 
However, the influence of environmental factors in driving the adaptive need to 
invoke these higher-order strategies in the service of memory control has been less 
clearly demonstrated. Doing so necessitates greater integration with the cognitive 
control literature summarised previously (see Section 1.2.), and how control is 
engaged under expectation-induced response conflict and variations in goal state. In 
both cases, memory control is putatively heightened when endorsing the decision 
outcome that runs contrary to the instilled strategic bias. For biases associated with 
cued expectations, memory control is heightened when expectations conflict with 
available memory evidence, requiring the controlled countermanding of these 
expectations via access to confirmatory memory analyses or other environmental 
sources of strategic information. For biases instilled by goal and reward-related 
information, memory control is heightened when making the decision associated with 
greater rewards and punishment (i.e. the decision associated with greater ‘goal 
emphasis’). In comparison, when the decision suggested by a strategic bias is 
47 
 
matched by the available evidence, this putatively expedites the process of making 
an accurate memory decisions. 
To summarise, the proposed interplay between cognitive systems respectively 
underpinning the assessment of retrieved memory strength and the instilment of 
environmental strategic biases is likely a crucial regulator of memory control. It was a 
primary aim of my PhD to substantiate the dynamic interplay between these two 
systems, and elucidate the role of response criterion as a behavioural index of their 
interaction. Whilst strategic adjustments in criterion under expectation-induced 
conflict have been previously documented, criterion adjustment in response to 
environmentally emphasised goals has received less empirical scrutiny. Another of 
my PhD objectives was therefore to provide behavioural evidence of this newly 
proposed link between criterion and goal emphasis, and how this role is 
accommodated with its established relationship with cued expectation.  
It is also worthwhile highlighting that despite the primary focus on response criterion 
as the behavioural correlate of memory control, a more cohesive understanding of 
the underlying control mechanisms required complimentary analyses of a number of 
different measures, such as reaction time, response confidence and measures 
collapsing across subjective decision rather than objective item categories (Duncan, 
Sadanand & Davachi, 2013; see Section 2.2.1.4. for further details on these 
measures). This insight at the behavioural level was further complimented by 
functional neuroimaging investigation of the neural substrates underpinning various 
aspects of memory control. The ensuing section reviews relevant functional 




1.5. Functional neuroimaging correlates of memory control 
Early functional neuroimaging studies of recognition memory, like their behavioural 
counterparts, also focused primarily on memory strength processes. One early 
finding that has garnered particular research interest is the observed increase in 
brain activation for correct ‘old’ decisions (hits) compared to correct ‘new’ decisions 
(correct rejections; CRs). Evidence for this “retrieval success” effect first came from 
ERP studies reporting scalp voltage fluctuations that distinguished hits from CRs 
(Sanquist, Rohrbaugh, Syndulko & Lindsley, 1980; Warren, 1980). Subsequent 
research has separated this late positivity into two topographically distinct sub-
components: an early frontal-parietal negativity peaking around ~300-500 Ms post-
item onset (the N400) and a late left parietal positivity emergent ~400-800 Ms post-
item onset, extending into an ensuing slow-wave component (the P600 or ‘late 
positive component’; Rugg & Curran, 2007). A functional differentiation for these 
early and late sub-components has also been proposed, as respective neural 
markers of familiarity and recollection in accordance with the dual process model of 
retrieval output. This is supported by the observed selective engagement of each 
ERP component to the presence of either familiarity or recollection in self-rated 
assessments of these two processes (Duzel, Yonelinas, Mangun, Heinze & Tulving, 
1997; Woodruff, Hayama & Rugg, 2006).  
Rugg and colleagues (Rugg, Mark, Schloerscheidt, Birch & Allan, 1998) dissociated 
these two processes on more objective grounds, by varying the encoding task 
between deep and shallow levels-of-processing to affect strong and weak overall 
levels of memory strength at test. ERP analyses at the test phase recovered an 
N400-like component sensitive to the shallow hit > shallow Miss (i.e. an old item 
incorrectly deemed ‘new’) contrast, which was considered a marker of the use of 
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familiarity to make correct ‘old’ decisions under memory strength conditions 
unconducive to the use of recollection. A P600-lke component was recovered for the 
deep Hit > shallow Hit contrast, which was interpreted as reflecting the successful 
use of recollection under conducive high levels of memory strength.  
The retrieval success contrast has also been widely interrogated in fMRI research, 
which has yielded an increase in BOLD activation in a fairly replicable network of 
brain regions (see Figure 1.4a for a typical fMRI retrieval success activation map, 
taken from O’Connor et al., 2010). This network includes prefrontal regions, such as 
dorsolateral PFC, medial PFC, regions of the cingulate cortex, including anterior and 
rostral cingulate cortices, as well as parietal regions, including the inferior and 
superior parietal lobules (de Zubicaray, McMahon, Eastburn, Finnigan & Humphreys, 
2005; Kim, 2013; Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson & Buckner, 2000; Spaniol et al., 
2009). Recent research has also observed retrieval success effects in increasing 
pupil size (Goldinger & Papesh, 2011; Vo et al., 2008), which is considered a reliable 
physiological index of autonomic nervous system activity implicated in cognitive 
processing (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Nieuwenhuis, Geus & Aston-Jones, 2011). 
Hence, findings from a number of imaging modalities suggest that the correct 
identification of ‘old’ items is associated with an elevated neural response. 
However, whether this neural response is exclusively driven by processes involved 
in successfully retrieving memory content is unclear. Rather, it has recently been 
conjectured that unconstrained memory control processes might also contribute to 
the retrieval success response. The potential involvement of memory control is 
illustrated by reconsidering Rugg et al.’s (1998) ERP results. The N400 ‘familiarity’ 
effect was predicated on the shallow Hit > shallow Miss contrast, which essentially 
isolates activity underlying the correct identification of old items in conditions of weak 
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and non-diagnostic memory strength. Correct performance under this condition 
might therefore also result from higher-order strategies recruited in light of the 
uncertain memory strength conditions (the behavioural correlates of which have 
been outlined in previous sections e.g. Hirshman, 1995; Reder & Wible, 1984). This 
provides an alternative interpretation of the early mid-frontal ERP as reflecting the 
engagement of memory control under conflict, rather than the successful use of 
familiarity. A control reinterpretation can also be applied to Rugg et al.’s P600 
‘recollection’ effect predicated on the deep Hit > shallow Hit contrast. Rather than 
exclusively reflecting the successful use of recollection, the observed activation 
increase might also be reward-related, in signalling the higher goal salience typically 
imparted to the detection of old over new items by aspects of the test format (Neville, 
Kutas, Chesney & Schmidt, 1986). This alternative interpretation suggests the 
engagement of control under variations in environmentally emphasised goals. 
In further support of these control reinterpretations, the neural correlates of retrieval 
success overlap considerably with those associated with wider aspects of control in 
the dedicated cognitive control literature, as highlighted by the similarity of the left 
parietal ERP reported by Rugg et al. to the late positive component of the P3 
complex (associated with the general allocation of control; Polich, 2007), and the 
recurrent report of similar fMRI regions in non-episodic control tasks (Botvinick, 
2007; Kouneiher et al., 2009; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). A related issue is the regular 
absence of medial temporal lobe (MTL) activations in the fMRI retrieval success 
effect (Kim, 2013), despite the established linkage between these regions and 
episodic retrieval in both animal neurophysiological (e.g. Wood, Dudchenko & 
Eichenbaum, 1999) and human neuropsychological studies (e.g. Corkin, 2002). 
These re-interpretations should not suggest that retrieval output processes are not 
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prominent contributors to the retrieval success effect, but rather that a ‘process pure’ 
interpretation of the effect as solely driven by retrieval output is an oversimplification. 
Rather, it is suggested that the effect also involves the contributions of empirically 
unconstrained memory control processes of the kind recurrently highlighted during 
this chapter. 
Recent attempts at elucidating the precise underpinnings of the retrieval success 
effect have identified three likely constituents:  processes involved in the output and 
maintenance of retrieval (i.e. those implied by the original retrieval success 
interpretation), control processes that contribute to effortful aspects of retrieval, and 
strategic control processes that constrain eventual decision outcomes (Cabeza, 
Ciaramelli, Olson & Moscovitch, 2008; Kim, 2013; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn & 
Buckner, 2005). These constituents are equivalent to the memory strength, retrieval 
control and decision control processes outlined previously, and hence clarifying their 
respective neural correlates is an important aim for research into memory evaluation. 
To this end, the operationalization of retrieval control in the functional neuroimaging 
literature raises clear parallels with the source monitoring framework (Johnson et al., 
1993; Jacoby et al., 1999), in capturing the effortful, goal-directed modulation of the 
act of retrieval itself (Buckner, 2003). Control processes are therefore potentially a 
salient contributor to the retrieval success effect, in mediating the effortful attempt to 
recover recollective content, which may or may not ultimately lead to success in 
doing so.  
In support of this view, fMRI studies that have manipulated the need for effortful 
source monitoring, either by instantiating encoding tasks that lead to weak memory 
strength (Wheeler & Buckner, 2003) or demanding increased contextual details to 
diagnose memory decisions (Ranganath, Johnson & D’Esposito, 2000), have 
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observed activation increases in prefrontal and parietal retrieval regions irrespective 
of accuracy. Dobbins and colleagues (Dobbins, Foley, Schacter & Wagner, 2002) 
emphasised the distinction between source monitoring and retrieval success 
interpretations, by explicitly showing that regions previously associated with retrieval 
success were in fact sensitive to source monitoring manipulations i.e. showing 
increased activation for source memory > item recognition tasks, that crucially was 
insensitive to decision accuracy. More recent fMRI studies employing functional 
connectivity methods have highlighted the increased coupling between frontal and 
medial temporal lobe regions as a neural substrate of source monitoring (Barredo, 
Oztekin & Badre, 2013). This connectivity dynamic can be interpreted as prefrontal 
regions enforcing a ‘top-down’ bias on the memory strength processing mediated by 
the MTL, raising clear parallels with neural mechanisms highlighted in the dedicated 
cognitive control literature (e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001). Overall, functional 
neuroimaging investigations of source monitoring have highlighted the prominent 
influence of effortful retrieval control processes in driving brain activation during 
memory evaluation. 
Compared to the above retrieval control processes, functional neuroimaging 
investigations of decision control have suffered from a similar neglect as highlighted 
in the previous summary of behavioural research (see Section 1.4.). However, recent 
years have witnessed a burgeoning of interest, motivated by reports of the sensitivity 
of retrieval success activations to higher-order strategic processes. For instance, 
Finnigan and colleagues (Finnigan, Humphreys, Dennis & Geffen, 2002) uncovered 
a link between ERP retrieval success correlates and general monitoring/control 
processes, by reporting the modulation of the P600 component to both the CRs > 
FAs contrast (i.e. correctly identified new items > incorrectly identified new items) 
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and the more anticipated hits > Misses contrast (i.e. correctly identified old items > 
incorrectly identified old items). Given that the correct identification of new items is 
unlikely to reflect the presence of recollection (as assumed by the retrieval success 
effect; Rugg & Curran, 2007), the elevation of the parietal P600 to CRs instead 
suggests a link with decision factors associated with correct responding irrespective 
of item status. Of these, the sensitivity of the P600 to subjective assessments of 
confidence has been demonstrated, in the form of the increased P600 positivity for 
high compared to low confidence decisions that presented for both hits and CRs (i.e. 
occurred irrespective of old/new item status; Rubin, van Petten, Glisky & Newberg, 
1999). This pattern of findings support the stipulations of memory control models 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996) in demonstrating that metacognitive assessments of 
performance are a prominent contributor to retrieval activations. 
Further, manipulation of the base rate proportion of old and new items has 
highlighted the sensitivity of retrieval success activations to strategic processes that 
overtly impact on decision outcomes (as summarised in Section 1.4.). Herron and 
colleagues (2003) reported a split of the parietal P600 retrieval success ERP into a 
left parietal-located positivity sensitive to retrieval success (i.e. the hits > CRs 
contrast) and a right parietal-located positivity sensitive to the detection of low 
probability items (i.e. low probability > high probability items, collapsed across 
old/new status). This latter component parallels the elevated parietal positivity 
observed in oddball paradigms following detection of low probability stimuli (Polich, 
2007). Indeed, even the left parietal P600 component linked with retrieval success 
was not found to be insensitive to the base rate manipulation, given that the greatest 
P600 amplitude was observed for low probability hits. With reference to the strategic 
processes outlined in the previous section, Herron et al.’s results suggest a neural 
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marker of the engagement of control to overcome the strategic bias towards making 
the high probability response. 
An fMRI recognition study in which base rate was similarly manipulated also showed 
a split amongst retrieval success regions by their sensitivity to the probability 
manipulation (Herron, Henson & Rugg, 2004).  This sensitivity to base rate was most 
prominent in frontal sub-regions, including anterior and dorsolateral PFC, but also 
encompassed parietal sub-regions, such as the superior parietal lobule. These 
observations of the active modulation of neural correlates of memory evaluation by 
decision control processes validate the importance ascribed to these processes in 
this chapter. However, a limitation of the above base rate studies is their apparent 
failure to induce a behavioural effect on response criterion (Herron et al., 2003; 
Herron et al., 2004). Given the robust association between adopted higher-order 
strategies and adjustments to criterion summarised in Section 1.4., these null effects 
call into question the actual efficacy of the base rate manipulation in heightening 
decision control. The null effect on criterion is likely due to the vague information 
about the base rate manipulation given to participants in both studies (i.e. lacking in 
explication of the actual proportions), which prior behavioural research suggests 
would have impaired awareness of base rates as a source of strategic information 
(Estes & Maddox, 1995; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007).  
However, a handful of functional neuroimaging studies have followed the emerging 
trend in behavioural research of employing more explicit strategic manipulations, and 
have thereby enabled more reliable interrogations of memory control processes. For 
instance, O’Connor and colleagues (2010) provided trial-by-trial textual cues of the 
form ‘likely old’ and ‘likely new’ that preceded the appearance of items at a 
recognition test phase. Participants were explicitly told that the cues were 75% valid 
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in predicting the status of upcoming items, and this led to their perception as a 
reliable source of strategic information (as validated behaviourally by an 
improvement in accuracy for valid cue trials). fMRI results revealed  an activation 
increase in a number of regions previously linked with ‘retrieval success’ when 
participants correctly countermanded cues relative to correctly endorsing valid cues 
(i.e. for the contrast invalid > valid; see Figure 1.4b for O’Connor et al.’s fMRI invalid 
cue effect). This ‘invalid cueing’ response manifested for both old and new items, 
thereby challenging the old item specificity implied by retrieval success accounts. 
Rather, the effect is consistent with the recruitment of control to resolve the conflict 
generated by the cued expectation and the item-provoked memory strength analysis. 
This link with control is strengthened by the fact that regions within this invalid cueing 
network, such as medial prefrontal cortex, lateral prefrontal cortex and the inferior 
parietal lobule, are all recurrently activated in non-episodic control tasks (Bunge et 
al., 2002a; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004).  
To further validate their control interpretations, O’Connor et al. also analysed an 
independent fMRI dataset of standard uncued recognition data, and revealed a 
positive correlation between the activity of invalid cueing regions and participants’ 
response criterion (i.e. increasing regional activity for an increased bias against 
responding ‘old’). Countermanding criterion-indexed biases against responding ‘old’ 
is likely to necessitate similar recruitment of control under conflict (as described in 
Section 1.4.), and this is borne out by the activation increase in the invalid cueing 
regions. Subsequent follow-ups have shown that the invalid cueing network is 
amenable to further functional segregation, both based on the precise control 
mechanisms underlying the response (i.e. early conflict detection and late control 
allocation; Mill & Connor, 2014, under review) as well as the items driving the 
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response (i.e. with partially separable activation patterns for the detection of 
unexpected old and unexpected new items; Jaeger, Konkel & Dobbins, 2013). 
Hence, O’Connor et al.’s likelihood cueing paradigm is well-suited to the study of 
memory control mechanisms recruited under environmental conflict. This is one of 
the two key environmental precipitants of memory control highlighted in this chapter 
(see Section 1.1. and 1.2.), and hence the paradigm featured prominently in my PhD 
research. 
The second of these environmental cues to decision control – variation to goal and 
reward-related information – was targeted in an fMRI study by Han and colleagues 
that also questioned retrieval success (Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock & Dobbins, 
2010). The authors were motivated by prior suggestion that a prominent contributor 
to the retrieval success response was the preferential goal salience imparted to the 
detection of old over new items by implicit aspects of the test format (Neville et al., 
1986). To directly interrogate this, a ‘mixed incentives’ procedure was applied in 
separate recognition test phases that served to differentially emphasise the detection 
of hits (hit incentive condition: +1 token for Hit, -1 token for FA) and the detection of 
CRs (CR incentive condition: +1 for CR, -1 for Miss) as the higher-order goals of 
memory evaluation. The strategic influence of the incentive manipulation was 
behaviourally validated by an observed reduction in confidence for decisions that 
conflicted with the available incentives. A non-significant incentive effect on criterion 
was also observed that was nevertheless in a direction reflective of heightened 
caution towards the emphasised decision (e.g. a positive criterion shift in the hit 
incentive condition), as predicted by previously discussed memory control models 
(Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; see Section 1.3.). fMRI analyses of the non-incentivised 
control condition recovered a typical network of regions activated by the ‘retrieval 
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success’ contrast. Subsequent analyses revealed that a number of these regions 
were in fact preferentially sensitive to the incentives manipulations, including caudate 
nucleus, lateral PFC, medial PFC, cingulate cortex and lateral parietal cortex. Of 
these, the caudate nucleus was shown to preferentially track incentive status over 
and above item status, such that its retrieval success effect was reversed in the CR-
incentive condition (i.e. caudate activation in the CR-incentive condition was greater 
for CRs than hits). Further, the presence of performance feedback served to 
enhance the incentive effects, thereby paralleling behavioural findings of enhanced 
strategic processing in the presence of feedback (e.g. Estes & Maddox, 1995).  
The observed involvement of the caudate nucleus is consistent with its role in 
processing goal- and reward-related information highlighted in the dedicated 
cognitive control literature (Delgado et al., 2004; Elliot et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 
2001). Overall, Han et al.’s findings highlight the prominent influence of 
unconstrained environmental sources of goal emphasis in cueing strategies that 
differentially bias the rendering of ‘old’ and ‘new’ decisions. That these strategies are 
reflected in the modulation of brain activations linked with retrieval further illustrates 
the importance of these decision control processes in memory evaluation.  
To summarise, functional neuroimaging research in recognition memory increasingly 
testifies to the importance of retrieval control and decision control processes, which 
interact with core memory strength processes in determining the outcomes of 
memory evaluation. The influence of environmental factors on retrieval activations 
should serve to emphasise the need for tighter experimental control over these 
factors, so as to enable more valid functional inferences of neuroimaging data. 
Attempts at isolating these environmental factors would benefit from greater efforts 
to behaviourally validate the implied strategic influence and verify the underlying 
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neural mechanisms across different imaging techniques and cognitive domains 
beyond episodic recognition memory. To this end, the final section will outline 
another important question that was interrogated during the course of my PhD – are 





Figure 1.4. fMRI activation maps of the two recognition memory tasks effects highlighted in 
the main text (Section 1.5.): a. the retrieval success effect (correct ‘old’ i.e. hits > correct 
‘new’ i.e. correct rejections, CRs) and b. the invalid cueing effect (correct decision after 
invalid cue > correct decision after valid cue). Both maps are rendered using data from 
O’Connor, Han & Dobbins (2010) provided by Akira O’Connor, at a significance threshold of 
p < .001, 5 contiguous voxels. Substantial overlap between the two activation maps is 
evident in left inferior parietal, left prefrontal and bilateral striatal regions.   
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1.6. Cross-domain properties of memory control processes 
An emerging theme from the theoretical and empirical review in this introductory 
chapter is that the control processes that constrain memory might impose similar 
constraints on other cognitive domains. Such speculations on the ‘cross-domain’2 
nature of control have arisen in both the dedicated cognitive control literature 
(Ridderinkhof et al., 2004; Polich, 2007) and the memory control literature (Jacoby et 
al., 1999; Whittlesea, 2002). Findings and theoretical perspectives in other cognitive 
fields also connote similar cross-domain features of processing. One early example 
is the ‘general capacity’ theory of processing load (Kahneman, 1973; Moray, 1967), 
which posits the existence of a centralized cognitive system capable of integrating 
processing across different task domains. This view was predicated on the findings 
of dual-task paradigms in which subjects are required to learn to integrate across two 
tasks performed sequentially (e.g. Task 1: ‘press right index finger when you hear a 
tone’, Task 2: ‘press left index finger when a light is flashed) so as to flexibly process 
their conjunction (e.g. upon simultaneous presentation of the tone and the light, 
subjects learn to press both the left and right index fingers to receive a reward; 
Colavita, 1971; Kahneman, 1973). The ability to integrate processing across different 
tasks to form unified rules and strategies implies that part of the processing system 
has access to both implicated domains (i.e. visual perception and motor response). 
A similar overarching control system is implied by an influential neuroscientific model 
of attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), which proposes that prefrontal and parietal 
regions affiliated with two distinct functional networks environment – the dorsal 
                                            
2
 For the benefit of this chapter and the remainder of this thesis, a distinction should be made here 
between my use of the terms ‘modalities’ and ‘domains’ – both of which have often been used 
interchangeably in previous research. The former pertains to the sensory form in which to-be-
evaluated stimuli are presented (e.g. verbal, pictorial, auditory etc.), whereas the latter pertains to the 
cognitive operations undertaken when attempting to discriminate the status of to-be-evaluated stimuli 
(e.g. episodic memory, semantic memory, visual perception etc.).  
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attention network and the ventral attention network – facilitate orienting to diverse 
forms of motivationally relevant stimuli in the environment. The dorsal attention 
network, which prominently comprises regions of the intraparietal sulcus and dorsal 
prefrontal cortex, is implicated in providing ‘top-down’ biases on the basis of prior 
expectations and current goals that facilitate attending to different perceptual 
features, such as spatial location (Corbetta, Kincade, Olinger, McAvoy & Shulman, 
2000) and object shape (Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999). These same fronto-parietal 
regions are also implicated in maintaining ‘top-down’ expectations in non-visual 
domains, such as in auditory and tactile discrimination (Downar, Crawley, Mikulis & 
Davis, 2000) and motor response tasks (Kawashima, Roland & O’Sullivan, 1995).  
The capacity for this dorsal fronto-parietal network to allocate attentional resources 
across different visual modalities, as well as across perceptual and motor domains, 
renders it as a promising neural substrate for cross-domain processing. Indeed, this 
network has also been suggested to mediate attentional demands in episodic 
memory tasks, by imposing ‘top-down’ strategic biases on memory strength 
processes (Cabeza et al., 2008). Whilst these models nominally focus on the effect 
of environmental factors on attention, it is likely that these factors impact similarly on 
cognitive control, given that attention is often considered a constituent of control 
(Banich et al., 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001). Indeed, activation in both the dorsal 
attention network and the ventral attention network has been observed to underlie a 
‘reorienting’ response subsequent to violations of prior expectations (Corbetta, Patel 
& Shulman, 2008), which was previously highlighted as a  key precipitator of 
cognitive control (see Section 1.2.). Empirical evidence of a cross-domain control 
system remains largely speculative, however the sparse behavioural and functional 
neuroimaging research presently available is summarised below.  
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Tentative behavioural support for cross-domain control comes from reports of 
common manipulations impacting similarly on measures of performance across 
different task domains. For instance, the degree to which individuals’ confidence 
ratings correlate with their actual decision accuracy has been shown to be reliable 
across two different visual detection tasks (orientation discrimination and contrast 
discrimination; Song et al., 2011). This finding is consistent with the underlying 
engagement of a ‘metacognitive’ system (that conceptually overlaps with Koriat & 
Goldsmith’s, 1996, memory control model described in Section 1.3.) capable of 
performing an overarching monitoring/control role, albeit confined in this 
demonstration to two tasks that differed in modalities within the same visual cognitive 
domain. With regard to measures more directly determinative of decision outcomes, 
environmentally-cued expectations have been found to reliably increase accuracy 
and reduce reaction time across perceptual (Posner, Snyder & Davidson, 1980), 
motor (Abrams & Jonides, 1988) and episodic memory tasks (O’Connor et al., 2010). 
Conversely, instances where expectations conflict with available item evidence have 
been shown to reliably increase reaction time and reduce accuracy across cognitive 
domains (O’Connor et al., 2010; Posner et al., 1980), supporting the role of these 
raw performance measures as behavioural correlates of cross-domain control 
processes. 
In a recent study involving more refined behavioural measures, White and Poldrack 
(2014) probed the cross-domain correspondence of two response bias parameters 
estimated from  the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978). The diffusion model 
differentiates between biases that impact directly on how stimuli are processed 
(termed ‘stimulus bias’) and those that impact on the eventual responses made 
(termed ‘response bias’), with each form of bias indexed by a separate model 
63 
 
parameter. This differentiation parallels the retrieval control/decision control 
dichotomy outlined previously in this chapter (see Section 1.3.). The authors 
instantiated independent manipulations of these forms of bias in a perceptual task 
(involving ‘bigger’/‘smaller’ judgements of line length stimuli relative to a presented 
exemplar) and a standard recognition task (involving ‘old’/‘new’ decisions in a 
standard recognition format). Stimulus bias was manipulated by instructing 
participants to demand differing levels of diagnostic evidence when making decisions 
in the respective tasks. Response bias was manipulated by varying the base rate 
proportion of respective items in each task (which reliably affects strategic bias, as 
illustrated previously). The results revealed striking influences of these manipulations 
in affected concordant shifts in both stimulus bias and response bias estimates 
across both task domains. White and Poldrack’s findings therefore provide direct 
behavioural evidence in support of a unified control system that mediates the use of 
similar higher-order strategies across different task domains. 
Further support for this cross-domain system is provided by functional neuroimaging 
studies. This is in largely speculative form in the ERP control literature, with the 
N2b/N2c complex associated with response conflict (Kok, 2001; Ridderinkhof et al., 
2004) and the P3a/P3b/late positive complex signalling expectancy violations 
(Polich, 2007; Squires, Wickens, Squires & Donchin, 1976) both suggested to have 
cross-domain properties that have remained largely empirically unsubstantiated. 
fMRI research has affected more direct interrogations, with recent functional 
connectivity findings suggesting that regions affiliated with a large-scale fronto-
parietal control network dynamically interact with other domain/modality-specific 
functional networks to facilitate the upregulation of control across a number of task 
domains (Cole et al., 2013). A more anatomically derived proposal is that of the 
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hierarchical organisation of prefrontal cortex (Badre & D’Esposito, 2009), with caudal 
regions participating in domain/modality-specific processes and rostral regions 
involved in abstracted, integrative functions linked with control. A similar hierarchical 
functional organisation was suggested to underlie episodic memory processing 
(Buckner, 2003), with caudal frontal regions involved in the retrieval of modality-
specific information and rostral frontal regions involved in  control exerted over this 
retrieved information.  
Fleck and colleagues (Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins & Cabeza, 2006) directly 
interrogated the cross-domain properties of prefrontal and parietal regions 
recurrently linked with aspects of memory control. Participants performed 
discrimination tasks in two different domains – perceptual (decide which of ‘upper’ 
and ‘lower’ coloured segments covered a larger onscreen area) and episodic 
(standard ‘old/new’ recognition) – and provided ratings of subjective confidence. 
Brain regions in which activation increased for low compared to high confidence 
decisions were assumed to underpin the engagement of control under uncertainty. 
Conjunction analyses revealed regions that were commonly engaged by the low > 
high confidence contrast across both task domains, which included regions of the 
cingulate cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and superior parietal lobule. Fleck et 
al.’s findings therefore provide clear evidence of the cross-domain properties of 
memory control regions, challenging prior suggestion of their specificity to the 
episodic domain (Henson, Rugg, Shallice & Dolan, 2000). 
Overall, the findings summarised above provide incipient behavioural and functional 
neuroimaging evidence for the existence of a cross-domain control system. Further 
elucidation of these control processes would benefit from greater attempts to subject 
the same sample of participants to common control manipulations enacted in 
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different task domains (as effectuated by White & Poldrack, 2014, and Fleck and 
colleagues, 2006). Behavioural work to this effect was conducted in the ensuing 
experimental chapters, by following up White and Poldrack’s demonstration of the 
cross-domain correspondence of expectation-induced bias with examination of the 
cross-domain correspondence of goal- and reward-related biases. The need for 
more explicit manipulations of cross-domain control is especially important in the aim 
of elucidating the underlying neural correlates. This would prevent an over-reliance 
on confidence as an inferred index of decision control (as in Fleck et al., 2006), 
which is potentially problematic given the ambiguous nature of the measure e.g. 
heightened activation in low confidence trials might reflect participants’ overall lack of 
motivation to engage in the task, or reflect the amalgamated recruitment of likely 
functionally distinct retrieval and decision control processes. A related aim is to 
utilise multi-modal imaging methods to probe the coherence between markers of 
cross-domain control evoked in the ERP and fMRI literatures. An improved 
understand of such cross-domain features would likely yield insight into the flexible 
and abstractive cognitive functions that are most intimately tied to our conscious 
experience.   
 
1.7. Conclusion 
The literature review provided in this introductory chapter should serve to highlight 
the conceptual and empirical motivations for my research into memory control. The 
first section described real-world scenarios in which memory evaluation is overtly 
influenced by specific aspects of the test environment, namely cued expectations 
and emphasised goals. With reference to the dedicated cognitive control literature, 
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these two environmental influences were characterised as provoking the 
engagement of control under expectation-induced response conflict and variations in 
higher-order decision goals respectively. The putative electrophysiological and 
hemodynamic neural correlates of these control processes were then sourced to the 
co-ordinated activity of prefrontal, parietal and sub-cortical brain regions. This was 
followed by a description of extant episodic memory models, in which more precise 
mechanisms by which cognitive control impacts on mnemonic processing were 
outlined. One key feature emerging from this section was the proposed dichotomy 
between control processes that act on retrieval itself (‘retrieval control’) or on the 
output of retrieval (‘decision control’), with the latter process comparatively neglected 
in the field despite it being more amenable to the influence of environmental factors. 
Nascent attempts at elucidating the behavioural correlates of these memory control 
processes were then summarised, with particular emphasis placed on 
environmentally cued biases that affect the criterion parameter of the SDT model of 
retrieval output. The role of the interplay between these strategic biases and 
available memory strength in regulating levels of memory control was also 
highlighted. Functional neuroimaging investigations of episodic memory also 
increasingly bear out the importance of factoring in memory control processes, as 
evidenced by the progressive refinement of activation patterns originally linked with 
the success of retrieval output to accommodate their modulation by both retrieval 
control and decision control processes. The final section formalised an emergent 
question as to whether the highlighted memory control processes were indeed 




The primary avenues of investigation that emerged from this review and that were 
empirically interrogation during my PhD are as follows.  Firstly, the literature and the 
depicted real-world scenarios highlight the need to more fully elucidate aspects of 
the test environment capable of influencing participants’ strategic biases and 
relatedly provoking the need for memory control. Secondly, the potential cross-
domain properties of these environmental influences and their precipitant control 
mechanisms warrant systematic investigation. Finally, the utilisation of both 
behavioural and functional neuroimaging methods would aid in conclusively isolating 
these memory control processes. These avenues were pursued in the ensuing 
experimental chapters. Chapter 2 presents behavioural evidence for a novel aspect 
of the test environment capable of engaging memory control via variation in goal 
emphasis – the wording of the test question. Chapter 3 interrogates the cross-
domain properties of the observed question emphasis effect, in a paradigm involving 
episodic and non-episodic forms of evaluation. Chapter 4 probes the interaction of 
the two highlighted decision control mechanisms, in a paradigm involving more 
explicit manipulation of both goal emphasis (via mixed incentives) and textually cued 
expectations, and examines their persistence across episodic and semantic 
processing domains. Chapter 5 details a multi-modal neuroimaging study involving 
simultaneous EEG-fMRI which sought a comprehensive insight into the neural 
correlates of decision control recruited under response conflict in episodic and 
semantic domains. Chapter 6 directly scrutinised the adaptive basis of these 
decision control mechanisms, by assessing the effects of expectation-induced 
memory conflict on autonomic nervous system activity measured by pupillometry. 
The experimental chapters collectively evidence an attempt to elucidate the precise 
behavioural and functional neuroimaging correlates of memory control. The  
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observed findings serve to align the laboratory study of memory evaluation more 




Chapter 2: Question format as an implicit source of goal emphasis 
in recognition memory 
 
2.1. General Introduction 
The preceding review chapter highlighted the capacity for the test environment to 
encourage the use of higher-order strategies in memory evaluation. However, 
precisely which aspects of the test environment are capable of provoking such 
strategic influences is in need of further clarification. This arises as laboratory 
investigations of environmentally-provoked strategies have thus far primarily focused 
on one manipulation – decision cueing. Cueing the likely old/new status of an 
upcoming test item has been found to instil a strategic bias towards making the cued 
response (Aminoff et al., 2012; O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 
2007; see Section 1.4 for further detail on this effect). This bias has been shown to 
be behaviourally indexed by signal detection criterion estimates (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005). For example, being cued that the status of an upcoming test item 
is likely to be old leads to a negative shift in criterion, reflecting the lower level of 
memory strength required for an “old” decision (e.g. Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). The 
observed confirmatory bias therefore bears out the influence of environmentally cued 
expectations on the strategies adopted in memory evaluation highlighted in the 
previous chapter. However, the exclusive research focus on cueing manipulations 
has led to a neglect of other environmental factors capable of influencing evaluative 
strategies. The aim of this chapter was to systematically interrogate one such 
neglected factor, pertaining to how aspects of the environment serve to emphasise 
the goals and reward associated with particular decision outcomes. The findings 
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have contributed to a published article in a peer-review journal (Mill & O’Connor, 
2014; see Appendix A for the full manuscript).  
Variation in environmental “goal emphasis” information can have pronounced effects 
on the outcomes of memory evaluation, as demonstrated in the real-world scenario 
presented in the previous chapter involving recognition decisions in eyewitness test 
and supermarket environments (see Section 1.1.; see Figure 1.2.).  The greater 
consequences of making incorrect “old” decisions in the eyewitness compared to the 
supermarket environment led to a hypothesised reduction in the likelihood of 
responding “old”, consistent with the use of a more cautious evaluative strategy 
under heightened goal emphasis. Despite this real-world significance, the laboratory 
study of goal and reward-related influences on memory evaluation have thus far 
been confined to extreme manipulations of payoff incentives. For example, 
rewarding correct “old” decisions (i.e. hits) in the absence of any other payoff 
contingencies serves to increase the likelihood of responding “old” (Healy & Kubovy, 
1978; van Zandt, 2000). This confirmatory bias is in an identical direction to that 
observed following the above cueing manipulations and hence may reflect the 
adoption of the same underlying strategy. Neither manipulation is likely to provide a 
laboratory analogue of the goal-driven caution evidenced in the eyewitness scenario, 
which putatively yields a strategic bias in a converse disconfirmatory direction, 
reflecting a reduced likelihood of endorsing the decision category emphasised as a 
higher-order goal. 
In search of this laboratory analogue, prior work in the dedicated cognitive control 
literature suggests that mixed incentives might elicit similar disconfirmatory 
strategies in non-episodic forms of decision-making. Unlike the extreme reward-only 
payoffs provided in the incentivised recognition studies mentioned above (e.g. Healy 
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& Kubovy, 1978), mixed incentives involve the provision of both reward for correct 
performance and punishment for incorrect performance for one of two available 
decision options. These payoff contingencies are commonly applied in go/no-go 
tasks, which require the commission of button-press responses (i.e. “go” responses) 
to one class of stimuli and inhibition of button-press responses (i.e. “no-go” 
responses) to another class of stimuli (Brutkowski, 1964). The selective provision of 
mixed incentives for “go” responses (i.e. +1 incentive for correct “go” and -1 incentive 
for incorrect “go” responses, with no incentives associated with “no-go” responses 
irrespective of correctness) motivates a bias against making the “go” response 
(Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985; Hartung, Milich, Lynam & Martin, 2002). The 
disconfirmatory direction of this bias is consistent with the instilment of strategic 
caution towards making the “go” decision associated with a higher propensity for 
reward and punishment. Hence, mixed incentive manipulations serve to heighten 
goal emphasis in non-episodic forms of decision-making, raising the possibility of 
exerting similar influences on episodic decision-making and providing a laboratory 
analogue of the strategic behaviour described in the eyewitness real-world scenario. 
Indeed, these explicit forms of heightening memory control under goal emphasis are 
examined in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
However, the aim of the present chapter was to examine the influence of more 
implicit sources of goal emphasis, as imparted by the format of the memory test 
itself. This follows from reported effects of test format on response strategies in the 
applied domains of questionnaire design (‘yea-responding’; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, 
Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and eyewitness testimony (‘leading questions’; Loftus, 
1996). Test format influences have been comparatively neglected in memory 
research, despite the stipulations of extant memory control models that participants 
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routinely infer the wider goals of memory evaluation from subtle aspects of the 
presented format (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In support of this, strategies that serve 
to improve performance have been evidenced after framing a memory test as a 
source monitoring compared to a standard item recognition task (Lindsay & Johnson, 
1989), as well as for free (as opposed to forced) report formats (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996). These test format manipulations affect memory evaluation in a “global” way, 
by emphasising the need for overall accuracy when making both “old” and “new” 
decisions. Such global goal emphasis mechanisms putatively contribute to the 
overarching strategic caution described in the eyewitness real-world scenario. 
However, more “selective” mechanisms that impart goal emphasis to either “old” or 
“new” decisions are also likely to be involved. Reconsidering the eyewitness 
scenario, “old” decisions might be selectively emphasised if the observer perceives 
the consequences of making an incorrect “old” decision as greater than making an 
incorrect “new” decision (in that the former decision connotes a committed action 
that results in the wrongful conviction of an innocent individual, whereas the latter 
maintains the status quo of the ongoing suspect search and is comparatively less 
consequential). Similar selective emphasis for “old” decisions might even be 
imparted in the supermarket scenario comparatively lacking in global emphasis, in 
that making an incorrect “old” decision for a stranger is likely to lead to an awkward 
and potentially embarrassing social encounter (whereas an incorrect “new” decision 
maintains the status quo of supermarket shopping). Selective emphasis imparted by 
both test environments might therefore lead to heightened strategic caution in 
making “old” decisions, as a parallel to selective emphasis imparted to “go” decisions 
in the mixed incentive research alluded to previously (e.g. Newman et al., 1985).  
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A potential implicit source of such selective goal emphasis in laboratory test 
environments is the format of the test question. Question format in single item 
recognition typically comprises the question “old?” with “yes” and “no” keypress 
response options (indeed, item recognition is often termed yes/no recognition; 
Donaldson, 1996). If this format implicitly imparts emphasis to “old” decisions, and 
this implicit emphasis serves to introduce a strategic bias on memory performance, 
then this bias is putatively engaged in covert form in a large number of laboratory 
recognition studies. Hence, this first chapter describes a series of three recognition 
experiments in which we provide behavioural evidence that question format does 
indeed serve as an environmental source of implicit goal emphasis. The strategic 
nature of this bias in inducing caution was indexed across all experiments by effects 
on various estimates of SDT criterion (a measure of bias which bins responses by 
“objective” old or new item status) and ‘decision accuracy’ (which bins responses by 
“subjective” decision status; Duncan, Sadanand & Davachi, 2012). 
 
2.2. Introduction to Experiment 1 
The first experiment examined whether question formats adopted as standard in 
laboratory recognition tests are capable of influencing participants’ strategies. 
Following an incidental encoding procedure, the wording of the test question was 
varied in separate blocks according to two factors: the decision emphasised by the 
question (“question emphasis”: old or new emphasis) and the number of decisions 
mentioned in the question (“question dimension”: single (“old” or “new?”) or 
composite dimensions (“old/new?” or “new/old?”)). To clarify, I speculated that 
emphasis would be imparted in single dimension questions to the decision presented 
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in isolation (e.g. “old?” emphasises “old” decisions), whereas it would be imparted to 
the decision appearing first in composite dimension questions (e.g. “old/new?” 
emphasises “old” decisions). The capacity for question emphasis to shift criterion in 
“disconfirmatory” goal-driven directions (i.e. reducing the likelihood of endorsing the 
emphasised decision) as described in the introduction was hence explored in both 
these question dimension conditions. 
 
2.2.1. Method 
2.2.1.1. Participants. The sample comprised 30 self-reported native English 
speakers (14 female, mean age = 24.0; age range = 18-39 years), who all passed a 
minimum performance threshold of d′ sensitivity > 0.1 across all question format 
conditions. Informed consent was obtained in accordance with the University 
Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews (UTREC) 
and all participants were compensated for their time at the rate of £5/hr. 
2.2.1.2. Stimuli. For each participant, a different set of words was randomly sampled 
from a pool of 2199 singular, common nouns from the English Lexicon Project 
(Balota et al., 2007), following the removal of low frequency words (Hyperspace 
Analogue to Language HAL frequency high-pass cut-off: 7.70). This served to 
exclude highly distinctive items, which could lead to extreme variations in memory 
strength and consequently attenuate the strategic bias effects of primary interest 
(final word list characteristics: mean HAL frequency = 8.98, mean word length = 
7.24, mean number of syllables = 2.43). Each of the four presented study-test blocks 
comprised 100 words, with 50 words presented at both study and test (old words) 
and 50 words presented at test only (new words). The experiment was presented 
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using PCs running MATLAB (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, 2000) and 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
2.2.1.3. Procedure. Participants were presented on-screen instructions and a 
practice task prior to completing four self-paced study-test blocks (see Figure 2.1a 
for a design schematic). The study task across all blocks required participants to 
count the syllables of single words appearing onscreen (i.e. prompted by the 
question “syllables?” with keyboard response options “1” through “4+”). A test phase 
immediately followed each study phase, wherein participants decided whether 
serially presented words were old (i.e. seen before at study) or new (i.e. not seen 
before during the experiment) for a test list comprising 50 words of each item 
category. Crucially, the format of the test question was varied in blockwise fashion 
according to the decision emphasised (old or new) and the dimensions of the 
question i.e. the number of decisions presented (single or composite), leading to four 
questions being presented in separate blocks: “old?” and “new?” (i.e. single old and 
single new emphasis questions, both with “yes” and “no” response options assigned 
to the “1” and “2” number keys), as well as “old/new?” and “new/old?” (i.e. a 
composite old emphasis question with “old” and “new” assigned to “1” and “2” 
number keys, and a composite new emphasis question with “new” and “old” 
assigned to the “1” and “2” keys).  
For all question types, participants also made a confidence rating on a three-point 
scale (i.e. prompted by “confidence?” with “low”, “medium” and “high” rating options), 
which appeared 0.25s after making an old/new response. Each study and test trial 
was preceded by a 0.5s fixation cross. Across participants, the study-test block order 
was pseudo-randomised, such that the single dimension question blocks always 
preceded the composite dimension blocks, with question emphasis fully randomised 
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within this static ordering of dimension conditions. This led to a total of 4 run orders 
to which participants were randomly assigned. 
2.2.1.4. Calculation. The primary analyses across all three experiments were 
conducted on sensitivity (d′) and response criterion (c) parameters estimated from 
the equal variance signal detection model (EV SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005; see Section 1.4. for more detailed explanation of these 
measures). A correction for errorless responding was made in accordance with 
Snodgrass and Corwin (1988), by taking the numbers of hits (Hn; the number of old 
items correctly judged “old”), misses (Mn; the number of old items incorrectly judged 
“new”), correct rejections (CRn; the number of new items correctly judged “new”) and 
false alarms (FAn; the number of new items incorrectly judged “old”), and calculating 
adjusted hit (H') and false alarm rates (FA') as follows: 
𝐇′ =  
𝐇𝐧+𝟎.𝟓
𝐇𝐧+𝐌𝐧+𝟏
   (1)   
𝐅𝐀′ =  
𝐅𝐀𝐧+𝟎.𝟓
𝐅𝐀𝐧+𝐂𝐑𝐧+𝟏
   (2) 
These adjusted measures were then used to compute d′ and c: 
d' =  𝐳(𝐇′) –  𝐳(𝐅𝐀′)  (3)   
c =  −𝟎. 𝟓 ×  [𝐳(𝐇′)  +  𝐳(𝐅𝐀′)]  (4) 
Eliciting response confidence enabled supplementary analyses of equivalent 
sensitivity and bias parameters estimated from the unequal variance signal detection 
model (UEV SDT; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This differs from the equal variance 
model in that the variance of the old item distribution is allowed to vary whilst the 
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new item distribution variance remains fixed at 1. Hence, UEV d′ and UEV criterion 
(ca), along with old distribution variance (σ), were estimated for each subject using 
nonlinear regression and a least squares criterion (iteratively minimizing the 
difference between actual hit/false alarm rates and those estimated from the varying 
d′, ca and σ parameters), as implemented in the Solver function in Excel (Harris, 
1998; O'Connor, Guhl, Cox, & Dobbins, 2011). Bias as indexed by the ca parameter 
was then adjusted to take into account the variation in optimal criterion placement 
engendered by the freely varying old item variance parameter (as described in 
O’Connor et al., 2011). Optimal criterion in the UEV model was therefore calculated 
as:  
𝐨𝐩𝐭𝐢𝐦𝐚𝐥 𝒄 =  
√𝒅′
𝟐
𝝈𝟐+𝟐𝝈𝟒 𝐥𝐧(𝝈)−𝟐𝝈𝟐 𝐥𝐧(𝝈)− 𝒅′
𝝈 𝟐−𝟏
    (5) 
The distance between ca and optimal c (i.e. ca minus optimal c) was termed crel and 
used as the criterion estimate in the UEV analyses. Fitting to both versions of the 
signal detection model ensured that any observed question format effects were not 
confined to the equal variance SDT model, and rather persisted even in the unequal 
variance SDT model that attempts to account for added response variability 
associated with confidence ratings. For both equal and unequal variance models, 
larger d' parameters indicate greater sensitivity (better discrimination of old from 
new), and larger c parameters indicate a more conservative bias (reduced tendency 
towards responding “old”).  
An additional analysis examined the proportion correct out of all “old” or “new” 
decisions made by each participant (oldcorr and newcorr respectively). These “decision 
accuracy” measures bin responses according to “subjective” decision status (i.e. the 
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total number of “old” or “new” decisions made, which varied across subjects), and 
are hence not to be confused with the hit and correct rejection rates used for the 
SDT measures, which bin responses according to “objective” item status categories 
(i.e. the total number of old or new items actually present in the test list, which 
remained fixed across subjects). The decision accuracy measures were calculated 
for each participant as follows: 
oldcorr = 
𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "old" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬
𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "old" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬+𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "𝐨𝐥𝐝" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬
  (6) 
 newcorr =  
𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "new" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬
𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "new" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬+𝐧𝐮𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐟 𝐢𝐧𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭 "𝐧𝐞𝐰" 𝐝𝐞𝐜𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬
  (7) 
These measures complemented the question-driven biases revealed in the primary 
SDT analyses with insight into how these biases impacted on the accuracy of 
memory decision-making, thereby serving to elucidate their underlying strategic 
nature. 
 
2.2.2. Results and Discussion 
2.2.2.1. Equal variance sensitivity and bias. Means and standard deviations for all 
three experiments presented in this chapter are provided in Table 2.1. The effects of 
question format on sensitivity were firstly investigated in a 2(question dimension: 
single or composite) x 2(question emphasis: old or new) repeated measures ANOVA 
on equal variance (EV) estimates of d′. This revealed a significant main effect of 
question dimension such that d′ was higher for single (M = 1.75, SD = 0.52) 
compared to composite questions (M = 1.50, SD = 0.49), F(1,29) = 10.61, p = .003, 
ηp
2 = .27. The reduced sensitivity for composite questions is likely due to these 
questions being presented after both single question types across all run orders, 
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rendering this test condition more susceptible to deleterious effects of fatigue and 
greater elapsed time from the study phase. There was neither a significant main 
effect of emphasis nor an interaction, F(1,29) = 1.74, p = .198, ηp
2 = .06 and F < 1 
respectively. The primary question format manipulation of goal emphasis therefore 
did not influence participants’ sensitivity at test. 
The same 2(question dimension) x 2(question emphasis) ANOVA was conducted on 
EV criterion, which yielded neither a significant main effect of dimension nor an 
interaction effect, both Fs < 1. A trend main effect of emphasis was observed, such 
that c was higher in the old (M = 0.05, SD = 0.33) compared to the new emphasis 
condition (M = -0.04, SD = 0.32; see Figure 2.1b), F(1,29) = 2.98, p = .095, ηp
2 = .09. 
Although non-significant, the direction of this criterion trend is reflective of question 
emphasis reducing the likelihood of endorsing the decision emphasised by the 
question. This bias direction is contrary to that observed following cueing 
manipulations, which act to increase endorsement of the cued decision (e.g. 
O'Connor et al., 2010). Rather these findings reflect a different strategic mechanism, 
wherein the test question serves to emphasise one memory decision as a higher-
order goal and provokes heightened caution as to how that emphasised decision is 
rendered. 
2.2.2.2. Unequal variance sensitivity and bias. The correspondence of the above 
effects was probed with parameters estimated from the unequal variance SDT 
model, which takes into account variation in response confidence. A 2(question 
dimension) x 2(question emphasis) ANOVA on UEV d′ revealed a significant main 
effect of dimension, with UEV d′ higher in the single (M = 2.17, SD = 0.98) compared 
to the composite condition (M = 1.75, SD = 0.68), F(1,29) = 9.69, p = .004, ηp
2 = .25. 
There was neither a main effect of emphasis nor an interaction, both Fs < 1. The 
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same 2 x 2 ANOVA on UEV crel yielded neither a main effect of dimension nor an 
interaction, both Fs < 1. As before, there was a trend towards a main effect of 
emphasis, such that crel was higher for old (M = -0.07, SD = 0.36) compared to new 
emphasis questions (M = -0.18, SD = 0.38), F(1,29) = 3.20, p = .084, ηp
2 = .099 (see 
Table 2.1. for means). Collectively, the UEV analyses accord with the EV analyses in 
recovering a trend effect of question emphasis on criterion bias (with d' sensitivity 
measures unaffected by emphasis). 
2.2.2.3. Decision accuracy. To elucidate the strategic nature of the question format 
bias, we also analysed how the accuracy of “old” and “new” decisions (oldcorr and 
newcorr respectively) varied across question conditions. A 2(question dimension) x 
2(question emphasis) ANOVA for oldcorr revealed a main effect of dimension, such 
that “old” decisions were more accurate in the single (M = .81, SD = .08) compared 
to the composite condition (M = .77, SD = .09), F(1,29) = 10.14, p = .003, ηp
2 = .26. 
This is consistent with the SDT sensitivity effects detailed above and is hence also 
attributable to the delayed presentation of the composite question blocks relative to 
the single question blocks. There was also a trend main effect of question emphasis 
such that the accuracy of “old” decisions was higher in the “old” emphasis (M = .80, 
SD = .08) compared to the “new” emphasis condition (M = .77, SD = .09), F(1,29) = 
3.79, p = .061, ηp
2 = .12. There was no dimension by emphasis interaction, F < 1. 
The effects on oldcorr highlight that the bias induced by question emphasis is strategic 
in nature and serves to improve the accuracy of the emphasised decision. 
The same 2 x 2 ANOVA conducted on newcorr revealed an analogous order-driven 
main effect of dimension, such that “new” decisions were more accurate in the single 
(M = .80, SD = .08) compared to the composite condition (M = .77, SD = .09), 
F(1,29) = 9.96, p = .013, ηp
2 = .19. Interestingly, both the main effect of emphasis 
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and the emphasis by dimension interaction were clearly non-significant, both Fs < 1 
(see Figure 2.1d). The clear lack of an emphasis effect on newcorr suggests that the 
question emphasis-provoked strategies might preferentially impact on “old” decision 
evaluations, a finding that is considered in greater detail in the general discussion 
(see Section 2.5.). 
Overall, the findings from Experiment 1 provide preliminary evidence for question 
formats presented as standard in the field of recognition memory acting as an implicit 
source of goal emphasis in the test environment. The goal emphasis imparted by 
these questions selectively influenced criterion estimates (with sensitivity 
comparatively unaffected) to elicit a disconfirmatory bias that reduced the likelihood 
of endorsing the decision emphasised by the question. Further, the decision 
accuracy analyses highlighted the strategic nature of this bias, with question 
emphasis also improving the accuracy of emphasised decisions when rendered. 
However, the non-significant trends evidenced in the analyses prevent strong 
inferences based on these data. The lack of significance is perhaps due to the 
reduced power of Experiment 1, derived from the relatively low number of trials per 
condition and the small sample collected. This interpretation was supported by an 
independent study in which single dimension questions of varying emphases were 
presented to a large sample, revealing analogous effects of question emphasis on 
criterion and decision accuracy that reached conventional significance3 (Mill & 
O’Connor, 2014; see Appendix A). 
  
                                            
3
 This experiment was not included in my thesis as it was programmed in JavaScript by my 
supervisor, Akira O’Connor, and not by me. 
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Table 2.1. Design key and descriptive statistics for all experiments, including equal variance (EV) and unequal variance (UEV) estimate of 
sensitivity (d′) and criterion (c and crel), as well as decision accuracy for “old” (oldcorr) and “new” decisions (newcorr). 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation. 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Encoding task syllables case pleasantness case 
Question 
format 
old? new? old/new? new/old? old? new? old? new? old? new? old? new? 
Response 
format 
- - - - - - - - yes yes no no 
Emphasis old new old new old new old new old new new old 
EV d′ M 1.81 1.69 1.54 1.47 1.37 1.28 2.83 2.57 1.26 1.28 1.26 1.18 
 SD 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.58 0.70 0.87 0.63 0.54 0.55 0.82 0.80 0.66 
EV c M 0.05 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.26 0.07 -0.09 -0.13 0.12 0.00 -0.07 0.08 
 SD 0.35 0.25 0.38 0.43 0.41 0.26 0.34 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.30 0.35 
UEV d′ M 2.24 2.10 1.70 1.79 1.55 1.45 3.62 3.18 1.52 1.42 1.32 1.44 
 SD 1.23 1.17 0.72 0.86 0.82 1.00 0.99 1.24 1.06 0.68 0.74 0.86 
UEV crel M -0.07 -0.15 -0.07 -0.22 0.07 -0.09 -0.31 -0.26 -0.03 -0.24 -0.22 -0.08 
 SD 0.49 0.32 0.38 0.56 0.50 0.35 0.51 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.47 
oldcorr M .82 .79 .78 .76 .78 .73 .90 .87 .74 .71 .70 .72 
 SD .09 .09 .09 .11 .11 .12 .07 .07 .11 .12 .12 .12 
newcorr M .81 .80 .77 .77 .71 .71 .92 .91 .70 .71 .72 .68 




Figure 2.1. Design and results of Experiment 1. a) Design schematic showing the study 
phase (which was the same for all test phases) and the test phase for the single dimension 
“old” emphasis question (“old?”). Note that the response options for the single dimension 
“new” emphasis question (“new?”) was identical to that presented above. Response options 
for composite dimension questions were as follows: “old/new?” question with the “old” 
response to the left of the “new” response, and “new/old?” question with “new” to the left of 
the “old” option. The remaining graphs depict question emphasis effects on b) equal 
variance criterion (EV c), c) old decision accuracy (oldcorr), and d) new decision accuracy 
(newcorr). Note that the arrowheads to the right of panel b) illustrate the bias tendencies 
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indexed by criterion placement (for this and subsequent criterion figures), such that 
increasing c values reflect a reduced likelihood of responding “old” (i.e. conservative “old” 
bias) and decreasing values reflect a greater likelihood of responding “old” (i.e. liberal “old” 
bias). Separate lines in panels b-d represent question dimension conditions and error bars 




2.3. Introduction to Experiment 2 
Another potential contributor to the numerically small question effects of Experiment 
1 was the reasonably high levels of memory strength available at test, as predicated 
on the “deep” levels-of-processing (LOP; Craik & Lockhart, 1972) achieved by the 
syllable counting task. Sufficiently high memory strength reduces the need to recruit 
higher-order strategies to accurately diagnose memory decisions (Jacoby et al., 
1999; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). To investigate this mediating influence, memory 
strength was systematically manipulated in Experiment 2 by presenting different 
tasks at study – a pleasantness judgement task leading to “deep” LOP and a case 
judgement task leading to “shallow” LOP. This study manipulation was crossed with 
analogous manipulation of question emphasis as in the single dimension question 
condition in Experiment 1. To clarify, the case judgement task was expected to instil 
a lower level of overall memory strength than the syllable-counting task in 
Experiment 1 (i.e. expected LOP: pleasantness > syllable counting > case 
judgement), and therefore enhance the emphasis-driven shifts in criterion bias and 
decision accuracy. Such enhancement would further indicate that the question effect 
is rooted in higher-order strategies that are bear a greater influence on performance 
in situations of low overall memory strength and associated uncertainty (Benjamin, 
2007; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). 
 
2.3.1. Method 
2.3.1.1. Participants. The sample comprised 29 native English speakers who 
reached the minimum performance threshold (20 female; mean age = 22.1; age 
range = 19 to 28) from a total of 31 recruited. Two participants were excluded for 
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poor performance based on the same threshold as in Experiment 1 (i.e. d′ < 0.1). 
Informed consent and participant compensation were identical to Experiment 1. 
2.3.1.2. Stimuli. Word stimuli were randomly drawn from the same pool used in 
Experiment 1. Each of the four study-test blocks constituted 120 words (60 old and 
60 new at each test phase), which were presented on PCs running MATLAB and 
Psychophysics Toolbox as before. 
2.3.1.3. Procedure. After the presentation of on-screen instructions and a practice 
phase, participants completed four self-paced study-test blocks comprising blocked 
combinations of study LOP (shallow, deep) and test question emphasis (“old?”, 
“new?”; see Figure 2.2a). The two shallow LOP study phases involved a case 
judgement task for 60 words presented serially in either uppercase or lowercase (30 
of each case type) below the prompt “uppercase?” and with “yes” and “no” response 
options assigned to the keyboard. The two deep LOP study phases involved a 
pleasantness judgement task, wherein lowercase words appeared beneath a 
“pleasant?” question with “yes” and “no” response options. A test phase immediately 
followed each study phase and comprised 60 old and 60 new words. Participants 
made old/new recognition decisions with test question emphasis varied analogously 
to the single dimension question condition in Experiment 1 i.e. with “old?” and “new?” 
questions presented in separate test blocks (with “yes” and “no” response options 
available throughout). As before, three-point confidence ratings were solicited 0.25s 
after each old/new decision. A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each trial across all 
study and test blocks. Across participants, the study-test block order was pseudo-
randomised such that only one level of a factor would change in any block transition. 
Hence, while it was possible for a participant to experience a shallow-“old?” to 
shallow-“new?” block transition, it was not possible for a participant to experience a 
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shallow-“old” to deep-“new” block transition. This led to four orders in total to which 
participants were randomly assigned. 
 
2.3.2. Results and Discussion 
2.3.2.1. Equal variance sensitivity and bias. To confirm that the LOP manipulation 
affected memory strength as anticipated, a 2(LOP: shallow or deep) x 2(question 
emphasis: “old?” or “new?”) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on EV 
estimates of d′. The ANOVA revealed an anticipated main effect of LOP, such that 
sensitivity was lower in the shallow LOP (M = 1.33, SD = 0.73) than the deep LOP 
condition (M = 2.70, SD = 0.52), F(1,28) = 109.14, p = .001, ηp
2 = .80. There was 
also an unexpected main effect of question emphasis such that d' was higher in the 
old (M = 2.10, SD = 0.55) than the new emphasis condition (M = 1.92, SD = 0.57), 
F(1,28) = 5.84, p = .022, ηp
2 = .17. There was no significant LOP x emphasis 
interaction, F(1,28) = 1.06, p = .311, ηp
2 = .04. The unexpected main effect of 
emphasis on d' suggests that emphasis impacted on memory strength processes 
and this finding is elaborated on in ensuing sections.  
The primary analysis on EV c was carried out using a 2(LOP) x 2(question 
emphasis) repeated measures ANOVA. A main effect of question emphasis was 
observed, with significantly higher c estimates in the old (M = 0.09, SD = 0.24) than 
the new emphasis condition (M = -0.03, SD = 0.32), F(1,28) = 6.65, p = .015, ηp
2 = 
.19 (see Figure 2.2b). Although there was no significant interaction effect, F(1,28) = 
3.13, p = .088, ηp
2 = .101, a numerical trend was observed, and planned pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the disconfirmatory question bias achieved statistical 
significance in the shallow LOP condition but not in the deep LOP condition, t(28) = 
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3.05, p = .005, d = 0.62 and t(28) = .70, p = .487, d = 0.13 respectively. These 
findings replicate the disconfirmatory emphasis bias observed in Experiment 1, and 
support our prediction of its enhancement under conditions of high overall memory 
strength. 
From the same ANOVA on c, we found a main effect of LOP on criterion placement, 
such that c estimates were significantly lower in the deep (M = -0.11, SD = 0.29) 
than the shallow LOP conditions (M = 0.17, SD = 0.30), F(1,28) = 23.66, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .46. Participants hence adopted a liberal “old” response strategy in the 
condition of higher memory strength, and this finding is reminiscent of prior reports of 
criterion sensitivity to metacognitive inferences of overall memory strength (as 
alluded to in the previous chapter, see Section 1.4.; Glanzer & Adams, 1985; 
Hirshman, 1995). 
2.3.2.2. Unequal variance sensitivity and bias. As in Experiment 1, we probed the 
correspondence between the above equal variance SDT effects in equivalent 
unequal variance analyses. A 2(LOP) x 2(question emphasis) repeated measures 
ANOVA on UEV d′ recovered a main effect of LOP, such that d' was significantly 
higher in the deep (M = 3.40, SD = 0.89) than the shallow LOP condition (M = 1.50, 
SD = 0.85), F(1,28) = 88.89, p = 0.001, ηp
2 = 0.76. A trend main effect of emphasis 
was also observed, with sensitivity once again higher under old emphasis (M = 2.59, 
SD = 0.67) compared to new emphasis (M = 2.32, SD = 0.89), F(1,28) = 3.16, p = 
0.086, ηp
2 = 0.10. The LOP by emphasis interaction was non-significant, F(1,28) = 
1.62, p = 0.214, ηp
2 = 0.06. 
A 2(LOP) x 2(question emphasis) ANOVA on crel revealed a main effect of LOP, 
such that crel was lower in the deep (M = -0.28, SD = 0.40) than the shallow LOP 
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conditions (M = -0.01, SD = 0.36), F(1,28) = 12.23, p = 0.002, ηp
2 = 0.304. There 
was neither a main effect of emphasis nor a significant interaction, F(1,28) < 1 and 
F(1,28) = 2.73, p = 0.110, ηp
2 = 0.089 respectively. However, planned pairwise 
comparisons revealed a trend towards a significant disconfirmatory bias in the 
shallow LOP condition, t(28) = 1.87, p = .072, d = 0.36, with a higher crel under old 
compared to new emphasis, but a clearly non-significant difference in crel in the deep 
LOP condition, t(28) = 0.60, p = .556, d = 0.11 (see Table 2.1. for means). Overall, 
the effects of question emphasis on unequal variance estimates of d' and crel are 
broadly consistent with those observed in the equal variance estimate analyses. The 
weakened effects of question emphasis on crel likely reflect the conservative nature 
of the UEV model, in that it aims to account for added response variability associated 
with assessments of confidence. 
2.3.2.3. Decision accuracy. As before, the accuracy of “old” and “new” decisions 
under varying question emphases was analysed, separately for shallow and deep 
LOP conditions. A 2(decision type) x 2(question emphasis) repeated measures 
ANOVA for the shallow LOP condition revealed a significant main effect of decision 
type, F(1,28) = 9.77, p = .004, ηp
2 = .26 (see Figure 2.2c). Participants’ “old” 
decisions were characterised by greater overall accuracy (M = .76, SD = .10) than 
their “new” decisions (M = .71, SD = .09). Similar disparities in the response profiles 
of “old” and “new” decisions have been reported previously (e.g. Jaeger, Cox & 
Dobbins, 2012). No main effect of question emphasis was observed, F(1,28) = 1.46, 
p = .237, ηp
2 = .050. Crucially, the decision type x question emphasis interaction was 
significant, F(1,28) = 9.04, p = .006, ηp
2 = .244. This suggests that question 
emphasis improved the accuracy of endorsing the emphasised decision i.e. “old?” 
improved the accuracy of “old” decisions and “new?” improved the accuracy of “new” 
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decisions (see Table 2.1. for means). Post-hoc comparisons revealed a significant 
difference in oldcorr across emphasis conditions and a nonsignificant difference for 
newcorr, t(28) = 2.23, p = .034, d = 0.41 and t(28) = 0.42, p = .679, d = 0.07 
respectively. The greater influence of emphasis on oldcorr compared to newcorr 
parallels the decision accuracy analyses of Experiment 1 in suggesting that the 
strategies instilled by the question format manipulations might selectively improve 
the accuracy of “old” decision evaluations. This possibility is discussed in greater 
detail in the General Discussion in Chapter 7 (Section 7.3.). 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA was also conducted for decision accuracy measures in the deep 
LOP condition, yielding a nonsignificant main effect of decision type and a 
nonsignificant interaction, F(1,28) = 3.80, p = .061, ηp
2 = .12 and F(1,28) = 1.00, p = 
.326, ηp
2 = .03 respectively. A significant main effect of question emphasis was 
observed, with the question “old?” (M = .91, SD = .05) leading to greater overall 
decision accuracy than the question “new?” (M = .89, SD = .05), F(1,28) = 5.65, p = 
.025, ηp
2 = .17 (see Figure 2.2d). Considered with the observed improvement in d′ for 
“old?” questions in the same deep LOP condition, these findings raise the possibility 
that the question “old?” instilled a more rigorous source monitoring strategy that 
prioritised the recovery of recollected content (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993). In conditions of high overall memory strength (as in the deep LOP condition), 
this directly improved performance as a higher proportion of recollected old items 
were likely encountered at test. This contrasts the lack of a main effect of emphasis 
on decision accuracy or d′ in the shallow LOP condition, where old items were less 
likely to be associated with recollected content and hence the adoption of a 
monitoring strategy that exclusively prioritised recollection exerted a less beneficial 
influence on performance. As such, these question format effects putatively impact 
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more directly on memory strength and related retrieval control processes, and hence 
reflect different strategic influences to the decision control processes of primary 
interest (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2. for further discussion). 
To summarise, the results of Experiment 2 provided further evidence for question 
format serving as an implicit source of goal emphasis in the test environment. The 
trend effects observed in Experiment 1, namely the criterion bias reflecting a reduced 
likelihood of endorsing emphasised decisions coupled with improved accuracy of 
those decisions when made, were found to be enhanced in the shallow LOP 
condition as predicted. This is consistent with the heightened engagement of goal-
driven strategies to counteract weakly diagnostic memory evidence and ensure 





Figure 2.2. Design and results of Experiment 2. a) Design schematic showing study and test 
phase manipulations. b) Question emphasis effects on equal variance criterion (EV c), with 
separate lines denoting levels-of-processing (LOP) achieved at study. The remaining graphs 
show effects of question emphasis on decision accuracy measures in c) the shallow LOP 
condition and d) the deep LOP condition, with separate lines representing decision types. 
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.   
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2.4. Introduction to Experiment 3 
The observed question format effects on recognition performance have thus far been 
suggestive of a goal-driven strategic bias, wherein the test question implicitly 
emphasises a particular memory decision as a higher-order goal and enforces more 
cautious endorsement of that decision. However, in both presented experiments, the 
varying question emphases were confounded by static “yes” and “no” response 
options. The question format effect may hence alternatively reflect a tendency to 
respond “no” irrespective of implicitly emphasised decision goals.  
To adjudicate between these interpretations, we independently manipulated question 
format as in Experiment 2, and introduced an orthogonal response format 
manipulation (see Figure 2.3a.) Response format was manipulated by providing only 
one physical, visible response option at test, with the alternative response indicated 
by withholding from using that response option. This is similar to laboratory-based 
go/no go procedures (e.g. Brutkowski, 1964) and applied eye-witness identification 
protocols where participants are given the option of not-responding in perpetrator-
free line-ups (e.g. Weber & Perfect, 2011). Across study-test blocks, the single 
response option was assigned either a "yes" or "no" response, thereby requiring 
participants to integrate both the question and the response formats to infer 
emphasised decisions. Varying these two test environment factors independently 
allowed us to test whether criterion and decision accuracy effects shift according to 
the decision emphasised as a goal by the combination of the question and response 
formats, or whether these follow the decision which maps onto a "no" response 





Figure 2.3. Experiment 3 design. a) Design schematic showing blockwise test format 
manipulations (study phase comprised the same case judgement task from Experiment 2). 
b) Criterion placement (c) as generated by the competing bias predictions for Experiment 3. 
Arrows denote criterion shifts, with increasing c associated with decreased “old” responding 
(conservative bias) and decreasing c associated with increased “old” responding (liberal 
bias). According to the “no” attraction prediction, participants consistently prefer responding 
“no”, and hence c should decrease when an “old” decision maps to the “no” response option 
(“new?”-“yes” and “new?”-“no” test blocks), and increase when it maps to the ‘yes’ response 
option (“old?”-“yes” and “old?”-“no” test blocks). According to the goal emphasis prediction, 
the combination of the question and response formats serves to emphasise one class of 
decision, and participants decrease endorsement of that decision. Hence, c should increase 
when “old” decisions are emphasised (“old?”-“yes” and “new?”-“no” test blocks) and 





2.4.1.1. Participants. The sample comprised 29 native English speakers who 
reached the minimum performance threshold of d′ > 0.1 (21 female; mean age = 
20.6; age range = 18 to 25) from a total of 35 completing the experiment (4 were 
excluded for failing to understand task instructions, 2 for poor task performance). 
Informed consent and compensation procedures were identical to those in the 
previous two experiments. 
2.4.1.2. Stimuli. Word stimuli were randomly drawn from the same pool used in 
Experiments 1 and 2. Each of five study-test blocks utilised 120 words (60 old and 
60 new at each test phase) and the experiment was presented using PCs running 
MATLAB and Psychophysics Toolbox (as before). 
2.4.1.3. Procedure. Following on-screen instructions and a practice phase, 
participants completed five study-test blocks (see Figure 2.3.a). All study phases 
employed a self-paced case judgement task presented and responded to in a 
manner identical to Experiment 2, and were immediately followed by old/new 
recognition test phases comprising 60 old words and 60 new words. The first test 
phase was used to calibrate the paced response window used in subsequent test 
phases, and employed the composite “old/new?” question format presented in 
Experiment 1 followed by a three-point confidence rating (with both trial responses 
being self-paced). The response window for subsequent test phases was set, on a 
participant-by-participant basis, as the 80th percentile of the slowest category of 
recognition decisions broken down by confidence (typically “low” confidence 
decisions). This liberal response window ensured that participants had sufficient time 
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to make paced recognition decisions in subsequent test phases (M = 3.84 s, SD = 
1.69). 
The next four test phases comprised blocked combinations of question format (“old?” 
or “new?”) and response format manipulations (“yes” keypress or “no” keypress; see 
Figure 2.3.a). Question format was manipulated across blocks as described for 
Experiment 2. Response format was manipulated across blocks by allocating either 
“yes” or “no” to a single keyboard response. Participants endorsed the allocated 
response with a keypress or endorsed the opposing response by withholding the 
keypress for the duration of the paced trial (similar to a go/no-go task, Brutkowski, 
1964). To prevent preferential keypress responding to hasten completion of the task, 
the second stage of responding was initiated after the full response window had 
elapsed, irrespective of whether a keypress was made or withheld. Subsequently, 
participants received the prompt “confidence?” and provided a self-paced confidence 
rating of “low”, “medium” or “high”. Participants could alternatively make a “discard” 
response if they wanted their previous recognition decision to be ignored. This option 
was intended for when participants had failed to render a response due to an 
attentional lapse and prevented such trials from being coded as deliberately withheld 
responses. A 0.5 s fixation cross preceded each recognition assessment and a 0.25 
s fixation cross preceded each confidence assessment. Hence, across the four 
study-test blocks, participants completed two test phases with an old decision 
emphasis (“old?”-“yes” and “new?”-“no”), and two test phases with a new decision 
emphasis (“old?”-“no” and “new?”-“yes”). The order of the four tests was 
pseudorandomised to minimise the combined switching of question and response 




2.4.2. Results and Discussion 
2.4.2.1. Equal variance sensitivity and bias. A 2(response format: “yes” keypress 
or “no” keypress) x 2(question format: “old?” or “new?”) repeated measures ANOVA 
on equal variance estimates of d′ revealed no significant main or interaction effects, 
all Fs < 1. Sensitivity was therefore unaffected by the test format manipulations. 
The same 2(response format) x 2(question format) ANOVA on EV c found no main 
effects of response or question format, F(1,28) = 3.73, p = .064, ηp
2 = .12 and F < 1 
respectively (see Figure 2.4a). Crucially, the interaction of response and question 
format was significant, F(1,28) = 8.50, p = .007, ηp
2 = .23 (see Table 2.1. for means). 
Planned pairwise t-tests revealed significant increases in c (reflecting a reduced 
likelihood of responding “old”) when old was emphasised by the combination of 
response and question formats. For the “yes” response format, c was placed higher 
for “old?” than “new?” questions, t(28) = 2.41, p = .023, d = 0.45. For the “no” 
response format, c was lower for “old?” than “new?” questions, t(28) = 2.77, p = .010, 
d = 0.52. Note that in the “no” response format condition, old emphasis is imparted 
by a “new?” question and new emphasis is imparted by an “old?” question (see 
Figure 2.3b for further details). These findings therefore replicate the biases 
observed in Experiments 1 and 2, and suggest that the effect is indeed driven by 
which decision is emphasised as a goal, and not by a general tendency to respond 
“no”.  
2.4.2.2. Unequal variance sensitivity and bias. Test format effects were also 
examined with UEV estimates of performance. A 2(response format) x 2(question 
format) repeated measures ANOVA on UEV d′ revealed no significant main or 
interaction effects, all Fs < 1. The same 2 x 2 ANOVA for UEV crel found no main 
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effects of response format or question format, both Fs < 1. As above, the response 
format x question format interaction was significant, F(1,28) = 4.57, p = 0.041, ηp
2 = 
0.140. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that within the “yes” response format 
condition, old question format crel estimates were significantly higher than new 
question format crel estimates, t(28) = 2.65, p = .013, d = 0.49. Within the “no” 
response format condition, crel estimates did not significantly differ across question 
format conditions, t(28) = 1.35, p = .187, d = 0.25 (see Table 2.1.). These findings 
coalesce with the equal variance analyses in suggesting that the disconfirmatory 
question bias is indeed driven by goal emphasis. 
2.4.2.3. Decision accuracy. The accuracy of “old” and “new” decisions was also 
analysed, separately for each response format condition. A 2(decision type) x 
2(question format) repeated measures ANOVA for the “yes” response condition 
yielded no main effects of decision type or question format, F(1,28) = 1.98, p = .171, 
ηp
2 = .066 and F < 1 respectively (see Figure 2.4b; see Table 2.1. for means). 
Importantly, the decision type x question format interaction was significant, in a 
direction such that “old?” improved the accuracy of “old” decisions and “new?” 
improved the accuracy of “new” decisions, F(1,28) = 14.19, p = .001, ηp
2 = .336. 
Pairwise comparisons revealed a numerical difference approaching significance in 
“old” decision accuracy across question conditions, t(28) = 2.01, p = .054, d = 0.37, 
with a nonsignificant difference direction obtained for “new” decision accuracy, t(28) 
= 0.48, p = .637, d = 0.09. The same 2 x 2 ANOVA for the “no” response condition 
yielded no significant main effects of decision type or question format, both Fs < 1 
(see Figure 2.4c). Crucially, the decision type x question format interaction was 
significant, with “new?” improving the accuracy of “old” decisions and “old?” 
improving the accuracy of “new” decisions, F(1,28) = 14.19, p = .001, ηp
2 = .336 (as 
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mentioned before, this bias is in a goal-driven direction, given the inverse emphasis 
imparted by questions in the “no” response condition; see Figure 2.3c). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed a trend approaching significance for new decision accuracy 
across question conditions, t(28) = 2.04, p = .051, d = 0.39, with a nonsignificant 
effect obtained for old decision accuracy, t(28) = 1.12, p = .271, d = 0.21. The 
decision accuracy findings from Experiments 1 and 2 were hence replicated in both 
response format conditions - question emphasis improved the accuracy of endorsing 






Figure 2.4. Experiment 3 results. a) Question format effects on equal variance criterion (EV c), with separate lines denoting response format 
conditions. The remaining graphs show effects of question emphasis on decision accuracy measures in b) the “yes” format condition and c) the 
“no” format condition, with separate lines representing decision types. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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2.5. Overall Discussion 
The experiments presented in this chapter provide evidence of a hitherto overlooked 
role of test question format as a source of goal information in memory evaluation. 
The behavioural trends of Experiment 1 suggested that test questions adopted as 
standard in recognition research are capable of influencing memory decision 
outcomes. Experiment 2 followed up these preliminary findings with systematic 
manipulation of memory strength, and recovered heightened test question effects 
under conditions of low overall memory strength. Experiment 3 tested two competing 
explanations for the question effects, and found evidence in favour of a goal 
emphasis mechanism rather than a habitual preference for responding “no”. In all 
three experiments, we replicated the effect of question emphasis shifting SDT 
criterion (as estimated from two prominent variants of the recognition SDT model) to 
instil a disconfirmatory bias that reduced the likelihood of endorsing the emphasised 
decision. Our analyses involving the more unorthodox decision accuracy measures 
also recovered a consistent effect, wherein question emphasis improved the 
accuracy of endorsements of the emphasised decision. Considered with the criterion 
bias effects, the pattern of results suggests that question emphasis improves the 
accuracy of making emphasised responses at the expense of their frequency, 
consistent with the controlled engagement of strategic caution. These results are 
now discussed with reference to previous findings in the fields of memory and 
decision-making.  
Prior studies investigating effects of test format in standard single item recognition 
have typically focused on measures of source memory or subjective experiences of 
memory (Bastin & Van der Linden, 2003; Dodson & Johnson, 1993; Hicks & Marsh, 
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1999; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 2000; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). For 
example, Hicks and Marsh (1999) reported an increase in “old” responding in a 
recognition test phase comprising three response options with two “old” 
subcategories (“remember old”/“know old”/“new”) compared to a test phase with two 
equally weighted response options (“old”/“new”, followed by “remember”/“know”; 
though cf. Bruno & Rutherford, 2010). Here we present evidence of a test format 
bias in the primary measure of recognition performance, which manifests in the 
absence of unequally weighted response options. Nevertheless, our findings accord 
with previously reported test format biases in highlighting the salient influence of 
aspects of the test environment on the outcomes of memory evaluation (Johnson et 
al., 1993). 
Further, the observed disconfirmatory bias was in the opposite direction to previously 
reported test format biases, such as the acquiescence bias in questionnaire 
responding (‘yea-responding’; Podsakoff, et al., 2003), the Loftus framing effect in 
eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1996) and decision cueing in recognition research 
(e.g. O'Connor, et al., 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). We suggest that our 
emphasis-driven bias differs from these other biases in that it establishes a decision 
goal against which diagnostic evidence is evaluated, rather than contributing to the 
evidence itself. This aspect serves to distinguish the present question effects from 
the classic Loftus framing effect, in which questions that framed details of potentially 
encoded contexts (“leading questions”) led to a confirmatory response tendency that 
enhanced fallacious endorsement of contexts as having been previously 
experienced (Loftus, 1996). Our questions lacked any such allusion to explicit 
aspects of encoding, which would putatively impact upon memory evaluation by 
directly interfering with the assessment of memory evidence i.e. via the retrieval 
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control processes outlined in the previous chapter (see Section 1.3.). The question 
bias is similarly differentiated from the cueing bias, which despite also acting on the 
same broad category of decision control processes (operating independent of 
memory strength) as the emphasis bias, nevertheless serves to instil cued 
expectations that serve as an additional diagnostic evidence base for responding. 
Rather, our question manipulations impacted via a different strategy, by implicitly 
emphasising a particular memory decision as a higher order goal, the endorsement 
of which demanded a higher overall level of diagnostic evidence relative to the non-
emphasised decision.  Our findings therefore inform a tentative distinction between 
three major strategic biases wrought by different aspects of the retrieval 
environment: decision cueing (confirmatory), evidence framing (confirmatory) and 
goal emphasis (disconfirmatory). Chapter 4 examines the interaction of cueing and 
goal emphasis manipulations with a view to directly interrogating the above bias 
trichotomy. 
The present effects hence reveal a strategic influence on memory evaluation that is 
potentially consistent with findings in the rewarded decision-making literature, 
particularly mixed incentive research. In mixed incentive research, monetising one of 
two available response options leads to a reluctance to endorse the monetised 
decision (Newman et al., 1985). A similar behavioural trend indicative of this 
disconfirmatory bias was reported in a previous recognition experiment that 
differentially provided mixed incentives for “old” or “new” decisions (Han, Huettel, 
Raposo, Adcock & Dobbins 2010; see also Section 1.5.). The present findings are 
notable for inducing comparable caution without the provision of incentives, and 
demonstrate that even in the absence of any explicit mention of reward, participants 
display a goal-directed bias that is driven by implicit information gleaned from the 
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testing environment. Chapter 4 directly tests the correspondence of the present 
question emphasis effects with more explicit emphasis mechanisms engaged by 
mixed incentives. 
We also found evidence that the test question bias, whilst decreasing the frequency 
of the emphasised decision, improved the accuracy of these decisions when they 
were made. As outlined in the previous chapter, manipulations enacted solely at 
retrieval have little or no impact on old/new discrimination sensitivity, which is largely 
determined by encoding processes (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Stretch & Wixted, 1998; 
albeit with some exceptions; Dobbins & McCarthy, 2008; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). 
Indeed, across all three experiments our retrieval manipulations had little effect on 
measures of d′ sensitivity that binned responses by ‘objective’ item categories and 
collapsed across old and new decisions. However, the observed effects on decision 
accuracy measures oldcorr and newcorr (which binned responses by ‘subjective’ 
decision categories) highlight the efficacy of these more unorthodox analyses in 
elucidating a strategic effect which would otherwise be somewhat obscured by a 
reliance on SDT analyses alone. Analogous influences of the test environment on 
strategic use of retrieved memory evidence have been highlighted previously by 
models of memory control (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). In the present context, it 
furthers our suggestion of a goal-directed mechanism underlying the question format 
effects, which prompted participants to adjust their criterion towards a more rigorous 
evaluation of diagnostic evidence promoting the emphasised decision. The question 
therefore served to instil the goal of getting a greater proportion of the emphasised 
decisions correct, even if that entailed making fewer endorsements of that decision.  
Overall, the present findings allude to an implicit method by which the test 
environment heightens memory control under variations in goal state – an important 
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yet neglected environmental precipitant of memory control identified in the previous 
chapter (see Section 1.1. and 1.2.). This provides preliminary evidence for the 
previously speculated propensity for participants in a memory test to infer higher-
order goals from uncontrolled environmental aspects (Johnson et al., 1993; Koriat & 
Goldsmith, 1996). Further, the results also validate SDT criterion as a behavioural 
index of memory control processes, albeit whilst also demonstrating the virtue of 
conducting complementary analyses of other behavioural measures to enable 
stronger inferences (indeed, this complementary analytic technique will be 
maintained in subsequent chapters). The real-world implications of these laboratory 
findings are made apparent by revisiting the previous eyewitness test scenario in 
which heightened goal emphasis acted to reduce the likelihood of identifying a 
suspect in a lineup as the perpetrator of a crime. The present findings raise the 
additional possibility that cross-examiners might be capable of biasing eyewitness 
reports merely by selectively mentioning either “old” or “new” decisions in their 
manner of questioning (especially if the strength of the eyewitness’ memory of the 
crime itself is weak). The real-world significance of these goal emphasis effects 
inspired further investigation in ensuing experimental chapters. 
The most immediate avenue of investigation followed from the literature review of the 
previous chapter, which highlighted a neglect in determining whether 
environmentally provoked strategies observed in episodic memory evaluation also 
manifest in other cognitive domains (see Section 1.4. and Section 1.6.). This 
represents an important step in elucidating the cognitive underpinnings of 
behaviourally observable memory strategies, and specifically whether such 
strategies are rooted in control processes confined to the episodic domain (“domain-
specific” control) or those that are capable of modulating behaviour in a number of 
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different domains (“cross-domain” control). Hence, the next experimental chapter 
investigated the emergence of the presently established question emphasis bias 




Chapter 3: Question format as an implicit source of goal emphasis 
across cognitive domains 
 
3.1. Introduction to Experiment 4 
The previous experimental chapter established question format as an implicit source 
of goal emphasis in the test environment, which acts to regulate the controlled 
evaluation of episodic memories. A related question – one that was raised in the 
literature review of Chapter 1 (see Section 1.6.) and which follows on from the 
findings of Chapter 2 – is whether question emphasis impacts on controlled 
processing in other cognitive domains. Hence, the aim of Chapter 3 was to 
instantiate similar variations of question format across a number of single item 
discrimination tasks spanning different cognitive domains, as performed by the same 
sample of subjects. Evidence of comparable behavioural effects across these 
different discrimination tasks would suggest that the controlled processes engaged 
by question emphasis manipulations are not specific to the domain of episodic 
memory. This would also serve to address the longstanding yet rarely empirically 
tested question as to the potential cross-domain nature of behavioural correlates of 
memory control (Fleming & Dolan, 2012; Jacoby, Kelley & McElree, 1999; White & 
Poldrack, 2014; Whittlesea, 2004). Of these correlates, this chapter will focus on 
both “primary” measures of performance (directly reflecting yes/no decision 




The main focus of the primary response analyses was in examining the effects of 
question format in instilling decision strategies, as characterised by the criterion bias 
parameter of the signal detection theory model (SDT; Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This follows from the widespread application of SDT 
in modelling episodic evaluation in yes/no recognition tasks (as outlined in Chapter 
1, Section 1.4.) and more fine-grained aspects of source memory (e.g. the 
Remember/Know procedure; Donaldson, 1996), as well as in discrimination tasks 
beyond the episodic domain, such as visual perception (Tanner & Swets, 1954), 
auditory perception (Paul & Sutton, 1972) and semantic word recognition (Townsend 
& Ashby, 1982). Analyses of response criterion were of particular interest, given the 
question emphasis effects on criterion described in Chapter 2 and prior allusion to 
criterion as an overarching index of strategic biases often left unconstrained in 
laboratory psychology experiments, such as the perceived sequential dependencies 
of randomly presented stimuli and the inferred goals of the experimenter (Swets, 
2014). However, direct empirical scrutiny of criterion as a cross-domain strategic 
index has been lacking, both in terms of the active manipulation of environmental 
sources of strategic bias, as well as in assessing the comparability of strategic 
influences across different tasks in the same sample of participants. 
The present experiment aimed to rectify this empirical dearth, by probing the 
correspondence of the strategic question effect established in the previous chapter 
across four tasks encompassing processing in different cognitive domains. These 
four decision-making tasks shared the same basic decision format of discriminating 
between two item categories from which individually presented word stimuli were 
sampled. The tasks differed according to the cognitive domain under evaluation 
when making discrimination decisions, and spanned two non-episodic domains – 
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colour perception and semantic judgement – as well as two sub-domains within 
episodic memory – episodic recognition and episodic temporal judgement. Question 
emphasis was manipulated in analogous fashion across all tasks, with the wording of 
the question variably emphasising one of the two available decision categories (as in 
the selective question emphasis manipulation employed in Chapter 2, see Section 
2.2.). Hence, across all tasks, participants’ discrimination decisions were assumed to 
be subject to an assessment of the strength of available discrimination evidence 
(indexed by d' sensitivity) and the adjustment of a response criterion (c) in 
accordance with varying strategic biases. Whether criterion was influenced by 
question emphasis in a similar fashion to that evidenced in the recognition 
experiment of the previous chapter was of particular interest within this SDT 
framework (see Figure 3.1a).  
As an extension to the analytic approach of the previous chapter, the present 
experiment also examined effects of question emphasis on behavioural measures 
other than SDT criterion. This encompassed two further primary response measures 
– decision accuracy (the accuracy of endorsements of each category of 
discrimination decision when made) and decision RT (the time taken to endorse 
each decision category) – as well as a secondary measure of proportion confidence 
(the proportion of endorsements of each decision category made at each level of a 
three-point confidence scale). As in the previous chapter, decision accuracy was 
calculated according to decision status rather than “objective” item status (the latter 
being used in calculating the SDT measures; see Chapter 2 Section 2.2.1.4 for 
further details), and was expected to increase under concordant question emphasis. 
Decision RT complemented the other response-based measures with insight into 
how the time taken to make discrimination decisions varied according to question 
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emphasis. Prior research involving incentivized manipulations has reported quicker 
reaction times when making decisions that were congruent with immediately 
emphasised goals, both in episodic (Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock & Dobbins, 2010) 
and non-episodic decision-making tasks (Small et al., 2005). Hence, question 
emphasis was expected to serve as an implicit form of these goal-driven effects and 
induce similar reductions in RT for emphasised decisions.  
Proportion confidence served as an important index of evidence strength, which was 
shown in Experiment 2 of the previous chapter (Section 2.3.) to modulate the 
strategic influence of question emphasis. Direct manipulation of evidence strength in 
each of the four presented tasks would have led to a prohibitively long overall run 
time. For example, manipulating memory strength in the episodic memory task would 
require the presentation of separate study phases (as in Experiment 2, Section 2.3.), 
and calibrating evidence strength for the colour discrimination task would have 
involved time-consuming psychophysical methods applied to each individual 
participant.  Self-rated confidence therefore served as a less precise but more 
practicable alternative in inferring levels of evidence strength. To clarify, decisions 
made with high confidence were assumed to entail high evidence strength, whereas 
those made with low confidence were assumed to reflect low evidence strength, as 
in previous studies of episodic memory (Henson, Rugg, Shallice & Dolan, 2000; 
Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins & Cabeza, 2006) and visual discrimination (Fleming, 
Huijgen & Dolan, 2012). Following from the findings of Experiment 2, a related 
assumption was that strategic processes would be heightened under low evidence 
strength and associated decision uncertainty, and it was therefore expected that 
question emphasis effects would primarily be driven by a reduction in the proportion 
of emphasised decisions specifically made with “low” confidence (and hence 
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characterised by greater uncertainty). The results from analyses of these behavioural 
measures provide partial support for question emphasis effects being underpinned 
by cross-domain control processes, but also serve to highlight the intricacies in 




Figure 3.1. Model definition and experiment design. a. Operationalization of the four 
discrimination tasks according to the equal variance signal detection model. Across task 
domains, participants were assumed to be discriminating between Signal A and Signal B, as 
determined by their sensitivity (d') to the strength of evidence in favour of Signal A and their 
criterion placement (c) along the Signal A evidence axis (as demonstrated by the left panel 
distributions). Positive criterion shifts therefore reflect a reduced likelihood of endorsing a 
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“Signal A” decision (i.e. “Decision A”) and relatedly an increased likelihood of endorsing a 
“signal B” decision (i.e. “Decision B”), whereas negative criterion shifts reflect the inverse 
bias. The assignment of item categories in each task to Signal A (correct identification of 
which leads to a ‘Hit’) and Signal B status (correct identification of which leads to a ‘Correct 
Rejection or ‘CR’) is illustrated in the right panel table. Summaries of the sampling 
methodologies used to create stimuli in each task are also provided in parentheses (see the 
companion Section 3.2.2. for further details). b. Design schematic illustrating the common 
yes/no discrimination format maintained across the question emphasis manipulations 
instantiated in the four task domains. Each task involved 120 trials in which question format 
was varied between selectively emphasising the two available response options (i.e. 60 trials 




3.2.1. Participants. Thirty-two participants (21 female, mean age = 21.2, age range 
= 19-25 years) were recruited for this experiment, all of whom had normal colour 
vision (confirmed by Ishihara colour test; Ishihara, 1917) and reported English as 
their first language. Only participants that met the minimum performance threshold of 
d' > .1 (maintained from the previous chapter) were included in the “primary” 
response analyses specific for each task. This led to the exclusion of four 
participants from the episodic recognition task analyses (n = 28, 18 female, mean 
age = 21.1, age range = 19-25) and eleven participants from the episodic temporal 
judgement task analyses (n = 21, 14 female, mean age = 21.1, age range = 19-25). 
Additional participants were excluded from the “secondary” proportion confidence 
analyses in each task if they failed to make a decision at that confidence level across 
all emphasis conditions. This led to the exclusion of three participants from the low 
confidence proportion analyses for the colour task (n = 29, 18 female, mean age = 
21.3, age range = 19-25), one participant from the medium confidence proportion 
analyses for the semantic task (n = 31, 20 female, mean age = 21.1, age range = 19-
25) and one participant from the low confidence proportion analyses for the semantic 
task (n = 31, 20 female, mean age = 21.2, age range = 19-25). Informed consent for 
all participants was obtained in accordance with the University Teaching and 
Research Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews. Participants were 
compensated for their time at a rate of £5/hour. 
3.2.2. Stimuli. Stimulus creation methodologies for each task are summarised in 
Figure 3.1a. For each participant, a different set of words was randomly sampled 
from a pool of 2584 common nouns taken from the Toglia and Battig semantic word 
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norms (Toglia & Battig, 1978). Although these words served as stimuli for all tasks, 
the Toglia and Battig database was used primarily for its appropriateness to the 
semantic task, given that it contains words rated for pleasantness on a 7-point scale 
in a large sample (with low ratings for unpleasant words and high ratings for pleasant 
ones). These ratings were used to divide words in the Toglia & Battig database into 
pleasant and disagreeable semantic item categories, which were separated from 
each other by 1 standard deviation in their pleasantness ratings to enforce a 
relatively robust pleasant/disagreeable semantic status divider, and ensure that 
words of ambiguous pleasantness were excluded from either category. These two 
semantic item categories formed the  “objective” basis for participants’ 
pleasant/unpleasant discrimination decisions in the semantic task, and were hence 
used when estimating sensitivity and criterion bias parameters in the SDT model 
(pleasant items = semantic Signal A; disagreeable items = semantic Signal B; see 
Figure 3.1a).  
Each resultant semantic category spanned a pleasantness rating range 
encompassing both strongly diagnostic and weakly diagnostic semantic items 
(disagreeable category range = 1.73-3.58 pleasantness rating, pleasant category 
range = 4.43-6.32 pleasantness rating), and was randomly sampled from at regular 
intervals across this range to create task lists. Words from the low semantic 
diagnosticity range were sampled in an attempt to equate the overall levels of 
evidence strength in the semantic task with that in the two episodic memory tasks 
(i.e. the recognition and temporal tasks). Similar efforts were made for the colour 
task (outlined below), as both these non-episodic tasks involved processing “in the 
present” of immediately accessible item evidence, and would hence likely be 
characterised by greater evidence strength compared to the analysis of the more 
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volatile memory traces in the two episodic tasks. Each semantic task wordlist hence 
comprised 120 words, of which 60 had pleasant meanings and 60 had disagreeable 
meanings, with words from each category assigned equally to each question 
emphasis condition. 
For the colour task, participants had to decide if word stimuli were presented in either 
orange or yellow coloured font (ascribed Signal A and Signal B statuses respectively 
in the adopted SDT framework; see Figure 3.1a). These specific colours were 
chosen as they span a relatively small portion of the visible colour spectrum – one 
that does not fall under any perceptually distinct colour category as determined by 
the sensitivities of retinal cone photoreceptor cells (i.e. short, medium and long 
wavelength cones, broadly sensitive to blue, green and red colours respectively; 
Wright & Pitt, 1934). Choosing the perceptually ambiguous orange-yellow spectrum 
therefore avoided ceiling levels of colour evidence strength and discrimination 
sensitivity, which would reduce scope for the influence of higher-order strategies 
(including the question emphasis bias) on decision-making performance (Kahneman, 
Slovic & Tversky, 1982; see also the findings of Experiment 2, Section 2.3.). All 
colour hues were sampled from the sRGB colour space, which comprises three 
adjustable scales for levels of red, green and blue colour intensities (‘R’, ‘G’ and ‘B’ 
respectively) that all range from 0-255 in value. Three orange and three yellow hues 
were created from the available RGB orange-yellow spectrum by varying the G 
intensity value whilst keeping R and B values constant (R for all colours = 255, B for 
all colours = 0, G sampling range = 128-255). This broad range enabled creation of 
‘strong’, ‘medium’ and ‘weak’ evidence diagnosticity sub-types for each colour 
category. An orange/yellow category divider was instantiated by spacing the “weak 
orange” and “weak yellow” hues equally on opposing sides of the G value that was 
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“objectively” of equal orange/yellow intensity (i.e. the median of the G sampling 
range 191.5). The inclusion of weakly diagnostic colour hues situated close to the 
orange-yellow category divider was undertaken to equate levels of evidence 
uncertainty in the colour decision-making task with that in the two episodic tasks.  
The six resultant hues had the following sRGB values, with associated International 
Commission on Illumination (CIE) Yxy values provided in brackets: strong orange = 
255, 154, 0 (44.03, 0.51, 0.43); medium orange = 255, 169, 0 (49.60, 0.49, 0.45); 
weak orange = 255, 184, 0 (56.17, 0.47, 0.46); weak yellow = 255, 199, 0 (63.33, 
0.46, 0.47); medium yellow = 255, 214, 0 (71.34, 0.44, 0.49); strong yellow = 255, 
229, 0 (80.33, 0.43, 0.50). These six coloured fonts were randomly assigned to 
words sampled from the Toglia and Battig word norms (1978), leading to the 
presentation of 60 orange and 60 yellow words in each participants’ 120 task 
wordlist, with each category comprising 20 of each colour diagnosticity sub-type. To 
minimise confounding influences on colour perception, stimuli were presented 
against an achromatic background on a monitor positioned in a dark room without 
ambient sources of illumination. All participants viewed stimuli in the colour task (and 
all other task phases) on CRT monitors that were calibrated for colour display using 
the ColorCAL MKII Colorimeter (Cambridge Research Systems). 
The semantic task served as the study phase for the ensuing episodic temporal 
judgement task, and the colour task served as study for the ensuing episodic 
recognition task. All 120 words appearing in the semantic task were presented in a 
randomised order for the temporal task, with 60 words having been previously 
presented in the first half of the semantic task (assuming temporal task Signal A 
status in the SDT framework, see Figure 3.1a) and 60 in the second half (Signal B). 
Each of these two temporal item categories was further divided into three sub-
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categories based on the precise order of presentation in the semantic task and 
hence the assumed evidence strength (“strong”, “medium” or “weak”) when 
discriminating the temporal status of these items. To clarify, the “strong” subcategory 
of first half items comprised the first 20 words presented in the semantic task, the 
“medium” first half subcategory comprised the moderately diagnostic 21-40 
presented words, and the “weak” subcategory comprised the final 41-60 first half 
words that were presented close to the onset of the second half items (and hence 
more likely to be confused with them). Equivalent stratification was employed for 
second half subcategories e.g. the “strong” category of second half items comprised 
words ordered from 101-120 in the semantic task wordlist. As with the stratified 
sampling strategies employed in the colour and semantic tasks, these subcategories 
were allocated equally to task lists in the temporal question conditions. 
The 120 words used in the recognition task comprised a random selection of 60 old 
words (recognition Signal A; see Figure 3.1a) that were presented in the preceding 
colour task and 60 new words (recognition Signal B) not previously seen that were 
sampled afresh from the Toglia and Battig word database. The experiment was 
presented and responses recorded using PCs running MATLAB (The MathWorks 
Inc., Natick, MA, 2000) and Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
3.2.3. Procedure. After the presentation of onscreen instructions, participants 
worked through a practice phase composed of brief versions of all four tasks. Each 
task in the main phase involved the presentation of 120 words broken into 4 mini-
blocks of 30 words each, within which the format of the test question was varied to 
emphasise one of the two decision categories available for that task (i.e. semantic 
task questions: “pleasant?”, “disagreeable?”; colour task: “orange?”, “yellow?”; 
recognition task: “old?”, “new?”; temporal task: “first half?”, “second half?”; see 
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Figure 3.1b). Participants were alerted to the change in question via an instruction 
screen presented for 5s prior to the appearance of the first word in each question 
mini-block (e.g. “Next question: pleasant?”). Across all tasks, the appearance of to-
be-judged words on each trial was preceded by a 0.5s fixation cross. Participants 
submitted their self-paced task decisions using the number keys, where 1 denoted a 
“yes” response and 2 a “no” response. After a 0.25s delay, participants 
supplemented their yes/no decision with a self-paced rating of decision confidence 
using a 3-point scale (1 = “low”, 2 = “medium” and 3 = “high” confidence). The 
semantic task was always succeeded by the temporal task, and the colour task was 
always succeeded by the recognition task. The ordering of these task pairings was 
counterbalanced so that half the participants performed the semantic-temporal block 
first, and the other half performed the colour-recognition block first. Question 
emphasis order was partially counterbalanced within these task orders, with half the 
participants in each task order exposed to the following first questions in each 
respective task phase (with the questions alternating thereafter for the remaining 3 
mini-blocks): “orange?-old?-pleasant?-first half?” questions first; while the other half 
were exposed to the inverse sequence first: “yellow?-new?-disagreeable?-second 
half?” 
3.2.4. Calculation. Analyses were conducted on sensitivity (d') and criterion bias (c) 
parameters estimated from the equal variance signal detection model (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), following a correction for errorless 
responding (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988; see Section 2.2.1.4 for further details). 
Across the four discrimination tasks, item categories were assigned Signal A”(the 
correct identification of which led to a “hit”) and Signal B status (correct identification 
of which led to a “correct rejection” or CR) in accordance with the “discrimination” 
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rather than “detection” operationalization of the SDT model (Benjamin, Diaz & Wee, 
2009; Tanner, 1956; see Figure 3.1a). Participants were hence assumed to be 
discriminating between Signal A and Signal B item categories cross the four tasks, 
as informed by their estimated d' sensitivity (the distance between the two item 
distributions) and criterion c parameters (the threshold amount of evidence required 
to decide that Signal A was present). This common formalisation of Signal A and 
Signal B item categories in each task is extended to describe cross-task analyses 
involving decision categories (i.e. endorsements of Signal A are termed “Decision A” 
and endorsements of Signal B are termed “Decision B”) and the cross-task question 
emphasis conditions (i.e. questions that impart emphasis to “Decision A” and 
“Decision B” in each task). 
Cross-domain question emphasis effects were also interrogated by analyses of other 
behavioural measures. The analyses of old and new decision accuracy conducted 
for the recognition task in Chapter 2 (oldcorr and newcorr respectively; see Section 
2.2.1.4.) were extended to encompass decision categories across all four tasks, in 
the form of the DecisionAcorr and DecisionBcorr parameters. To clarify with reference 
to the semantic task, the proportion of correct “pleasant” decisions out of all 
“pleasant” decisions made by each individual subject was indexed by semantic 
DecisionAcorr (given that pleasant is assigned Signal A item status in that task; see 
Figure 3.1a), whereas the proportion of correct “disagreeable” decisions out of all 
“disagreeable” decisions made was indexed by DecisionBcorr (as disagreeable is 
assigned Signal B status). Decision RT was calculated as the time taken to render 
each category of decision available in each task (irrespective of the correctness), in 
the form of the DecisionART and DecisionBRT parameters. The proportion confidence 
analyses were conducted on calculations of the proportion of high, medium and low 
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confidence decisions made for each category of decision in each task (Decision A 
confidence measures: HighAprop, MedAprop, LowAprop; Decision B confidence 
measures: HighBprop, MedBprop, LowBprop). For example, the number of “pleasant” 
decisions rendered with high confidence divided by the total number of “pleasant” 
decisions made was indexed by HighAprop. Comparisons of the above behavioural 
measures across the different question emphasis conditions enabled a thorough 




3.3.1. Overall task performance. Differences in overall performance across the four 
tasks were first quantified by analyses of d' sensitivity in the complete sample4 (i.e. 
without performance-based exclusions), which collapsed across question emphasis 
conditions in each individual task. A one-way repeated measures ANOVA of task 
format (semantic, colour, temporal and recognition) on overall d' yielded a significant 
main effect, F(3,93) = 263.11, p < .001, ηp
2 = .90. Pairwise t-tests confirmed that 
sensitivity in the colour task (M = 2.92, SD = 0.46) was significantly greater than 
sensitivity in the semantic task (M = 2.11, SD = 0.38), t(31) = 8.65, p < .001, d = 
1.53, which was in turn greater than sensitivity in the recognition task (M = 0.82, SD 
= 0.37), t(31) = 12.95, p < .001, d = 2.29, which was in turn greater than sensitivity in 
the temporal task (M = 0.57, SD = 0.41), t(31) = 3.57, p = .001, d = 0.63.  
                                            
4
 A similar pattern of differences in overall task performance was observed for d' sensitivity analyses 
that excluded sub-threshold performers in each task. 
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The differences in overall performance across the four tasks imply a considerable 
degree of variation in the levels of underlying evidence strength, which has been 
previously highlighted as a salient impediment to recovering cross-domain control 
effects in the field of metacognition (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). This variability in 
evidence strength might have had the collateral effect of instilling strategies other 
than the question emphasis strategy of primary interest (see the Discussion Section 
3.4. for further details). The overall sensitivity differences are likely to account for the 
lack of consistent cross-domain question emphasis effects on “primary” behavioural 
measures centring on the basic yes/no response selection (detailed in ensuing 
sections). 
3.3.2. Signal detection sensitivity and bias. Means and standard deviations for 
analyses of SDT measures across the question emphasis conditions are presented 
in Table 3.1. The effects of question emphasis on discrimination sensitivity were first 
analysed via paired-samples t-test conducted for each task separately. For the 
semantic task, d' was significantly lower for “disagreeable?” compared to “pleasant?” 
questions, t(31) = 3.68, p = .001, d = 0.65. There was also a significant effect of 
question emphasis on sensitivity in the temporal judgement task, such that d' was 
lower for “second half?” than “first half?” questions, t(20) = 2.21, p = .039, d = 0.49. 
Question emphasis did not significantly influence d' in the colour and recognition 
tasks, t(31) = 1.36, p = .183, d = 0.25, and t(27) = 1.06, p = .301, d = 0.20 
respectively. The reduced sensitivity for the “disagreeable?” and “second half?” 
questions is potentially due to the greater difficulty entailed in fluently integrating 
these questions into ongoing decision-making. For “disagreeable?” questions in the 
semantic task, this processing difficulty might result from its lower frequency of 
usage in the English language and associated greater lexical difficulty compared to 
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the alternate “pleasant?” question. For “second half?” questions in the temporal task, 
the processing difficulty might arise from the dissonance between its featuring the 
term “second” whilst requiring participants to press the “1” number key to endorse 
the question (unlike the alternate “first half?” question, for which the numerical 
descriptor worded in the question is congruent with its method of endorsement via 
the “1” key). These suggested difficulties in processing the questions themselves 
would have served to reduce overall sensitivity both by using up pre-decision 
cognitive resources otherwise directed towards the assessment of evidence 
strength5, as well as by increasing the post-decision likelihood of pressing the wrong 
response buttons.  
Admittedly, this interpretation of the question effects on semantic and temporal 
discrimination sensitivity is speculative, however the discussion of these findings is 
limited as such given that the primary aim was to interrogate question effects on 
criterion bias. Nevertheless, the ensuing criterion analyses are complemented by 
analyses of a measure that takes into account the above variation in sensitivity – c′ 
(Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This is simply criterion divided by d′, which serves as 
a scaling operation that reduces the potential for differences in sensitivity across 
question emphasis conditions to exert confounding influences on bias. 
The analyses of unscaled criterion bias (c) were also conducted via separate paired 
samples t-tests for each individual task (see Table 3.1. for means; see Figure 3.2.). 
For the semantic task, c was significantly higher for “pleasant?” compared to 
“disagreeable?” questions, t(31) = 6.08, p < .001, d = 1.09. The disconfirmatory or 
                                            
5
 The proposed disruption of evidence-strength processing is comparable to the interference of source 
monitoring processes following divided attention and response speeding manipulations enacted at 
recognition test phases, as described in Chapter 1 section 1.3. (Johnson, Kounios & Reeder, 1994; 
Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993). 
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“counter-emphasis” direction of this criterion shift parallels that observed in the 
previous chapter, in reflecting the reduced likelihood of endorsing the semantic 
decision emphasised by the question (i.e. “pleasant?” reduces the likelihood of 
responding “pleasant”). However, the difference in c across question emphasis 
conditions in the recognition task was non-significant, t(27) = 0.39, p = .697, d = 
0.07. Despite the counter-emphasis direction of this shift in recognition criterion, the 
failure for the shift to reach significance was contrary to the findings of the previous 
chapter (in which significant question emphasis effects on recognition criterion were 
recovered in two separate samples) and an independent study involving a large 
online sample (Mill & O’Connor, 2014). Further, c shifted in the opposing “pro-
emphasis” direction in the colour and temporal tasks (i.e. reflecting an increased 
likelihood of endorsing emphasised decisions) albeit to non-significant degrees, t(31) 
= 1.29, p = .206, d = 0.23, and t(20) = 1.54, p = .138, d = 0.10 respectively (see 
Figure 3.2.).  
Given the previously described effects of question emphasis on d′ sensitivity in the 
semantic and temporal tasks, the c analyses were complemented by analysis of the 
sensitivity-scaled bias parameter c′. The pattern of bias results involving c′ was the 
same as that for unscaled c, with a significant counter-emphasis bias shift observed 
between question conditions in the semantic task and a non-significant shift in the 
same direction observed for the recognition task, t(31) = 6.42, p < .001, d = 1.16, and 
t(27) = 0.70, p = .489, d = 0.14 respectively (see Table 1 for means). Sensitivity-
scaled bias did not differ between question conditions in the colour and temporal 
tasks, t(31) = 0.77, p = .446, d = 0.13, and t(20) = 0.458, p = .652, d = 0.10 
respectively. Collectively, analyses involving both c and sensitivity-scaled c′ reveal 
that the only reliable effect of question emphasis in shifting response criterion was 
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evidenced in the semantic task. Hence, the overall pattern across the four tasks 
does not provide compelling evidence in support of cross-domain effects of question 
emphasis being registered in SDT estimates of bias.
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Table 3.1. Design key and descriptive statistics for cross-task analyses of equal variance signal detection theory (SDT) parameters, including 
sensitivity (SDT d′), unscaled bias (SDT c) and sensitivity-scaled bias (SDT c′). 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation. 
Task Semantic Colour Temporal Recognition 
Question pleasant? disagreeable? orange? yellow? first half? second half? old? new? 
Emphasis Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B 
SDT  d′ M 2.29 1.92 2.85 2.99 0.84 0.68 0.92 0.82 
 SD 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.59 0.38 0.33 0.49 0.38 
SDT c M -0.05 -0.41 -0.30 -0.22 0.01 0.11 0.12 0.09 
 SD 0.35 0.29 0.41 0.40 0.30 0.21 0.38 0.32 
SDT c′ M -0.02 -0.22 -0.11 -0.09 0.12 0.19 0.19 0.08 




Figure 3.2. Question emphasis effects on equal variance (EV) estimates of criterion bias (c) 
across the four presented tasks: a. semantic task, b. colour task, c. temporal task and d. 
recognition task. In each panel, graphs depict shifts in criterion bias according to the 
decision emphasised by the question, such that increasing c values reflect a reduced 
likelihood of endorsing the “Signal A” decision (i.e. “pleasant”, “orange”, “first half” and “old” 
decisions respectively; see Figure 3.1. for further detail on this formalization). Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.  
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3.3.3. Decision accuracy. Question emphasis effects were also examined on the 
accuracy of endorsements of the two decision categories available in each task (i.e. 
DecisionAcorr and DecisionBcorr, see Calculation Section 3.2.4). Means and standard 
deviations for decision accuracy analyses are provided in Table 3.2. A 2(decision 
type: Decision A and Decision B) x 2(question emphasis: “Decision A?” or “Decision 
B?”) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on decision accuracy for each 
separate discrimination task (see Figure 3.3.). For the semantic task, there was a 
main effect of decision type, such that “disagreeable” decisions (M = .89, SD = .06) 
were more accurately made overall than “pleasant” decisions (M = .82, SD = .06), 
F(1,31) = 23.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .43. A main effect of decision type was also 
observed in the colour task, such that “yellow” decisions (M = .96, SD = .05) were 
more accurately made than “orange” decisions (M = .89, SD = .06), F(1,31) = 16.13, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .34. Considered with the overall biases revealed by the SDT analyses 
in the colour and semantic tasks, reflective of a reduced tendency to endorse 
“disagreeable” and “yellow” decisions (i.e. absolute criterion in relation to statistically 
optimal placement at 0 was negative across question emphasis conditions in both 
tasks; see Table 3.1.), these main effects of decision type suggest that participants 
were more strategically cautious in endorsing “disagreeable” and “yellow” decisions 
than their respective decision alternatives (regardless of question emphasis). There 
were no main effects of decision type in the temporal task and the recognition task, 
F(1,20) = 1.38, p = .254, ηp
2 = .06, and F(1,27) = 3.92, p = .058, ηp
2 = .13 
respectively. The variable effects of decision type on decision-making across the four 
tasks once again highlight the performance differences arising from the variable 
evidence domains under evaluation in each task. 
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The decision accuracy ANOVAs also revealed main effects of question emphasis in 
the semantic and temporal tasks, F(1,31) = 17.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .37, and F(1,20) = 
5.09, p = .036, ηp
2 = .20 respectively. Overall accuracy was worse following 
“disagreeable?” (M = .83, SD = .06) than “pleasant?” questions (M = .88, SD = .05), 
and for “second half?” (M = .64, SD = .06) than “first half?” questions (M = .67, SD = 
.07). There were no main effects of question emphasis on decision accuracy in the 
colour and recognition tasks, F(1,31) = 1.75, p = .196, ηp
2 = .05, and F(1,27) = 1.00, 
p = .325, ηp
2 = .04 respectively. The question effects in the semantic and temporal 
tasks parallel the earlier SDT sensitivity effects in suggesting that “disagreeable?” 
and “second half?” questions led to worse overall discrimination performance. As 
before, these deleterious effects on performance can be speculated to arise from the 
greater difficulty in integrating these question types into ongoing decision-making. 
The interaction of decision type and question emphasis was of primary interest in 
determining whether the hypothesised increase in decision accuracy under 
concordant question emphasis was borne out by the data. The 2x2 ANOVAs 
revealed a significant decision type x question emphasis interaction for the semantic 
task, F(1,31) = 40.36, p < .001, ηp
2 = .57. In support of the observed counter-
emphasis bias on semantic criterion, planned pairwise comparisons revealed that 
the accuracy of “pleasant” decisions was significantly improved for “pleasant?” 
compared to “disagreeable?” questions, with a non-significant shift in a counter-
emphasis direction observed for “disagreeable” decisions, t(31) = 8.08, p < .001, d = 
1.43, and t(31) = 0.60, p = .554, d = 0.10 respectively (see Table 3.2.; see Figure 
3.3The decision type x question emphasis interactions were non-significant in the 
colour, recognition tasks and temporal tasks, F(1,31) < 1, F(1,27) < 1 and F(1,20) = 
3.34, p = .083, ηp
2 = .14 respectively.  
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Hence, the sole goal emphasis-consistent effect of question format on decision 
accuracy was evidenced in the semantic task, with question emphasis increasing the 
accuracy of emphasised semantic decisions. Considered with the earlier SDT 
analyses, which demonstrated a counter-emphasis criterion bias exclusively in this 
task, the pattern of findings suggests that the influence of question format in instilling 
strategic caution towards particular decision categories was successfully isolated in 
the semantic task by the same measures used in Chapter 2. However, the fact that 
the remaining tasks failed to recover consistent strategic question effects on SDT 
bias and decision accuracy highlights the potential contamination of these measures 
by other factors, such as the observed difficulty in integrating particular questions 
and the adoption of alternative evidence-based strategies in different tasks. The 
subsequent analyses of decision RT and proportion confidence were therefore 





Table 3.2. Design key and descriptive statistics for cross-task analyses of decision status measures, including the accuracy of endorsing 
available decision categories (DecisionAcorr and DecisionBcorr) and the reaction time for endorsing these categories (DecisionART and 
DecisionBRT). 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation; RT measures are in seconds.
Task Semantic Colour Temporal Recognition 
Question pleasant? disagreeable? orange? yellow? first half? second half? old? new? 
Emphasis Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B 
DecisionAcorr M .87 .76 .88 .90 .67 .65 .69 .67 
 SD .07 .06 .08 .09 .08 .08 .11 .08 
DecisionBcorr M .88 .89 .96 .96 .67 .62 .66 .65 
 SD .07 .08 .06 .05 .08 .05 .08 .08 
DecisionART M 1.70 2.07 1.37 1.43 1.85 2.18 1.87 2.07 
 SD 0.54 0.69 0.52 0.48 0.44 0.58 0.70 0.85 
DecisionBRT M 1.90 1.95 1.57 1.29 1.79 1.94 1.88 1.91 




Figure 3.3. Question emphasis effects on the accuracy of endorsements of decision 
categories available across tasks: a. semantic task, b. colour task, c. temporal task and d. 
recognition task. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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3.3.4. Decision RT. Effects of question emphasis were examined on the time taken 
to endorse each of the two decision categories available in the four tasks (i.e. 
DecisionART and DecisionBRT, see Calculation Section 2.4 above), via 2(decision 
type: Decision A and Decision B) x 2(question emphasis: “Decision A?” or “Decision 
B?”) repeated measures ANOVAs conducted for each task separately. Means and 
standard deviations for the decision RT analyses are provided in Table 3.2. The 
main effect of decision type was significant in the temporal task, such that “first half” 
decisions (M = 2.01s, SD = 0.48) were made slower overall than “second half” 
decisions (M = 1.87s, SD = 0.48), F(1,20) = 8.72, p = .008, ηp
2 = .30. Inspection of 
the decision RT means in the temporal task (see Table 3.2.; see Figure 3.4.) 
suggests that the decision type effect is driven by the slower reaction time for “first 
half” decisions made under “second half?” questions, compared to other condition 
cells. This decision type main effect was specific to the temporal task, with non-
significant effects observed in the semantic, colour and recognition tasks, F(1,31) = 
1.08, p = .307, ηp
2 = .03, F(1,20) < 1 and F(1,27) = 1.28, p = .267, ηp
2 = .05 
respectively. As before, this finding can be linked with the dissonance between 
decision categories and available response options (i.e. the need to press the “2” key 
to submit a “first half” decision). 
Main effects of question emphasis on decision RT were observed in the semantic, 
temporal and colour tasks, F(1,31) = 18.29, p < .001, ηp
2 = .37, F(1,20) = 12.92, p = 
.002, ηp
2 = .39, and F(1,31) = 6.30, p = .018, ηp
2 = .17 respectively. The main effect 
of question emphasis was non-significant in the recognition task, F(1,27) = 3.38, p = 
.077, ηp
2 = .11. The direction of the main effects in the semantic and temporal tasks 
complements the earlier decision accuracy analyses in highlighting the greater 
processing difficulties associated with “disagreeable?” and “second half?” questions 
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than their task counterpart (linked with lexical difficulty and dissonant response 
options respectively). Hence, “disagreeable?” questions (M = 2.01, SD = 0.69) were 
responded to slower than “pleasant?” questions (M = 1.80, SD = 0.56), and “second 
half?” questions (M = 2.06, SD = 0.53) were responded to slower than “first half?” 
questions (M = 1.82, SD = 0.44). The question main effect in the colour task was 
driven by the slower reaction time for “orange?” questions (M = 1.47, SD = 0.55) 
compared to “yellow?” ones (M = 1.36, SD = 0.43). Given the absence of 
complementary effects of question emphasis on decision accuracy in the colour and 
recognition tasks, interpretation of this latter main effect remains speculative.  
As with the earlier decision accuracy analyses, the interaction of decision type and 
question emphasis was the primary index of the effects on decision RT expected if 
the test question served to impart goal emphasis to specific decision categories (i.e. 
a reduction in the time take to endorse the decision category emphasised by the 
question). The decision type x question emphasis interaction was significant in the 
semantic and colour tasks, F(1,31) = 23.28, p < .001, ηp
2 = .43, and F(1,31) = 15.85, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .34 respectively. The colour task interaction was in the anticipated 
goal emphasis-driven direction, with pairwise t-tests revealing a significant reduction 
in the time taken to make “yellow” decisions for “yellow?” compared to “orange?” 
questions, and a non-significant reduction in the time taken to make “orange” 
decisions for “orange?” compared to “yellow?” questions, t(31) = 4.55, p < .001, d = 
0.99, and t(31) = 1.02, p = .314, d = 0.18 respectively (see Table 3.2.; see Figure 
3.4.). However, the direction of the semantic task interaction was not consistent with 
the goal emphasis prediction, and merely extended the prior main effect of question 
emphasis in increasing RT for “disagreeable?” compared to “pleasant?” questions. 
Pairwise t-tests demonstrated that the greater RT under “disagreeable?” questions 
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was significant for “pleasant” but not “disagreeable” decision types, t(31) = 6.25, p < 
.001, d = 1.22, and t(31) = 0.92, p = .367, d = 0.17 respectively. The decision type x 
question emphasis interactions were non-significant and non-supportive of emphasis 
predictions in the temporal and recognition tasks, F(1,20) = 2.51, p = .129, ηp
2 = .11, 
and F(1,27) = 2.46, p = .129, ηp
2 = .08 respectively. 
Hence, the only goal emphasis-consistent effect recovered in the decision RT 
analyses was the significant decision type x question emphasis crossover interaction 
in the colour task, reflecting the reduced time taken to make emphasised colour 
decisions. Those remaining decision RT effects that reached significance bore the 
influence of extraneous behavioural factors, such as the previously described 
difficulty in integrating particular question types in the semantic and temporal tasks. 
Overall, the decision RT analyses parallel the earlier SDT and decision accuracy 
analyses in revealing the general absence of cross-domain effects of question 
emphasis. A likely cause of these modest effects is the fact that all behavioural 
measures presented thus far collapse across the variable evidence strength signals 
in each task, which were shown to be present to a significant degree by the overall 
differences in task sensitivities reported in Section 3.3.1.  The ensuing proportion 
confidence analyses therefore aimed to counteract these variations in task evidence 
signals by segregating decisions in each task according to self-rated confidence and 




Figure 3.4. Question emphasis effects on the reaction time (RT) taken to endorse decision 
categories across tasks: a. semantic task, b. colour task, c. temporal task and d. recognition 




3.3.5. Proportion confidence. Across the four tasks, the proportion of high, medium 
and low confidence decisions made for each decision category was calculated (i.e. 
Decision A confidence measures: HighAprop, MedAprop, LowAprop; Decision B 
confidence measures: HighBprop, MedBprop, LowBprop). To reiterate, confidence was 
assumed to serve as an index of evidence strength, such that decisions rendered 
with low confidence were assumed to reflect heightened uncertainty. Following on 
from the counter-emphasis bias described in the previous chapter (i.e. the reduced 
likelihood of endorsing decisions emphasised by the question; see Section 2.3.), it 
was expected that question emphasis would serve to reduce the proportion of those 
emphasised decisions specifically given low confidence ratings (and associated with 
greater uncertainty). Hence, a series of 2(decision type: Decision A and Decision B) 
x 2(question emphasis: “Decision A?” or “Decision B?”) repeated measures ANOVAs 
were conducted on the proportion of high, medium and low confidence decisions, 
separately for each of the four tasks. Means and standard deviations for these 
proportion confidence analyses are provided in Table 3.3.  
For the analyses of the proportion of high confidence decisions (HighAprop and 
HighBprop), the main effect of decision type was significant in the temporal and 
recognition tasks, F(1,20) = 4.88, p = .039, ηp
2 = .20, and F(1,27) = 5.22, p = .030, 
ηp
2 = .16 respectively. The proportion of high confidence ratings was higher for 
“second half” decisions (M = .46, SD = .22) compared to “first half” decisions (M = 
.40, SD = .22), and for “old” decisions (M = .38, SD = .18) compared to “new” 
decisions (M = .31, SD = .18). The main effects of decision type did not generalize 
across the two tasks, with non-significant effects observed in the semantic and 
colour tasks, both Fs(1,31) < 1. The main effects of question emphasis were non-
significant in the semantic, colour, temporal and recognition tasks, F(1,31) < 1, 
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F(1,31) < 1, F(1,20) < 1, and F(1,27) = 1.21, p = .281, ηp
2 = .04 respectively. 
Crucially, the decision type x question emphasis interactions were also non-
significant across the four tasks, F(1,31) = 2.06, p = .162, ηp
2 = .06, F(1,31) < 1, 
F(1,20) < 1, and F(1,27) = 2.91, p = .100, ηp
2 = .10 respectively. As before, 
interactions of decision type and question emphasis served as the primary index of 
counter-emphasis effects in the proportion confidence analyses. Hence, the 
complete absence of such interactions for the analyses of the high confidence 
decision proportions across tasks is consistent with the inferred high evidence 
strength associated with these decisions. High evidence strength ensures sufficiently 
accurate responding that precludes the need to engage controlled strategies, such 
as heightening strategic caution towards the rendering of emphasised decisions. 
A similar pattern of results was observed for the analyses of the proportion of 
medium confidence decisions (MedAprop and MedBprop). The 2(decision type) x 
2(question emphasis) ANOVAs revealed non-significant main effects of decision type 
across the semantic, colour, temporal and recognition tasks, F(1,30) = 2.74, p = 
.108, ηp
2 = .08, F(1,31) < 1, F(1,20) < 1, and F(1,27) < 1 respectively. The main 
effects of question emphasis across these four tasks were also non-significant, 
F(1,30) < 1, F(1,31) < 1, F(1,20) < 1, and F(1,27) = 3.53, p = .071, ηp
2 = .12. Finally, 
the interaction of decision type and question emphasis was non-significant in the 
semantic, colour and recognition tasks, F(1,30) < 1, F(1,31) < 1 and F(1,27) < 1 
respectively. A significant interaction was observed in the temporal task, although in 
a converse direction to that expected of the counter-emphasis bias i.e. question 
emphasis increased the proportion of emphasised decision endorsements at 
medium confidence (see Table 3.3. for means), F(1,20) = 23.20, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54. 
Pairwise t-tests revealed that this accuracy improvement under emphasis was 
139 
 
significant for both “first half” and “second half” decisions, t(20) = 4.43, p < .001, d = 
0.98, and t(20) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 1.01 respectively. Overall, the proportion of 
medium confidence decisions did not display consistent counter-emphasis shifts 
across tasks. Rather, the converse “pro-emphasis” shift evidenced in the temporal 
task highlights the virtue of segregating performance by confidence level and 
inferred evidence strength, as converse behavioural trends might be present at 
different confidence levels. 
Unlike the analyses of high and medium proportion confidence measures (and those 
involving the earlier “primary” response measures), the analyses of the proportion of 
low confidence decisions yielded a reliable cross-domain effect in the anticipated 
goal emphasis direction. The 2(decision type) x 2(question emphasis) ANOVAs 
revealed main effects of decision type in the semantic, temporal and recognition 
tasks, F(1,30) = 9.42, p = .005, ηp
2 = .24, F(1,20) = 5.34, p = .032, ηp
2 = .21, and 
F(1,27) = 6.98, p = .014, ηp
2 = .21 respectively. Across these tasks, a greater 
proportion of low confidence ratings were given for “disagreeable” decisions (M = 
.13, SD = .11) compared to “pleasant” decisions (M = .09, SD = .09), as well as for 
“first half” (M = .23, SD = .15) compared to “second half” decisions (M = .18, SD = 
.13), and for “new” (M = .31, SD = .22) compared to “old” decisions (M = .24, SD = 
.17). The main effect of decision type was non-significant in the colour task, F(1,28) 
< 1. These decision type main effects are putatively driven by domain-specific 
characteristics of the evidence strength under evaluation in each task. Further, the 
main effects of question emphasis were non-significant in the semantic, colour, 
temporal and recognition tasks, F(1,30) < 1, F(1,28) < 1, F(1,20) = 1.06, p = .317, ηp
2 
= .05, F(1,27) = 1.48, p = .234, ηp
2 = .05 respectively. 
140 
 
 Crucially, the decision type by question emphasis interactions were significant in the 
semantic, temporal and recognition tasks, F(1,30) = 13.76, p = .001, ηp
2 = .31, 
F(1,20) = 17.50, p < .001, ηp
2 = .47, and F(1,27) = 14.12, p = .001, ηp
2 = .34 
respectively. The interactions were in the same direction across these tasks, 
reflecting “counter-emphasis” shifts in response proportion i.e. a reduced proportion 
of low confidence decisions made under question emphasis (see Figure 3.5.). 
Although the interaction was clearly non-significant in the colour task, the direction 
was nevertheless in the same counter-emphasis direction as the other three tasks, 
F(1,28) = 1.48, p = ..233, ηp
2 = .05. Pairwise t-tests demonstrated significant counter-
emphasis low confidence shifts for “disagreeable” but not “pleasant” decisions in the 
semantic task, t(30) = 2.60, p = .014, d = 0.48, and t(30) = 1.99, p = .055, d = 0.36 
respectively; for both “first half” and “second half” decisions in the temporal task, 
t(20) = 4.68, p < .001, d = 1.23, and t(20) = 3.00, p = .007, d = 0.70 respectively; for 
“new” but not “old” decisions in the recognition task, t(27) = 3.17, p = .004, d = 0.60, 
and t(20) = 1.85, p = .075, d = 0.35 respectively; and neither for “orange” nor “yellow” 
decisions in the colour task, t(28) = 0.75, p = .459, d = 0.15, and t(28) = 1.34, p = 
.190, d = 0.26 respectively. The low confidence proportion results therefore bear out 
the prediction that strategic effects of question emphasis would manifest across 
cognitive domains exclusively in the presence of low evidence strength and 
heightened levels of uncertainty.  
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Table 3.3. Design key and descriptive statistics for cross-task analyses of proportion of endorsements of available decision categories 
(Decision A and Decision B) made at particular confidence levels, comprising the proportion of decisions made with high (HighAprop and 
HighBprop), medium (MedAprop and MedBprop) and low confidence levels (LowAprop and LowBprop). 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation. 
Task Semantic Colour Temporal Recognition 
Question pleasant? disagreeable? orange? yellow? first half? second half? old? new? 
Emphasis Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B Decision A Decision B 
HighAprop M .63 .60 .77 .75 .40 .40 .40 .35 
 SD .18 .19 .18 .17 .22 .25 .20 .18 
HighBprop M .60 .63 .75 .76 .47 .45 .30 .32 
 SD .20 .19 .16 .19 .25 .21 .19 .19 
MedAprop M .31 .31 .17 .18 .43 .31 .37 .39 
 SD .12 .13 .13 .12 .15 .12 .15 .14 
MedBprop M .27 .28 .17 .18 .30 .42 .35 .41 
 SD .13 .15 .11 .16 .13 .16 .11 .14 
LowAprop M .08 .10 .07 .07 .16 .29 .22 .26 
 SD .11 .10 .08 .10 .12 .20 .18 .17 
LowBprop M .15 .11 .09 .07 .23 .13 .35 .27 
 SD .13 .11 .09 .07 .18 .12 .23 .22 
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Figure 3.5. Question emphasis effects on the proportion of low confidence decisions made 
for decision categories across tasks: a. semantic task, b. colour task, c. temporal task and d. 




The present experiment probed the strategic influence of implicit goal information 
imparted by test question format on evaluative performance across different 
domains. This followed from the findings of the recognition experiments conducted in 
Chapter 2, in which question format was found to impart goal emphasis to particular 
decision categories and instil strategies that directly influenced memory decision 
outcomes. The present experiment interrogated whether the question emphasis 
effect was rooted in cross-domain cognitive control mechanisms via presentation of 
four item discrimination tasks performed by the same sample of subjects: the 
semantic judgement task, the colour perception task, the episodic temporal 
judgement task and the episodic recognition task. The results revealed variable 
influences of question emphasis manipulations across behavioural measures, with a 
general lack of evidence in support of cross-domain emphasis effects emerging in 
analyses of “primary” measures of yes/no decision-making, including SDT estimates 
of criterion bias, as well as the accuracy and time taken to endorse task decision 
categories. However, consistent cross-domain emphasis effects were observed in 
the final set of “secondary” proportion confidence analyses, which segregated the 
proportion of endorsements of decision categories in each task according to self-
rated confidence, and demonstrated reliable effects of question emphasis in shifting 
the proportion of low confidence decisions across the four tasks. The findings serve 
to highlight the intricacies in elucidating control processes that exert “general” 
influences on cognitive processing across different domains. 
The establishment of the question emphasis effect in the previous chapter centred 
on analyses of SDT criterion and decision accuracy measures of recognition 
performance. Specifically, question emphasis shifted SDT criterion so as to reduce 
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the likelihood of endorsing emphasised decisions, whilst improving the accuracy of 
emphasised endorsements when made. These effects of question emphasis on 
recognition behaviour were demonstrated to be reliable via replication of these 
concomitant effects on criterion and decision accuracy in two separate experiments 
presented in Chapter 2, as well as in an independent online study recruiting a large 
sample (Mill & O’Connor, 2014). However, in the present experiment, the only 
reliable effect of question emphasis on these two behavioural measures was 
exclusive to the semantic task. As with the findings of the previous chapter, question 
emphasis shifted SDT criterion to reduce the frequency of endorsing emphasised 
semantic decisions, whilst concurrently increasing the accuracy of these emphasised 
endorsements. Hence, the SDT criterion and decision accuracy effects in the 
semantic task suggest that question format might serve as a hitherto unaccounted 
for source of strategic bias on “primary” yes/no response measures in laboratory 
tests of semantic memory. Response biases operating on semantic memory have 
been alluded to previously, albeit as nested within recognition tasks that engage 
aspects of semantic processing, such as the proposed criterion-gating of semantic 
elaboration of retrieved content in the remember/know procedure (Donaldson, 1996) 
and in the recognition of emotional stimuli (Kapucu, Rotello, Ready & Seidl, 2008; 
Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). The findings of the present experiment suggest that 
tasks directly assessing semantic memory might also be subject to goal-driven 
strategic biases. 
However, rather than describing sources of bias specific to semantic evaluation, the 
primary aim of the present experiment was to elucidate strategic biases that manifest 
across different cognitive domains. Indeed, the question emphasis effects on SDT 
criterion and decision accuracy in the semantic task did not generalize to the other 
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discrimination tasks. Of particular note is the failure to recover question effects on 
criterion and decision accuracy in the current recognition task, which was of a 
broadly similar format to the recognition tasks of the previous chapter that yielded 
reliable question effects on these measures. One potential factor accounting for the 
replication failure is the reduced power afforded by the present recognition task, in 
that only 60 trials of each question emphasis condition were presented to 
participants, whereas 120 trials of each question condition were presented in the 
Chapter 2 experiment. Hence, it is possible that the present recognition criterion 
shift, which operated in the expected counter-emphasis direction, would have 
reached conventional significance if more trials were provided.  
Further, the ostensibly minor differences in format between the present recognition 
task and those of Chapter 2 might nevertheless have introduced significant 
behavioural differences, as supported by prior reports of subtle aspects of task 
format influencing measures of recognition performance (Hicks & Marsh, 1999; 
Marsh & Hicks, 1998). The implied difficulties in isolating specific strategic influences 
on recognition performance are substantiated by prior failure to recover reliable 
biases following more explicit test environment manipulations than the present subtle 
variations of question format. For instance, both extreme variations in the base rate 
proportion of old to new items (Herron, Quayle & Rugg, 2003; Cox & Dobbins, 2011) 
and cueing of likely evidence strength on a trial-by-trial basis (Morell, Gaitan & 
Wixted, 2002; Stretch & Wixted, 1998b) have been observed to yield surprisingly 
modest effects on response criterion. An important factor contributing to these mixed 
findings is participants’ willingness to adopt controlled strategies (Koriat & Goldsmith, 
1996) and the related ease of integrating strategies into ongoing evaluative 
processing (Benjamin & Bawa, 2004; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; Stretch & Wixted, 
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1998b). Hence, the present partial intermixing of the question format manipulations 
(i.e. question emphasis alternated after 30 trials within each task’s 120 test list) might 
have contributed to the weak effects on criterion and decision accuracy measures, 
by increasing the cognitive effort entailed in integrating this source of goal 
information into the ongoing analysis of memory strength. This is contrasted with the 
fully blocked manipulations of question format in the Chapter 2 experiments, which 
putatively affords easier goal emphasis integration.  
A major cause of the difficulty in isolating question emphasis effects in criterion and 
decision accuracy measures is the observed variance in overall sensitivity across 
tasks. These cross-task sensitivity differences putatively arise from differences in the 
underlying evidence strength signals under evaluation in each task domain (Green & 
Swets, 1966). Variability in evidence strength has been highlighted as a primary 
impediment in eliciting stable cross-task measures of performance monitoring in the 
field of metacognition (Lau, 2010; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). Evidence strength 
variability is also capable of impacting more directly on “primary” measures of 
performance, given that evaluative outcomes are widely assumed to emerge from 
the interaction of evidence strength assessment and higher-order strategic 
processes, as postulated in research in episodic (Benjamin, 2007) and non-episodic 
domains (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson & Moscovitch, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 
2002). Hence, failure to adequately equate the evidence strength signals might have 
encouraged differences in the relative contributions of evidence and strategic 
processes to evaluative processing in different task domains. For instance, high 
levels of evidence strength in the colour task (for which overall sensitivity was at 
ceiling levels) might have served to reduce the general need to engage strategic 
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biases to optimise performance, as is suggested by the broad absence of strategic 
effects of question format in this task.  
Variation in evidence strength across the four tasks might also have enhanced 
strategic influences other than the question emphasis bias, such as the observed 
strategic caution towards particular decision categories within tasks (as 
demonstrated by the patterns of negative absolute criterion placement in the 
semantic and colour tasks, and complementary effects of decision type on decision 
accuracy and RT). Other extraneous strategic influences might have arisen from the 
online monitoring of the different performance levels across the different tasks. For 
instance, given the greater difficulty of the episodic recognition and temporal tasks 
compared to the two non-episodic tasks (as revealed by the overall task 
sensitivities), participants might have attempted to counteract the subjective 
experience of weaker episodic evidence by adopting confirmatory biases acting in 
converse directions to the question emphasis bias. Similar biases resulting from 
evidence strength monitoring have been reported in prior recognition research 
(Hirshman, 1995; see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.). Overall, both the SDT criterion and 
decision accuracy measures suffered from collapsing across the observed variability 
in overall levels of evidence strength across tasks. The related variability introduced 
in the strategic processes engaged during task performance therefore made it harder 
to isolate the question emphasis bias of primary interest. 
Indeed, reliable effects of question emphasis emerged in the proportion confidence 
analyses that aimed to account for the cross-task variability in evidence strength. 
Implicit in the proposed dichotomy between evidence strength and strategic 
processes is the dynamic up-regulation of strategic processes when evidence 
strength is weakly diagnostic and leads to the experience of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
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drives a heightened reliance on strategic sources of diagnostic information to reach 
adaptive decision outcomes, as documented in diverse forms of decision-making 
(Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982) and perception (Whiteley & Sahani, 2008). 
Hence, stronger question emphasis effects were expected in the present experiment 
for the proportion confidence analyses, which segregated decision proportions 
according to levels of confidence and inferred levels of evidence uncertainty. 
Decisions rendered with low confidence were assumed to reflect high levels of 
uncertainty, as predicated on similar assumptions in functional neuroimaging studies 
of decision-making in episodic (Henson et al., 2000; Fleck et al., 2006) and visual 
domains (Fleming et al., 2012). The results demonstrated reliable cross-domain 
reductions in the endorsements of decisions emphasised by the question, 
specifically at low levels of confidence and heightened uncertainty. Indeed, the only 
proportion low confidence shift that failed to reach significance was observed in the 
colour task, in which evidence strength was at ceiling levels and the scope for the 
question emphasis bias to impact on behaviour was reduced. 
Further, the present strategic confidence shifts acted in the same “counter-
emphasis” direction as the question biases described in the previous chapter i.e. in 
reducing the likelihood of endorsing emphasised decisions. The fact that these 
strategic shifts were confined to low confidence decisions (and, in the case of the 
temporal task, manifested despite presence of a converse “pro-emphasis” criterion 
bias) corroborates allusion in the previous chapter to the mediating influence of 
evidence strength uncertainty on environmental strategies. To clarify, stronger 
question emphasis effects were obtained in Experiment 2 (Sections 2.2. and 2.3.) 
when episodic evidence was systematically weakened by encoding tasks that 
yielded shallow levels-of-processing (LOP; Craik & Lockhart, 1972), with 
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progressively weaker question emphasis effects elicited following intermediate and 
deep LOP encoding tasks.  
The selective impact of strategic question effects on the low confidence portion of 
the evidence spectrum also clarifies the relative involvement of the ‘retrieval control’ 
(or ‘evidence control’, to use a less domain-specific term) and ‘decision control’ sub-
processes defined in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.3.). If question emphasis shifts were 
underpinned by evidence control mechanisms, selective impacts on the proportion of 
high confidence decisions would be expected, resulting from heightened attempts to 
recover stronger evidence for emphasised decisions. In this scenario, question 
emphasis would increase the proportion of emphasised decisions registered at high 
confidence, consistent with prior suggestion of heightened evidence control leading 
to heightened recollective source monitoring in episodic evaluation (given that 
recollection is typically associated with high confidence responding; Jacoby, Kelley & 
McElree, 1999; Jacoby, Toth & Yonelinas, 1993). Rather, the observed results bear 
out the selective impact of question emphasis effects on low confidence decisions, 
consistent with the recruitment of decision control mechanisms in the face of 
uncertainty. The findings serve to highlight that environmental manipulations 
primarily impact on evaluative performance via the up-regulation of decision control 
mechanisms, thereby validating the preferential study of this sub-category of 
cognitive control during the course of my PhD. 
The present question emphasis effects also highlight the potential role for decision 
confidence as a behavioural index of cross-domain processing. This complements 
prior report of cross-modality metacognitive processes being elicited in measures of 
response confidence across different perceptual tasks (Song et al., 2011; see 
Section 1.6.). The cross-domain consistency of the present confidence effects is 
150 
 
especially noteworthy when considering the large differences in overall sensitivity 
and evidence strength across tasks. The earlier discussion illustrated the propensity 
for evidence strength variability to impede the isolation of higher-order processes 
active in different cognitive domains – a problem that is typically controlled by 
psychophysical methods of performance equation for perceptual domains (e.g. 
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan & Rees, 2010) and by levels-of-processing 
manipulations for episodic memory domains (as in the previous chapter, Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). The present findings illustrate the utility of response confidence as 
an inferential alternative to these more time-consuming methods of evidence 
strength control (especially as overall run time is a key concern in experiments 
involving a number of task domains). A confidence-based segregation of evidence 
strength might be especially useful when trying to access a large sample, in which 
case the psychophysical calibration of each individual’s available evidence strength 
becomes particularly impracticable. These concerns might become increasingly 
pertinent with the advent of online methods of psychological experimentation 
(Birnbaum, 2000).  
In conclusion, whilst the findings of the present experiment provide evidence 
suggesting that question emphasis effects are indeed underpinned by cross-domain 
strategic control processes, they nevertheless also serve to emphasise the difficulty 
in isolating these control processes in overt behaviour. The variable evidence 
strength signals across different task domains impaired the recovery of cross-task 
question emphasis in “primary” measures of performance, such as SDT criterion and 
decision accuracy. Stronger effects in these primary measures might be expected 
following more explicit manipulations of strategic control. This was demonstrated by 
a recent study that explicitly manipulated the base rate proportion of presented items 
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in perceptual and episodic discrimination tasks, and observed comparable shifts in 
diffusion model estimates of response bias across both task domains (White & 
Poldrack, 2014; see Section 1.6.). Hence, the next experimental chapter 
implemented stronger manipulations of goal emphasis (in the form of monetary 
incentives) with the aim of recovering more pronounced cross-domain strategic 
effects in primary measures of evaluative performance. These manipulations were 
applied to the semantic and episodic tasks that have thus far recovered the strongest 
strategic biases across the four presented experiments. The reduction in presented 
task domains raised the additional benefits of increasing the trial counts for 
conditions of interest in each task (and associated power), as well as reducing the 
scope for extraneous strategic effects driven by the monitoring of relative 
performance across task domains (as discussed previously). This enabled a more 
targeted interrogation of cognitive control mechanisms capable of influencing 




Chapter 4: The interaction of explicit goal emphasis and cued 
expectation in cross-domain control 
 
4.1. Introduction to Experiment 5 
The previous chapter investigated the capacity for an implicit feature of the test 
environment – goal emphasis imparted by the test question – to heighten strategic 
control across different cognitive domains. The experiment yielded only partial 
evidence of cross-domain question format manipulations leading to common 
strategic effects, which were confined to “secondary” measures of decision 
confidence. The present chapter sought clearer evidence of cross-domain effects on 
“primary” response measures (directly related to yes/no decision performance) via 
more explicit manipulation of the test environment. Goal emphasis was therefore 
varied by the provision of mixed monetary incentives (Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock 
& Dobbins 2010; Newman, Widom & Nathan, 1985) and expectations were varied by 
the provision of textual cues (O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 2010; Posner, Snyder & 
Davidson, 1980; Squires, Squires & Hillyard, 1975). These two features of the test 
environment were manipulated in identical fashion across an episodic recognition 
task and a semantic judgement task, both comprising the same yes/no discrimination 
format as the tasks described in the previous chapter (see Section 3.2.3.). The 
experiment afforded a direct behavioural interrogation of cross-domain control 
mechanisms previously speculated in the literature (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Fleming & Dolan, 2012). 
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Manipulation of goal emphasis was effectuated by the mixed incentives procedure, 
wherein both a monetary reward and punishment are selectively associated with one 
of the two decision categories available in each task domain (i.e. for “old” or “new” 
decisions in the recognition task, and for “pleasant” or “unpleasant6” decisions in the 
semantic task). As highlighted in the introduction to Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.), findings 
in the human rewarded decision-making literature suggest that mixed incentives 
selectively emphasise a particular decision category as a higher-order goal, leading 
to a disconfirmatory or “counter-emphasis” bias that reduces the likelihood of 
endorsing the emphasised decision (Newman et al., 1985; Hartung, Milich, Lynam & 
Martin, 2002). This reward-related bias differs from more widely studied effects of 
general presence or absence of performance incentives (applied to both available 
decision categories) that serve to heighten overall strategic caution (Duffy, 1962; 
Knutson, Adams, Fong & Hommer, 2001), as well as of “reward only” incentives 
applied to particular decision categories, which encourage biases in converse 
confirmatory directions (i.e. increasing the likelihood of endorsing the decision 
selectively associated with the reward; Swets, Tanner & Birdsall, 1961; Healy & 
Kubovy, 1978). Mixed incentives therefore permit empirical scrutiny of a goal-driven 
constraint on evaluative performance that has been thus far neglected in the human 
rewarded decision-making literature. 
The neglect in researching effects of mixed incentives also extends to the field of 
episodic memory, despite demonstration in the introductory chapter of how goal 
emphasis mechanisms might serve to heighten strategic caution over memory 
                                            
6
 Note that in the present experiment, the term “unpleasant” replaces the term “disagreeable”, which 
was used in Chapter 3 to describe the equivalent semantic item and decision categories. This follows 
from allusion in the previous chapter to fundamental difficulties in lexically processing “disagreeable?” 
question formats, which led to reduced sensitivity and decision accuracy, as well as slower reaction 
time.  Adoption of the alternative “unpleasant” descriptor is motivated by its comparatively greater 
frequency of occurrence in the English language and hence likely greater ease of integration into 
ongoing evaluative processing. 
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evaluation in the real world (in the eyewitness test scenario, Section 1.1.; see Figure 
1.2.). Indeed, a behavioural pattern reflective of a “counter-emphasis” strategy was 
observed in a prior functional neuroimaging study of recognition memory, in which 
mixed incentives were selectively applied to “old” or “new” decision categories (Han 
et al., 2010). However, this study failed to link the implied strategic effects to 
formalized measures of bias, such as signal detection theory estimates of response 
criterion (SDT c; MacMillan & Creelman, 2005), and instead found an effect on 
secondary measures of response confidence (specifically, an increase in confidence 
for decisions associated with mixed incentives). Indeed, the application of mixed 
incentives in the wider rewarded decision-making literature has also suffered from a 
lack of formalization, with bias effects predominantly inferred from shifts in raw 
response proportions (Newman et al., 1985; Hartung et al., 2002), that conflate 
sensitivity and bias (MacMillan & Creelman, 2005). It was therefore a primary aim of 
the present chapter to assess whether mixed incentives led to analogous “counter-
emphasis” shifts in criterion bias (and other primary response measures) as those 
reported in the recognition experiments of Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-3). 
Furthermore, the inclusion of an emphasis-neutral condition (the “No token” 
condition), in which no monetary incentives were provided for either decision 
category, enabled examination of whether particular decision categories in each task 
were driving goal emphasis effects.  Another focal aim, given the mixed findings of 
Chapter 3, was to determine whether more explicit manipulation of goal emphasis 
information led to common strategic effects across the semantic and episodic task 
domains. 
The present manipulation of cued expectation was similarly motivated by a desire to 
probe the cross-domain underpinnings of expectation-related strategies. Whilst 
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strategic expectation effects have been more widely studied than those associated 
with goal emphasis, research into expectation has nonetheless been conducted 
within largely separated fields focusing on isolated cognitive domains. This is true for 
expectation manipulations enacted both prior to the onset of a task block (i.e. by 
explicating the “base rate” proportion of items presented from available categories; 
Swets et al., 1961) and cued on a trial-by-trial basis within the block itself (Posner et 
al., 1980). Despite the failure to interrogate cross-domain expectation effects, 
expectation-driven strategies have often been indexed by formalized SDT criterion 
estimates, which reveal biases in confirmatory “pro-expectation” directions 
(increasing the endorsement of expected decisions) across a number of isolated task 
domains, including visual perception (Swets et al., 1961), spatial attention (Posner et 
al., 1980), motor response selection (Kawashima, Roland & O’Sullivan, 1995), and 
identification of both visual and auditory items in the oddball paradigm (Polich, 2007; 
Squires et al., 1975). Similar pro-expectation biases have been documented in the 
domain of episodic memory, following both blockwise base rate (Ratcliff, Gronlund & 
Sheu, 1992) and trial-by-trial cueing manipulations (Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2010; see Chapter 1, Section 1.4. for further details). An additional 
behavioural marker of the pro-expectation bias is the reliable reduction in reaction 
time for decisions that are made congruent to prior expectations, as observed in 
tasks spanning perceptual (Posner et al., 1980), motor (Abrams & Jonides, 1988) 
and episodic domains (O’Connor et al., 2010).  
The reliability of the above behavioural effects has led to the proposal of a dedicated 
neural system that enforces “top-down” expectation biases on the assessment of 
evidence accumulated in different sensory and cognitive domains (Cabeza, 
Ciaramelli, Olson & Moscovitch, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). However, direct 
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evidence of the cross-domain function of this proposed system has been lacking, 
given the failure to probe the correspondence of expectation-driven biases across 
different cognitive domains within the same sample of subjects. The design of the 
present experiment – in which the same sample is exposed to episodic and semantic 
discrimination tasks – enabled the interrogation of such cross-domain effects. 
A final aim of the present study was to examine how cued expectations and goal 
emphasis interact during cognitive evaluation. The interaction of these two 
environmental factors has not been systematically studied, despite both factors often 
exerting concomitant strategic influences on evaluation in the real world. To 
demonstrate by revisiting the eyewitness recognition scenario (Section 1.1.; Figure 
1.2.), the eyewitness’ evaluation of the suspect line-up might be coloured both by the 
greater emphasis imparted to “old” decisions (due to the greater perceived 
consequences of making incorrect “old” decisions, as explained in Chapter 2, 
Section 2.1.), as well as an expectation of encountering suspects with specific 
characteristics at the scene of the crime, leading to confirmatory pro-expectation 
biases towards members of the lineup that share such characteristics. Hence, both 
goal emphasis and cued expectation are capable of influencing real-world evaluative 
outcomes, yet these environmental factors have rarely been studied in conjunction in 
the laboratory. To rectify this neglect, the present experiment independently 
manipulated cued expectation and goal emphasis during the same task phase, 
enabling the examination of whether the combined presence of these environmental 
factors failed to interfere with their isolated strategic effects (i.e. leading to recovery 
of both a “counter-emphasis” bias and a “pro-expectation” bias), or whether these 
individual strategies were altered. Testing these competing predictions across both 
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presented task domains enabled further insight into the cross-domain underpinnings 
of the expectation by emphasis interaction. 
To summarise, three aspects of cross-domain control were under examination: the 
isolated effects of goal emphasis in selectively heightening caution towards 
emphasised decision categories, the isolated effects of cued expectation in 
increasing the tendency to endorse expected decision categories, and the combined 
effects of emphasis and expectation on strategic processing. These effects were 
examined on “primary” yes/no response measures analysed in previous chapters i.e. 
SDT criterion, as well as the accuracy and time taken to endorse decision categories 
(decision accuracy and decision RT). A final series of correlational analyses aimed to 
further interrogate the cross-domain properties of the emphasis- and expectation-
driven effects on SDT criterion, as well as the relationship between elicited cross-
domain task performance and individual differences in psychometric measures of 
personality. The findings bear out the prediction of stronger cross-domain 
behavioural effects following more explicit manipulations of strategic control, and 
provide novel insights into the methods by which different higher-order strategies 
interact. 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants. The sample comprised 29 self-reported native English speakers 
(20 female, mean age = 21.41, age range = 18-50) out of a total number of 32 
participants who completed the experiment (all of whom reached the minimum 
performance threshold of d' > .1). Three participants were excluded for adopting the 
extreme strategy of responding only to make emphasised decisions associated with 
the potential to earn incentives. Not only did this strategy complicate the analysis by 
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introducing empty cells for measures of non-emphasised decision performance, but 
it also served as a notable difference in the evaluative processes engaged by these 
participants compared to the remaining sample, given that all participants were 
instructed to factor in evidence strength, cues and the available incentives when 
making their decisions. The extreme incentive strategy implied an unwillingness to 
effectively analyse evidence strength or cues, and hence evidence of its adoption in 
any of the presented experimental phases led to the complete exclusion of three 
participants. Informed consent for all participants was obtained in accordance with 
the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the University of St 
Andrews. All participants were compensated for their time at a rate of £5/hour, in 
addition to the monetary value of the tokens earned during the course of the 
experiment (see Section 4.2.3 below for further details).  
4.2.2. Stimuli. As in the previous chapter, word stimuli for all task phases were 
sampled from the Toglia and Battig semantic word norms (Toglia & Battig, 1978), 
which contains 2584 common nouns rated for pleasantness in a large sample (with a 
higher rating denoting greater pleasantness). These ratings were used to create 
pleasant and unpleasant item categories in the semantic task (spanning 
pleasantness rating ranges of 4.43-6.32 and 1.73-3.58 respectively). As before, 
these semantic item categories were separated from each other by 1 standard 
deviation in pleasantness ratings, so as to enforce a relatively robust semantic item 
boundary and ensure that words of ambiguous pleasantness were excluded from 
either category. The wordlist for the single uncued semantic task comprised 192 
words, of which 96 had pleasant and 96 had unpleasant meanings, whereas 
wordlists created for the three cued versions of the semantic task each comprised 
180 words, of which 90 had pleasant and 90 had unpleasant meanings. Across both 
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uncued and cued task phases, words of each semantic item category were sampled 
from at regular pleasantness-rating intervals to encompass a range of high to low 
evidence strength (which was shown in the previous chapter to modulate cross-
domain goal emphasis effects, see Section 3.3.). 
For the recognition task phases, a randomly selected half of the preceding semantic 
task wordlist was carried over to form words in the studied old recognition item 
category. Hence, the single cued recognition task phase constituted 192 words, of 
which 96 were old and 96 were new (i.e. not seen before in the experiment), 
whereas wordlists created for the three cued recognition task phases each 
constituted 180 words, of which 90 were old and 90 were new. In creating these 
recognition task wordlists, potential confounding influences of the preceding 
semantic phase were counteracted by ensuring that old words across recognition 
conditions of interest comprised an equal proportion of semantic status tems 
(pleasant/unpleasant) and prior semantic incentives (emphasised/non-emphasised). 
The experiment was presented and responses recorded using PCs running MATLAB 
(MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA, 2000) and Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997). 
4.2.3. Procedure. All experimental phases were preceded by onscreen instructions 
and brief practice versions of the presented tasks. The main phases involved 
variations of two discrimination tasks – the semantic task and the recognition task – 
which shared the same underlying discrimination format (i.e. requiring a yes/no 
discrimination decision between Signal A and Signal B item categories; see Figure 
3.1a), but differed according to the cognitive domain under evaluation (semantic 
memory or episodic recognition memory). In the semantic task, participants 
discriminated between words based on whether their meaning could be deemed 
pleasant (Signal A) or unpleasant (Signal B). In the recognition task, participants 
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decided if words were old (seen in the previous semantic phase; Signal A) or new 
(not seen before in the experiment; Signal B). Across conditions of interest in both 
tasks, participants submitted their discrimination decisions via the number keys to 
which the assignment of decision categories remained fixed (semantic task: 1 = 
“pleasant”, 2 = “unpleasant”; recognition task: 1 = “old”; 2 = “new”). No question 
prompt was provided at any stage, in an attempt to minimize the implicit goal 
emphasis effects of question format detailed in Chapters 2 and 3. Further, response 
confidence was not measured given both the need to minimise the overall run time in 
light of the addition of cued task phases, and the anticipation that the present explicit 
goal emphasis manipulations would lead to effects on primary yes/no response 
measures (unlike the implicit effects of the previous chapter). 
Each participant’s session began with a single “uncued” semantic-recognition task 
block, in which mixed incentives were provided to manipulate goal emphasis in 
isolation (i.e. in the absence of cues; see Figure 3.1b). Incentives took the form of 
performance-related “tokens” that were converted to money at the end of the 
experiment. Participants were not informed of the total number of tokens available 
during the experiment nor the precise value of each token (i.e. 488 tokens each 
worth £0.02), merely that acquisition of tokens would lead to a maximum monetary 
bonus of £10 on top of the hourly compensation rate (rounded up to the nearest 
£0.50 denomination). The mixed incentive procedure involved the selective 
association of both a token reward for a correct response (+1 token) and a token 
punishment for an incorrect response (-1 token) for one of the two decision 
categories available in the task being performed. To demonstrate for the semantic 
task, goal emphasis was imparted to “pleasant” decisions in the “pleasant token” 
condition by adding one token for each correct “pleasant” decision and subtracting 
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one token for each incorrect “pleasant” decision, whilst providing no tokens for 
“unpleasant” decisions irrespective of accuracy. This payoff scheme was reversed in 
the “unpleasant token” incentive condition, such that correct/incorrect “unpleasant” 
decisions led to the gain/loss of tokens, whereas “pleasant” decisions did not. A “No 
token” condition was also presented as a baseline measure of performance in the 
absence of goal emphasis, such that performance-related tokens in this condition 
were entirely absent from either semantic decision category. Analogous mixed 
incentives were provided in the recognition task token conditions (“old token”, “new 
token” condition and “No token” conditions).  
The variation in token emphasis was enacted via a similar partially blocked scheme 
to that used in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3, Section 3.2.3). Hence, uncued wordlists for 
semantic and recognition tasks each comprised 192 words, which were presented in 
six mini-blocks of 32 trials, comprising two repetitions of the three token conditions. 
Participants were initially notified of the ensuing token emphasis mini-block by an 
instruction screen appearing for 5s. Feedback was also provided on a trial-by-trial 
basis whenever emphasised decisions were made (and hence whenever a token 
was lost or gained; see Figure 3.1b), so as to heighten awareness of the incentives 
manipulation and thereby increase its strategic influence on performance (following 
from prior research e.g. Estes & Maddox, 1995; see Section 1.4.).  To prevent 
inequalities in response pacing between token emphasised and non-emphasised 
decisions, participants had to wait the same duration after making their yes/no 
decision irrespective of whether token-related feedback was provided or not. 
The uncued phase was followed by three “cued” semantic-recognition blocks, in 
which participants’ expectations were manipulated in addition to token emphasis 
(see Figure 3.1b). Emphasis was manipulated in identical fashion to the “uncued” 
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phase, with the gain/loss of monetary tokens selectively associated with 
endorsements of one of the two available decision categories, as varied in a partially 
blocked fashion across each 180-word task phase (i.e. 6 mini-blocks of 30 trials, 
comprising 2 repetitions of the 3 token emphasis mini-block conditions). Participants 
were also provided with textual cues that appeared before items and remained 
onscreen for the remainder of the trial (semantic task cues: “likely pleasant”, “likely 
unpleasant”; recognition task cues: “likely old”, “likely new”). These cues were valid 
in predicting the status of ensuing test items on approximately 70% of trials and 
invalid on the remaining 30% (i.e. setting up ~70% encounters with “expected” items 
and ~30% “unexpected” items). Participants were informed of the validity of the cues 
and encouraged to utilise them when making their discrimination decisions (in 
addition to the varying token emphases). The cue and emphasis manipulations were 
fully orthogonalized, such that each token emphasis condition had the same number 
of validly and invalidly cued trials, comprising an equal number of words from each 
item category.  
The uncued phase preceded the cued phase for all participants. Further, the token 
emphasis mini-blocks within each task were presented in an order that equated 
fatigue effects for each emphasis condition across the entire participant run, based 
on an ordinal ranking of the anticipated extent of fatigue effects related to 
presentation order (i.e. first mini-block = low fatigue, mini-block 6 = high fatigue). 
Three of these fatigue-equated emphasis mini-block orders were created, to which 
participants were randomly assigned. 
After performing both uncued and cued task phases, participants finally completed a 
short battery of psychometric questionnaires. This included paper versions of the 
Behavioural Inhibition/Behavioural Activation (BIS/BAS; Carver & White, 1994), Big 5 
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(John, Donahue & Kentle, 1991) and Brief Sensation-Seeking (Hoyle, Stephenson, 
Palmgreen, Lorch & Donohew, 2002) questionnaires. Once participants filled out the 
psychometric battery, they were monetarily reimbursed based on their overall run 
time and the converted value of their token amount, and allowed to leave. 
4.2.4. Calculation. Analyses in the uncued and cued phases involved the same 
measures as those featured in Chapters 2 (Section 2.2.1.4.) and 3 (Section 3.2.4.). 
This included estimates of sensitivity (d') and criterion bias (c) parameters from the 
equal variance signal detection model (Green & Swets, 1966; Macmillan & 
Creelman, 2005), corrected for errorless responding (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). As 
in Chapter 3, item categories in each task domain were assigned Signal A and 
Signal B status (see Figure 3.1a), which participants discriminated between based 
on their sensitivity and bias. To reiterate, an increasingly positive criterion denotes a 
reduced likelihood of endorsing the “Signal A” response option. This nomenclature 
was extended to describe analyses calculated according to decision status across 
the two tasks i.e. “Decision A” (used to describe “pleasant” and “old” decisions in the 
respective tasks) and “Decision B” categories (“unpleasant” and “new”). Decision 
accuracy was therefore calculated as the proportion of correct endorsements out of 
all endorsements made for each decision category (DecisionAcorr and DecisionBcorr; 
see Section 2.2.1.4.). Decision RT was calculated as the time taken to endorse each 
decision category (DecisionART and DecisionBRT; see Section 3.2.4.). These 
measures were compared across the different token emphasis conditions, which 
were also characterised within the same common discrimination framework: “Token 
A” (i.e. “pleasant token emphasis” and “old token emphasis” conditions in the 
semantic and recognition tasks respectively), “Token B” (“unpleasant token 
emphasis” and “new token emphasis”) and “No token” conditions. Cue type 
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conditions in the cued phase were also defined via the same discrimination 





Figure 4.1. Model definition and cued phase design schematic. a. Common formalization of 
the evaluative process for the semantic and recognition tasks, with participants assumed to 
be discriminating between Signal A and Signal B on the basis of sensitivity (d') and criterion 
bias (c). Positive criterion shifts reflect a reduced likelihood of endorsing a “Signal A” 
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decision (i.e. responding “Decision A”) and relatedly an increased likelihood of endorsing a 
“Signal B” decision (i.e. “Decision B”), whereas negative criterion shifts reflect the inverse 
bias. b. Design schematic demonstrating the common yes/no discrimination format for the 
cued semantic and recognition tasks. Although only the cued phase is displayed, the uncued 
phase was identical in format and pacing except for the absence of textual cues, which onset 
during the trial screen outlined in blue during the cued phase. Token emphasis was imparted 
by notification screens that appeared for 5s at the start of each 30-trial mini-block and 
explicated the decision category associated with mixed incentives i.e. +1 token for each 
correct emphasised decision (as demonstrated here in the example semantic task trial), -1 
for incorrect emphasised decisions (as demonstrated in the example recognition task trial) 
and 0 tokens for correct/incorrect non-emphasised decisions (refer to the key in the top right 
of the panel for further clarification). A “No token” condition was also presented in both tasks, 
wherein neither category of decision was associated with the gain/loss of tokens irrespective 
of accuracy. Feedback was provided whenever emphasised decisions were made, and was 
replaced by a fixation cross of the same duration when non-emphasised decisions were 
made. Cues in the cued phase were of the form “likely A” (i.e. “likely pleasant” and “likely 
old” in the semantic and recognition tasks respectively) and “likely B” (“likely unpleasant” and 






4.3.1. Overall task performance 
Differences in overall performance were first assessed with analyses of overall d' 
sensitivity that collapsed across the token emphasis and cued expectation 
conditions. A 2(task phase: uncued or cued) x 2(task domain: semantic or 
recognition) repeated measures ANOVA conducted on overall d' yielded a significant 
main effect of task domain but not phase, F(1,28) = 16.93, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38 and 
F(1,28) = 1.57, p = .221, ηp
2 = .05 respectively. The interaction of phase and domain 
was not significant, F(1,28) = 2.57, p = .120, ηp
2 = .08. The main effect of domain 
paralleled a similar finding in the previous chapter (Section 3.3.1.), such that overall 
sensitivity was greater in the semantic (M = 2.46, SD = 0.25) compared to the 
recognition task (M = 2.16, SD = 0.39). This difference in overall sensitivity raises the 
potential for variation in evidence strength in each task, which was highlighted in the 
previous chapter as a salient contributor to the broad lack of cross-domain effects of 
implicit goal emphasis manipulations on primary measures of performance (Section 
3.4.). However, the present more explicit environmental manipulations of goal 
emphasis (via monetary token incentives) and cued expectation were expected to 
overcome these overall task sensitivity issues (as detailed in ensuing sections). 
4.3.2. Effects of explicit token emphasis in isolation (uncued phase analyses) 
4.3.2.1. SDT sensitivity and bias. Means and standard deviations for all analyses 
of the uncued phase are presented in Table 4.1. The effects of token emphasis on 
discrimination sensitivity were first analysed in one-way repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with emphasis as a factor (“Token A”, “Token B” or “No token”), conducted 
separately for the semantic and recognition tasks. The main effect of token emphasis 
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on d' was significant in the recognition but not the semantic task, F(2,56) = 6.65, p = 
.003, ηp
2 = .19 and F(2,56) = 1.58, p = .214, ηp
2 = .05 respectively. Pairwise t-tests 
confirmed that the cue effect on recognition sensitivity was due to the significantly 
greater sensitivity observed under “old token” emphasis compared to both “new 
token” and “No token” conditions, t(28) = 3.80, p < .001, d = 0.71, and t(28) = 2.77, p 
= .010, d = 0.52 respectively (the difference between the “new” and No token 
conditions was non-significant, t < 1). The improvement in recognition sensitivity 
under “old” emphasis parallels a similar finding in Experiment 2 (Section 2.3.2.1.), 
wherein implicit “old” emphasis had the same positive effect on sensitivity. The 
cause of this sensitivity effect is unclear, although prior recognition studies 
documenting heightened source monitoring following test format manipulations 
designed to aid the recovery of retrieved content offer one potential mechanism 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 1993; Marsh & Hicks, 1998; see Chapter 7 for 
greater discussion of this effect, Section 7.2.).  
The primary SDT analyses of criterion bias also involved one-way token emphasis 
ANOVAS conducted separately for each task domain.  A significant main effect of 
token emphasis was observed in both the semantic and recognition tasks, F(2,56) = 
7.53, p = .001, ηp
2 = .21 and F(2,56) = 7.84, p = .001, ηp
2 = .22 respectively. As 
expected, the direction of these main effects reflected bias shifts that reduced the 
likelihood of endorsing the decision emphasised by available token incentives (see 
Table 4.1; see Figure 4.2a and 4.2b). Planned pairwise t-tests conducted for the 
semantic task demonstrated that criterion in the “pleasant” token condition was 
significantly greater than criterion in both the No token and “unpleasant” token 
conditions, t(28) = 2.38, p = .024, d = 0.45 and t(28) = 3.32, p = .003, d = 0.62 
respectively (the difference between the “unpleasant” and No token conditions was 
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non-significant, t(28) = 1.70, p = .101, d = 0.32 respectively). Pairwise t-tests in the 
recognition task revealed that criterion in the “old” token condition was significantly 
greater than criterion in both the No token and “new” token conditions, t(28) = 4.46, p 
< .001, d = 0.83 and t(28) = 2.92, p = .007, d = 0.55 respectively (the difference 
between “new” and No token conditions was non-significant, t < 1). These pairwise 
comparisons suggest that cross-domain effects of emphasis on criterion were 
primarily driven by positive bias shifts in the respective Token A emphasis 
conditions.  
The overall pattern of SDT results suggest that the present explicit goal emphasis 
manipulations led to similar counter-emphasis biases as those observed in the 
experiments of Chapter 2 (in which goal emphasis was implicitly manipulated). 
Further, the counter-emphasis bias was reliable across both presented task 
domains, in contrast to the findings of Chapter 3 in which cross-domain effects of 
implicit goal emphasis manipulations were not registered in SDT criterion.
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Table 4.1. Design key and descriptive statistics for cross-task analyses of the uncued phase, including SDT sensitivity (d′) and criterion bias (c), 


















Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
Task Semantic Recognition 
Token Emphasis pleasant unpleasant No token old new No token 
 Decision A Decision B No token Decision A Decision B No token 
SDT  d′ M 2.60 2.46 2.38 2.49 2.10 2.13 
 SD 0.54 0.40 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.55 
SDT c M -0.03 -0.30 -0.21 0.14 -0.08 -0.08 
 SD 0.31 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.30 
DecisionAcorr M .90 .85 .85 .91 .84 .84 
 SD .05 .06 .08 .07 .09 .07 
DecisionBcorr M .90 .93 .92 .87 .87 .87 
 SD .07 .05 .05 .06 .08 .06 
DecisionART M 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.87 1.01 1.01 
 SD 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.11 
DecisionBRT M 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.93 0.96 1.06 




Figure 4.2. SDT criterion bias across token emphasis conditions in all experimental task 
phases: a) uncued semantic, b) uncued recognition, c) cued semantic and d) cued 
recognition phases. Note that token conditions on the x axis were also formalized according 
to the common discrimination format outlined in the Calculation section (4.2.4.) as follows: 
“Token A” emphasis (“pleasant” and “old” token conditions) and “Token B” emphasis 
(“unpleasant” and “new” token conditions). Separate lines in the cued plots represent 
different cue type conditions. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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4.3.2.2. Decision accuracy. The effect of token emphasis on the accuracy of 
endorsing emphasised decisions in the uncued phase was interrogated via 
2(decision type: Decision A or Decision B) x 3(token emphasis: Token A, Token B or 
No token) repeated-measures ANOVAs conducted separately for each task. The 
main effect of decision type was significant for the semantic but not the recognition 
task, F(1,28) = 24.06, p < .001, ηp
2 = .46 and F < 1 respectively. The decision type 
effect in the semantic task arose from the greater overall accuracy of endorsing 
“unpleasant” (M = .92, SD = .03) compared to “pleasant” decisions (M = .87, SD = 
.05), which considered with the pattern of absolute criterion placement in this task 
(i.e. negative criterion values across all emphasis conditions, indicating a reduced 
overall likelihood of making “unpleasant” decisions; see Table 4.1.), suggests that 
participants were more strategically cautious in making “unpleasant” compared to 
“pleasant” decisions. A similar decision type effect was observed in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.3.3.) and is likely to reflect processes specific to the semantic task, given 
that the main effect did not generalize to the recognition domain.  
Further, the main effect of token emphasis was significant in the recognition but not 
the semantic task, F(2,56) = 5.34, p = .008, ηp
2 = .16 and F(2,56) = 1.96, p = .150, 
ηp
2 = .07 respectively. Planned comparisons of the token condition means confirmed 
that the token main effect in the recognition task reflected the greater overall 
decision accuracy under “old” token emphasis (M = .89, SD = .05) compared to both 
the No token (M = .85, SD = .05) and “new” token (M = .86, SD = .07) conditions, 
F(1,28) = 14.03, p = .001, ηp
2 = .33 and F(1,28) = 6.46, p = .017, ηp
2 = .19 
respectively (there was no difference between the “new” and no token conditions, F 
< 1). This finding complements the earlier improvement in recognition sensitivity 
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under “old” emphasis (Section 4.3.2.1.) in suggesting an overarching performance 
benefit under “old” emphasis.  
The interaction of decision type and token emphasis was the primary index of the 
anticipated effects of explicit token emphasis in improving the accuracy of endorsing 
emphasised decisions. This interaction was significant for both the semantic and 
recognition tasks, F(2,56) = 9.54, p < .001, ηp
2 = .25 and F(2,56) = 9.57, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .26 respectively. However, the direction of the interactions in both tasks suggests a 
more complex pattern of token emphasis effects than anticipated (see Table 4.1.; 
see Figure 4.3a and 4.3b). Planned pairwise t-tests in the semantic task revealed 
that the accuracy of “pleasant” decisions was significantly greater under “pleasant” 
token emphasis than No token or “unpleasant” token emphasis, t(28) = 3.57, p = 
.001, d = 0.69 and t(28) = 4.12, p < .001, d = 0.78 respectively (there was no 
difference in “pleasant” decision accuracy between “unpleasant” and No token 
conditions, t(28) = 0.10, p = .920, d = 0.02). However, the accuracy of “unpleasant” 
decisions under “unpleasant” token emphasis, despite being numerically greater, 
was not significantly different from the No token and “new” token conditions, t(28) = 
1.62, p = .117, d = 0.30 and t(28) = 1.77, p = .087, d = 0.33 respectively (there was 
also no significant difference between “pleasant” and No token conditions, t(28) = 
0.66, p = .511, d = 0.12). A similar pattern was recovered in the recognition task, in 
which pairwise t-tests revealed that “old” decision accuracy was significantly greater 
under “old” token emphasis than both No token or “new” token emphasis, t(28) = 
5.19, p < .001, d = 0.96 and t(28) = 4.06, p < .001, d = 0.77 respectively (there was 
no difference in “old” decision accuracy between “new” and No token conditions, p = 
.767). The accuracy of “new” decisions did not reliably shift according to token 
emphasis, with “new” decision accuracy being numerically lowest in the “new” token 
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condition compared to the No token and “old” token conditions, although not 
significantly so, both ts < 1 (there was no difference in “old” decision accuracy 
between “new” and No token conditions, t < 1). Hence, the results of the pairwise 
comparisons in each task suggests that decision accuracy effects were confined to 
an improvement in Decision A accuracy under concordant Token A emphasis.  
The overall pattern of decision accuracy analyses demonstrate that explicit emphasis 
served to heighten strategic caution, albeit primarily towards how Decision A 
categories were evaluated. Considered with the SDT bias results, the decision 
accuracy effects suggest that the reduced likelihood of endorsing “old” and 
“pleasant” decisions under concordant emphasis was undertaken to maximise their 
accuracy. The persistence of token emphasis effects across the presented semantic 
and episodic task domains validates the prediction of stronger cross-domain 





Figure 4.3. Effects of token emphasis on decision accuracy and decision RT in the uncued 
phase. Decision accuracy plots are presented for a) semantic and b) recognition tasks. 
Decision RT plots (in seconds, s) are presented for c) semantic and d) recognition tasks. 
Separate lines denote decision categories available in each domain. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean.   
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4.3.2.3. Decision RT. The effects of token emphasis on the time taken to make 
emphasised decisions was also analysed via 2(decision type) x 3(token emphasis) 
repeated-measures ANOVAs conducted on decision RT. The main effect of decision 
type was non-significant in both the semantic and recognition tasks, F(1,28) = 1.44, p 
= .240, ηp
2 = .05 and F(1,28) = 3.60, p = .068, ηp
2 = .11 respectively. However, 
significant main effects of emphasis were observed on decision RT in both tasks, 
F(2,56) = 5.25, p = .008, ηp
2 = .16 and F(2,56) = 45.18, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62 
respectively. These token main effects were suggestive of an overall reduction in 
decision RT specifically under Token A emphasis conditions in each task. 
Comparisons of token condition means in the semantic task revealed a significant 
reduction in decision RT in the “pleasant” token condition (M = 0.89, SD = 0.12) 
relative to the No token (M = 0.94, SD = 0.12) but not the “unpleasant” token 
condition (M = 0.92, SD = 0.11), F(1,28) = 10.40, p = .003, ηp
2 = .27 and F(1,28) = 
2.38, p = .134, ηp
2 = .08 respectively (the difference between “unpleasant” and No 
token decision RT was also non-significant, p = .092). Comparison of condition 
means in the recognition task demonstrated a significant reduction in decision RT 
under “old” token emphasis (M = 0.90, SD = 0.10) relative to both No token (M = 
1.03, SD = 0.11) and “new” token conditions (M = 0.98, SD = 0.11), F(1,28) = 64.01, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .70 and F(1,28) = 45.27, p < .001, ηp
2 = .62 respectively (the 
difference between “new” and No token decision RT was also significant, F(1,28) = 
14.71, p = .001, ηp
2 = .34).  
As before, the interaction of decision type and token emphasis was the primary index 
of the hypothesised effects of goal emphasis on decision RT. The interaction was 
significant in both the semantic and recognition tasks, F(2,56) = 11.79, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .30 and F(2,56) = 18.57, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40 respectively. As with the earlier 
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decision accuracy analyses, the interactions in both tasks reflected a more complex 
pattern than the anticipated reduction in Decision A and Decision B under 
concordant token emphasis (see Table 4.1.; see Figure 4.3c and 4.3d). Planned 
pairwise t-tests conducted across token emphasis conditions in the semantic task 
revealed that “pleasant” decision RT was significantly reduced under “pleasant” 
emphasis compared to both No token and “unpleasant” emphasis, t(28) = 3.72, p = 
.001, d = 0.69 and t(28) = 4.05, p < .001, d = 0.76 respectively (there was no 
difference between “unpleasant” and No token conditions, p = .573). Decision RT for 
“unpleasant” decisions was significantly reduced in the “unpleasant” token compared 
to the No token but not the “pleasant” token condition, t(28) = 2.97, p = .006, d = 
0.60 and t(28) = 1.47, p = .153, d = 0.30 respectively (there was no difference 
between “pleasant” and No token conditions, t(28) = 1.36, p = .185, d = 0.25). For 
the recognition task, pairwise t-tests revealed a significant reduction in the time taken 
to make “old” decisions in the “old” token condition compared to both the No token 
and “new” token conditions, t(28) = 6.79, p < .001, d = 1.27 and t(28) = 8.57, p < 
.001, d = 1.64 respectively (there was no difference between “new” and No token 
conditions, p = .863). Further, whilst “new” decision RT was significantly reduced in 
the “new” token emphasis relative to the No token condition, it was also significantly 
reduced in the “old” token compared to the No token condition and to a numerically 
larger degree, t(28) = 6.10, p < .001, d = 1.13  and (28) = 7.17, p < .001, d = 1.33 
respectively (the reduction in “new” decision RT in the “old” compared to the “new” 
token condition was non-significant, t(28) = 1.76, p = .090, d = 0.33). 
Overall, the decision RT analyses complement the earlier decision accuracy 
analyses in demonstrating that the only reliable cross-domain effect of token 
emphasis was that imparted by the Token A condition to Decision A categories. 
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Token A emphasis served to reduce the time taken to endorse Decision A 
categories, consistent with the greater goal emphasis imparted to this decision 
category.  
4.3.2.4. Cross-domain emphasis correlations. To provide further validation of the 
cross-domain persistence of the above token emphasis effects, a correlation 
analysis was conducted for token-driven shifts in SDT criterion bias in the semantic 
and recognition tasks. Emphasis criterion shift was calculated as criterion in the 
Token A emphasis condition minus criterion in the Token B emphasis condition, such 
that positive criterion shift values indicated the presence of a counter-emphasis shift 
in bias. The results revealed a significant correlation between emphasis criterion 
shifts in each task (emphasis c shift: semantic M = 0.27, SD = 0.43; recognition M = 
0.23, SD = 0.42), thereby providing direct evidence (at the participant level) in 
support of a cross-domain control mechanism underlying the strategic effects of 
token emphasis on evaluative performance, r (27) = .44 (p = .017).
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4.3.3. Interaction of emphasis and expectation (cued phase analyses) 
4.3.3.1. Cued SDT sensitivity and bias. Means and standard deviations for all cued 
phase analyses are provided in Table 4.2. The effects of cues and token emphasis 
on SDT sensitivity were first investigated via 2(cue type: “likely A”, “likely B”) x 
3(token emphasis: Token A, Token B, No token) repeated-measures ANOVAs 
conducted separately for each task.  The main effect of cue type on d' was non-
significant in both the semantic and recognition tasks, F< 1 and F(1,28) = 1.08, p = 
.308, ηp
2 = .04 respectively. The main effect of token emphasis was significant in 
both tasks, F(2,56) = 3.79, p < .029, ηp
2 = .12 and F(2,56) = 16.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.37 respectively. Finally, the interaction of cue type and token emphasis was non-
significant for both tasks, both Fs < 1. Token main effects in both tasks reflected the 
greater sensitivity elicited by the presence of some form of token emphasis. This was 
confirmed by comparison of the token condition means, which in the semantic task 
yielded significantly lower sensitivity in the No token (M = 2.27, SD = 0.44) compared 
to both the “pleasant” (M = 2.45, SD = 0.36) and “unpleasant” token conditions (M = 
2.49, SD = 0.30), F(1,28) = 4.30, p = .047, ηp
2 = .13 and F(1,28) = 6.44, p = .017, ηp
2 
= .19 respectively (the difference between “pleasant” and “unpleasant” token 
sensitivity was not significant, F < 1). Comparison of token condition means in the 
recognition task illustrated a significant reduction in sensitivity in the No token (M = 
1.88, SD = 0.52) relative to both the “old” token (M = 2.24, SD = 0.54) and “new” 
token conditions (M = 2.03, SD = 0.54), F(1,28) = 31.83, p < .001, ηp
2 = .53 and 
F(1,28) = 6.44, p = .017, ηp
2 = .19 respectively. Recognition sensitivity was also 
significantly greater in the “old” compared to the “new” token condition, F(1,28) = 
10.14, p = .004, ηp
2 = .27. Hence, the observed main effects of token emphasis on 
sensitivity broadly reflect the greater level of task engagement engendered by the 
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opportunity to receive a monetary reward in the Token A and Token B task 
conditions. The additional observation of improved recognition sensitivity under “old” 
emphasis is comparable to effects reported in the uncued phase, and provides 
preliminary evidence of the recovery of analogous token emphasis effects in the 
presence and absence of cues. 
The focal analysis of cue and token emphasis effects on SDT criterion was also 
conducted via 2(cue type) x 3(token emphasis) repeated-measures ANOVAs for c in 
each separate task (see Table 4.2.; see Figure 4.2c and 4.2d). The main effect of 
cue type was significant in the semantic and recognition tasks, F(1,28) = 41.26, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .60 and F(1,28) = 48.43, p < .001, ηp
2 = .63 respectively. As expected, 
cue types shifted criterion in “pro-expectation” directions so as to increase the 
likelihood of endorsing the cued decision in both task domains (semantic task c: 
“likely pleasant” M = -0.29, SD = 0.16; “likely unpleasant” M = 0.04, SD = 0.25; 
recognition task c: “likely old” M = -0.14, SD = 0.21; “likely new” M = 0.01, SD = 
0.22).  
The main effect of token emphasis was also significant in the semantic and 
recognition tasks, F(2,56) = 6.02, p = .004, ηp
2 = .18 and F(2,56) = 6.13, p = .004, ηp
2 
= .18 respectively. These token main effects reflected a goal-driven reduction in the 
likelihood of endorsing the emphasised decision. Planned comparisons of token 
condition means in the semantic task confirmed that criterion was significantly more 
positive in the “pleasant” emphasis (M = -0.01, SD = 0.26) relative to the  
“unpleasant” (M = -0.17, SD = 0.25) and No token emphasis conditions (M = -0.20, 
SD = 0.22), F(1,28) = 5.25, p = .030, ηp
2 = .16 and F(1,28) = 11.9, p = .002, ηp
2 = .30 
respectively (the difference between “unpleasant” and No token criterion was not 
significant, F < 1). Comparisons in the recognition task also demonstrated a 
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significantly more positive criterion in the “old” emphasis (M = 0.03, SD = 0.25) 
compared to the “new” (M = -0.09, SD = 0.24) and No token emphasis conditions (M 
= -0.13, SD = 0.25), F(1,28) = 4.58, p = .041, ηp
2 = .14 and F(1,28) = 14.19, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .34 respectively (the difference between “new” and No token criterion was not 
significant, F < 1). The interaction of cue type and token emphasis was significant in 
the semantic but not the recognition task, F(2,56) = 3.64, p = .033, ηp
2 = .12 and 
F(2,56) < 1 respectively. Post-hoc t-tests demonstrated that the semantic task 
interaction was driven by stronger emphasis effects on criterion in the “Likely 
Unpleasant” compared to the “Likely Pleasant” cue condition (see Figure 4.2c)7.  
Hence, SDT analyses of the cued phase recovered virtually identical effects of 
explicit emphasis on cross-domain bias to those reported in the uncued phase, 
namely a bias shift that reduced the likelihood of endorsing decisions emphasised by 
the available incentives. The “counter-emphasis” direction of these token biases 
acted independently and in opposite directions to the numerically larger “pro-
expectation” biases instilled by presented cue types. The findings therefore provide 
clear evidence that independent and opposing strategic effects of emphasis and 
expectation are recovered even when both environmental factors are conjunctly 
manipulated. 
  
                                            
7
 Pairwise comparisons for token emphasis effects on semantic criterion were conducted separately 
for the “Likely Pleasant” cue condition (“pleasant” > No token, t(28) = 1.26, p = .219, d = 0.23; 
“pleasant” > “unpleasant” token,  t(28) = 1.55, p = .132, d = 0.29; No token > “unpleasant”, p = .605) 
and the “Likely Unpleasant” condition (“pleasant” > No token, t(28) = 4.73, p < .001, d = 0.88; 
“pleasant” > “unpleasant” token, t(28) = 2.56, p = .016, d = 0.48; “unpleasant” > No token,  t(28) = 
1.58, p = .125, d = 0.29).  
182 
 
Table 4.2. Design key and descriptive statistics for the cued analyses, including SDT sensitivity (d′) and bias (c), decision accuracy 
(DecisionAcorr, DecisionBcorr) and decision RT measures (DecisionART, DecisionBRT). Cue types are described using task-specific and cross-task 
descriptors (parenthetic “Cue A” and “Cue B”; see Figure 4.1.). Token emphasis conditions are presented using task-specific descriptors only: 
P = “pleasant” emphasis, U = “unpleasant” emphasis, O = “old” emphasis and N = “new” emphasis. 
Note: M, mean; SD, standard deviation.
Task Semantic Recognition 
Cue type Likely Pleasant (Cue A) Likely Unpleasant (Cue B) Likely Old (Cue A) Likely New (Cue B) 
Token emphasis P U no P U no O N no O N no 
SDT  d′ M 2.45 2.50 2.29 2.44 2.48 2.24 2.22 1.97 1.88 2.27 2.08 1.88 
 SD 0.42 0.38 0.46 0.41 0.47 0.57 0.70 0.55 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.59 
SDT c M -0.22 -0.34 -0.31 0.20 0.00 -0.09 -0.05 -0.15 -0.21 0.11 -0.03 -0.05 
 SD 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
DecisionAcorr M .92 .91 .90 .85 .81 .75 .92 .89 .88 .80 .73 .70 
 SD .03 .04 .04 .07 .10 .11 .06 .06 .06 .12 .12 .13 
DecisionBcorr M .85 .89 .84 .92 .94 .93 .77 .75 .75 .92 .92 .91 
 SD .09 .06 .09 .04 .04 .05 .11 .12 .12 .04 .05 .06 
DecisionART M 0.85 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.99 1.04 0.86 0.96 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.05 
 SD 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 
DecisionBRT M 0.95 0.94 1.00 0.89 0.87 0.96 0.98 1.01 1.11 0.95 0.96 1.06 
 SD 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
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4.3.3.2. Cued decision accuracy. The effects of cued expectation and token 
emphasis on decision accuracy were also interrogated via 2 (cue type) x 3 (token 
emphasis) repeated-measures ANOVAs, which were conducted separately for 
decision categories within each task domain for reasons of clarity (i.e. DecisionAcorr 
and DecisionBcorr; see Table 4.2.; see Figure 4.4.). For the semantic task, significant 
main effects of cue type were observed for both “pleasant” and “unpleasant” 
decisions, F(1,28) = 96.45, p < .001, ηp
2 = .78 and F(1,28) = 57.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = 
.67 respectively. Both cue type effects reflected increased decision accuracy under 
concordant cueing, such that the accuracy of “pleasant” decisions was improved 
under “Likely Pleasant” (M = .91, SD = .03) compared to “Likely Unpleasant” cue 
conditions (M = .80, SD = .07), whereas “unpleasant” decision accuracy was 
improved under “Likely Unpleasant” (M = .93, SD = .03) compared to “Likely 
Pleasant” cue conditions (M = .86, SD = .05). Significant main effects of cue type 
were also observed on the accuracy of “old” and “new” decisions in the recognition 
task, F(1,28) = 151.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .84 and F(1,28) = 169.80, p < .001, ηp
2 = .86 
respectively. Cue type effects once again reflected an accuracy improvement under 
concordant cueing, with the accuracy of “old” decisions being improved under “Likely 
Old” (M = .90, SD = .05) compared to “Likely New” (M = .74, SD = .11) cue 
conditions, whereas “new” decision accuracy showed the inverse pattern (“Likely 
New” M = .92, SD = .04; “Likely Old” M = .76, SD = .10). These results provide 
evidence that participants were utilising the cues strategically to improve the 
accuracy of their evaluations. 
The 2 x 3 ANOVA for the semantic task recovered a significant main effect of token 
emphasis on “pleasant” decision accuracy but not “unpleasant” decision accuracy, 
F(2,56) = 11.40, p < .001, ηp
2 = .29 and F(2,56) = 2.44, p = .097, ηp
2 = .08 
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respectively. Emphasis effects on decision accuracy in the cued semantic task 
therefore paralleled equivalent analyses of the uncued phase, in illustrating a more 
complex pattern of emphasis-driven adjustments to task performance (see Figure 
4.4a and 4.4b). Comparisons of the condition means demonstrated that the effect of 
token emphasis on “pleasant” decision accuracy was driven by a significant accuracy 
improvement in the “pleasant” (M = .89, SD = .04) compared to the No token (M = 
.83, SD = .06) but not “unpleasant” emphasis condition (M = .86, SD = .06), F(1, 28) 
= 25.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .47 and F(1,28) = 3.36, p = .078, ηp
2 = .11 respectively (the 
difference between “unpleasant” and No token conditions was also significant (F(1, 
28) = 8.56, p = .007, ηp
2 = .23). Further, the cue by emphasis interaction was 
significant for “pleasant” but not “unpleasant” decision accuracy, F(2,56) = 10.19, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .27 and F(2,56) = 1.51, p = .230, ηp
2 = .05 respectively. Post-hoc t-tests 
demonstrated that the “pleasant” decision accuracy interaction emerged from the 
stronger emphasis effects in the “Likely Unpleasant” compared to the “Likely 
Pleasant” cue condition (in which performance levels were at ceiling; see Figure 
4.4a)8.  
A similar pattern was observed in the recognition task, with the 2 x 3 ANOVA yielding 
a significant main effect of token emphasis on “old” but not “new” decision accuracy, 
F(2,56) = 19.78, p < .001, ηp
2 = .41 and F(2,56) = 1.27, p = .289, ηp
2 = .04 
respectively. Comparisons of the condition means illustrated that the effect of 
emphasis on “old” decision accuracy was driven by a significant accuracy 
improvement in the “old” (M = .86, SD = .09) compared to both the No token (M = 
                                            
8
 Pairwise comparisons for emphasis effects on “pleasant” decision accuracy were conducted 
separately for the “Likely Pleasant” cue condition (“pleasant” > No token, t(28) = 2.39, p = .024, d = 
0.45; “pleasant” > “unpleasant” token, t(28) = 1.00, p = .324, d = 0.19; “unpleasant” > No token, t(28) 
= 1.13, p = .268, d = 0.21) and the “Likely Unpleasant” condition (“pleasant” > No token, t(28) = 5.17, 
p < .001, d = 1.10; “pleasant” > “unpleasant” token, t(28) = 1.97, p = .059, d = 0.37; “unpleasant” > No 




.79, SD = .09) and “new” emphasis conditions (M = .81, SD = .09), F(1, 28) = 44.71, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .62 and F(1, 28) = 11.70, p = .002, ηp
2 = .30 respectively (the 
difference between “new” and No token conditions was also significant, F(1, 28) = 
6.25, p = .019, ηp
2 = .18). Further, the cue type by token emphasis interaction was 
significant for “old” but not “new” decisions, F(2,56) = 7.35, p = .001, ηp
2 = .21 and F< 
1 respectively. As with the semantic decision accuracy analyses, post-hoc t-tests 
revealed that the interaction for “old” decision accuracy resulted from stronger token 
emphasis effects in the “Likely New” compared to the “Likely Old” cue condition (in 
which “old” decision accuracy levels were at ceiling; see Figure 4.4c)9. 
Overall, the decision accuracy analyses of the cued phases suggest that the only 
reliable improvement in emphasised decision accuracy occurred as a result of Token 
A emphasis imparted to Decision A categories in each task. The unilateral nature of 
these effects provides a direct parallel to the earlier uncued decision accuracy 
effects, and therefore serves to once again highlight that equivalent cross-domain 
goal emphasis effects were recovered in the presence of cued expectations. 
  
                                            
9
 Pairwise comparisons for emphasis effects on “old” decision accuracy were conducted separately 
for the “Likely Old” cue condition (“old” > No token, t(28) = 3.55, p = .001, d = 0.66; “old” > “new” 
token, t(28) = 2.17, p = .038, d = 0.41; “new” > No token, t(28) = 1.24, p = .225, d = 0.23) and the 
“Likely New” condition (“old” > No token, t(28) = 5.92, p < .001, d = 1.11; “old” > “new” token, t(28) = 




Figure 4.4. Effects of cues and token emphasis on decision accuracy in the cued phase. 
Top panel depicts decision accuracy effects in the semantic task, with separate plots for a) 
“pleasant” and b) “unpleasant” decision accuracy analyses. Bottom panel depicts decision 
accuracy effects in the recognition task, with separate plots for c) “old” and d) “new” decision 
accuracy analyses. Separate lines in each plot denote cue type conditions for the relevant 
task. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.   
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4.3.3.3. Cued decision RT. 2(cue type) x 3(token emphasis) repeated-measures 
ANOVAs were also conducted on the time taken to endorse decision categories in 
each separate task (i.e. DecisionART and DecisionBRT respectively; see Table 4.2.; 
see Figure 4.5.). For the semantic task, significant main effects of cue type were 
observed for both “pleasant” and “unpleasant” decision RT, F(1,28) = 87.97, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .76 and F(1,28) = 26.68, p < .001, ηp
2 = .49 respectively. Both cue type 
effects signified a reduction in the time taken to make cued decisions, such that 
“pleasant” decision RT was reduced in the “Likely Pleasant” (M = 0.90, SD = 0.10) 
compared to “Likely Unpleasant” cue condition (M = 0.99, SD = 0.11), whereas 
“unpleasant” decision RT showed the inverse pattern (“Likely Unpleasant” M = 0.91, 
SD = 0.10; “Likely Pleasant” M = 0.96, SD = 0.10). Comparable main effects of cue 
type were also observed for “old” and “new” decision RT in the recognition task, 
F(1,28) = 70.98, p < .001, ηp
2 = .72 and F(1,28) = 17.86, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39 
respectively. Recognition cue type effects once again reflected a reduction in 
decision RT under concordant cueing, with “old” decision RT being reduced in the 
“Likely Old” (M = 0.94, SD = 0.09) compared to the “Likely New” cue condition (M = 
1.00, SD = 0.09), and “new” decision RT showing the inverse pattern (“Likely New” M 
= 0.99, SD = 0.10; “Likely Old” M = 1.03, SD = 0.10). These reaction time effects 
complement the earlier cued decision accuracy analyses in highlight the common 
strategic influence of cued expectations in both task domains. 
The main effect of token emphasis in the semantic task was significant for both 
“pleasant” and “unpleasant” decision RT, F(2,56) = 35.82, p < .001, ηp
2 = .56 and 
F(2,56) = 16.76, p < .001, ηp
2 = .37 respectively. As in the uncued decision RT 
analyses, token main effects on cued decision RT were more complex than the 
anticipated reduction in the time taken to endorse emphasised decisions (see Figure 
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4.5a and 4.5b). Comparisons of the condition means demonstrated a reduction in 
“pleasant” decision RT in the “pleasant” token (M = 0.89, SD = 0.11) compared to 
both the “unpleasant” (M = 0.95, SD = 0.11) and No token emphasis conditions (M = 
0.99, SD = 0.11), F(1,28) = 39.05, p < .001, ηp
2 = .58 and F(1,28) = 55.97, p < .001, 
ηp
2 = .67 respectively (“pleasant” decision RT was also significantly reduced in the 
“unpleasant” compared to the No token condition, F(1,28) = 9.12, p = .005, ηp
2 = 
.25). “Unpleasant” decision RT was significantly reduced in the “unpleasant” token 
(M = 0.90, SD = 0.11) compared to the No token (M = 0.98, SD = 0.11) but not the 
“pleasant” token condition (M = 0.92, SD = 0.10), F(1,28) = 32.38, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54 
and F(1,28) = 1.42, p = .243, ηp
2 = .05 respectively (the reduction in “unpleasant” 
decision RT for “pleasant” compared to No token emphasis was also significant, 
F(1,28) = 19.08, p < .001, ηp
2 = .41). Finally, the cue type by token emphasis 
interaction was non-significant for both “pleasant” and “unpleasant” decision RT, 
F(2,56) = 1.95, p = .151, ηp
2 = .07 and F(2,56) = 2.43, p = .097, ηp
2 = .08 
respectively.  
A similar pattern was observed in the recognition task, with the 2 x 3 ANOVA yielding 
main effects of token emphasis on both “old” and “new” decision RT, F(2,56) = 
47.04, p < .001, ηp
2 = .63 and F(2,56) = 42.52, p < .001, ηp
2 = .60 respectively. 
Token effects on RT for both recognition decision categories were seemingly driven 
by an overarching reduction in decision RT under “old” token emphasis (irrespective 
of decision type; see Figure 5c and 5d). Comparisons of the token condition means 
revealed that “old” decision RT was significantly reduced under “old” token (M = 
0.89, SD = 0.10) compared to “new” (M = 0.98, SD = 0.10) and No token emphasis 
(M = 1.03, SD = 0.11), F(1,28) = 37.46, p < .001, ηp
2 = .57 and F(1,28) = 73.07, p < 
.001, ηp
2 = .72 respectively (the reduction in “old” decision RT for “new” compared to 
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No token emphasis was also significant, F(1,28) = 15.21, p = .001, ηp
2 = .35). Whilst 
“new” decision RT was significantly reduced in the “new” token (M = 0.99, SD = 0.10) 
compared to the No token condition (M = 1.09, SD = 0.10), it was also reduced in the 
“old” token condition (M = 0.97, SD = 0.11) and to a numerically larger degree, 
F(1,28) = 41.99, p < .001, ηp
2 = .60 and F(1,28) = 65.35, p < .001, ηp
2 = .70 
respectively (“new” decision RT did not differ significantly between the “old” and 
“new” token conditions, F(1,28) = 2.79, p = .106, ηp
2 = .09). Finally, the cue type by 
token emphasis interaction was non-significant for both “old” and “new” decision RT, 
F(2,56) = 1.91, p = .157, ηp
2 = .06 and F < 1 respectively. 
Overall, the cued decision RT analyses parallel the equivalent uncued analyses in 
suggesting that the only reliable cross-domain effect of token emphasis on decision 
RT emerged from Token A emphasis reducing the time taken to endorse Decision A 
categories in both task domains. RT effects for the alternate Decision B categories 
broadly reflected a decrease in reaction time whenever the opportunity to win 
monetary tokens was present, with equivalent reduction in Decision BRT in the Token 
A and Token B conditions compared to the No token condition. Although the pattern 
of results is more complex than the predicted crossover reductions in decision RT 
under congruent decision emphasis, the fact that this pattern was recovered in both 





Figure 4.5. Effects of cues and token emphasis on decision RT in the cued phase. Top 
panel depicts decision RT effects in the semantic task, with separate plots for a) “pleasant” 
and b) “unpleasant” decision RT analyses. Bottom panel depicts decision RT effects in the 
recognition task, with separate plots for c) “old” and d) “new” decision RT analyses. 
Separate lines in each plot denote cue type conditions for the relevant task. Error bars 
represent standard error of the mean.   
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4.3.3.4. Cross-domain cue and emphasis correlations. A series of correlation 
analyses were conducted to directly test the cross-domain persistence of cued 
phase effects at the participant level. These analyses centred on two difference 
measures calculated for SDT criterion values in each task domain: “cue criterion 
shift” and “emphasis criterion shift”. Cue criterion shift was an index of the tendency 
for participants to adjust their bias in accordance with environmentally-cued 
expectations, and was calculated as criterion in the “Likely B” condition minus 
criterion in the “Likely A” condition (such that positive cue criterion shift values 
indicated an increased tendency to adhere to cued expectations). Emphasis criterion 
shift served as an index of the tendency to adjust bias in accordance with 
environmentally-emphasised goals, and was calculated as criterion in the “Token A” 
condition minus criterion in the “Token B” condition (with positive emphasis criterion 
shift values reflecting an increased adherence to emphasised goals, as in the 
uncued cross-task analyses).  
The results demonstrated a non-significant positive correlation between cue criterion 
shifts in the semantic (M = 0.32, SD = 0.28) and recognition tasks (M = 0.14, SD = 
0.12), r (27) = .24 (p = .239). However, a significant positive relationship was 
observed between emphasis criterion shifts in the cued semantic (M = 0.15, SD = 
0.39) and recognition tasks (M = 0.12, SD = 0.30), r (27) = .60 (p = .001). To probe 
the correspondence of this positive token relationship with the analogous positive 
token relationship described in the uncued cross-task analyses (see Section 3.1.4.), 
emphasis criterion shifts for tasks in both phases were also correlated. The 
emphasis criterion shift in the uncued semantic task was significantly positively 
correlated with that observed in the cued recognition task and non-significantly 
(albeit marginally so) positively correlated with the emphasis shift in the cued 
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semantic task, r (27) = .40 (p = .031) and r (27) = .36 (p = .055) respectively. The 
emphasis criterion shift in the uncued recognition task was significantly positively 
correlated with emphasis criterion shifts in both the cued semantic and cued 
recognition tasks, r (27) = .48 (p = .009) and r (27) = .61 (p < .001) respectively. 
Hence, whilst a stable relationship between expectation-driven bias shifts across 
different task domains was not observed, reliable positive relationships between 
emphasis-driven bias shifts were recovered in both cued and uncued experimental 
phases. The results of the cross-task analyses suggest that the tendency to adjust 
performance in light of varying goal emphases in one task domain correlates with the 
tendency to effectuate similar adjustments in other task domains, and this positive 
relationship persists in the presence and absence of cued expectations. The findings 
therefore serve to corroborate, at the participant level, the assertion that goal-related 
information is processed by a unified strategic control system, capable of influencing 
evaluative performance in different cognitive domains. 
 
4.3.4. Individual differences in emphasis and expectation biases. 
A final series of correlation analyses were conducted to assess the relationship 
between task-evoked tendencies to adopt controlled evaluative strategies and 
psychometric measures of personality. These measures were taken from the 
BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), Big 5 (John et al., 1991) and Brief Sensation-
Seeking scales (B-SS; Hoyle et al., 2002), and were correlated with emphasis 
criterion shifts in the uncued and cued phase, as well as the cue criterion shift in the 
cued phase (as described in the previous section). No significant correlations were 
found between uncued emphasis criterion shifts (in either task domain) and any of 
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the elicited psychometric measures. Psychometric associations with strategic shifts 
in the cued phase were also sparse, with only a positive relationship between 
emphasis criterion shift in the semantic task and the BAS fun-seeking component of 
the BIS/BAS (r (27) = .42, p = .023), as well as a positive relationship between cue 
criterion shift in the semantic task and the boredom susceptibility component of the 
B-SS observed (r (27) = .47, p = .009). The association of BAS fun-seeking and an 
increased propensity to be biased by token emphasis is plausible given that this 
component attempts to capture the willingness to engage in novel and rewarding 
experiences, of which maximising the number of tokens earned in the present task is 
likely a constituent (Carver & White, 1994). The relationship between boredom 
susceptibility and an increased tendency to be biased by cued expectation is also 
somewhat plausible, given that this component attempts to capture individual 
differences in the tendency to experience boredom (Hoyle et al., 2002). The 
experience of boredom is a likely consequence of the lengthy and repetitive nature of 
the presented task, which might sequentially drive a greater reliance on the static 
cue validities as a basis for responding, rather than the variable evidence strength 
associated with each test item.  
However, the fact that none of the above relationships generalized to corresponding 
criterion measures in the recognition task (or in the case of the emphasis criterion 
shifts, even to corresponding measures in uncued task phases) casts doubt over 
their reliability. As such, the overall results of the psychometric analyses do not 
reveal any stable relationships between personality traits and the cross-domain 




The present experiment interrogated the influence of two major environmental 
strategies (goal emphasis and cued expectation) on evaluative processing in two 
different cognitive domains (semantic memory and episodic recognition memory). 
Goal emphasis was manipulated via the application of mixed token incentives with 
one of two task decision categories, whereas cued expectation was manipulated by 
the provision of trial-by-trial textual cues that were mostly valid in predicting the 
status of ensuing task items. Analyses of the uncued phase, in which token 
incentives were manipulated in isolation, recovered reliable shifts in signal detection 
estimates of bias acting in “counter-emphasis” directions, such that the likelihood of 
endorsing the decision category emphasised by the available incentives was 
reduced. The strategic underpinnings of these bias effects were highlighted by 
complementary findings of greater accuracy and reduced reaction time for decision 
categories endorsed under concordant emphasis. The results also reveal particularly 
pronounced emphasis-driven adjustments in behaviour for “Decision A” categories 
under concordant “Token A” emphasis.  
Analyses of the cued phase, in which both explicit token incentives and cued 
expectations were manipulated, successfully recovered anticipated bias shifts in 
“pro-expectation” directions, such that the likelihood of endorsing the cued decision 
category was increased. Notably, the cued phase also recovered identical effects of 
token incentives to those reported in the uncued phase, namely bias shifts that 
reduced the likelihood of endorsing emphasised decisions, as complemented by 
analogous effects on decision accuracy and decision RT. The cued analyses 
therefore successfully isolated independent strategic influences of expectation and 
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goal emphasis on behavioural measures of task performance. Finally, strategic 
effects on all elicited measures analysed in both uncued and cued task phases were 
observed to generalise across the presented task domains. These cross-domain 
effects were further corroborated by a series of cross-task correlations, which 
recovered stable positive relationships between goal emphasis-driven bias shifts (but 
not expectation-driven bias shifts) across task domains. The findings provide 
behavioural evidence in support of a cross-domain cognitive control system. 
The present goal emphasis manipulations yielded findings comparable to prior 
research involving mixed incentives, in which counter-emphasis shifts were 
observable in raw forms of both primary and secondary response measures (Han et 
al., 2010; Hartung et al., 2002; Newman et al., 1985). However, the present 
experiment is the first to explicitly link mixed incentives with strategic adjustments to 
a formalized measure of bias, namely response criterion as estimated from the 
signal detection model. As such, the counter-emphasis direction of the observed bias 
also serves to differentiate the strategic influence of goal emphasis from that related 
to more widely studied “reward only” incentive manipulations, which yield bias in a 
converse confirmatory direction (Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Van Zandt, 2000). The 
strategic underpinnings of the counter-emphasis bias were further elucidated by 
complementary effects on decision accuracy, suggesting that participants reduced 
endorsements of the emphasised decision so as to maximise their accuracy. The 
bias and decision accuracy results parallel the findings of the recognition 
experiments of Chapter 2, and strengthen interpretation of the question format 
effects as resulting from implicit forms of the same goal-driven mechanism engaged 
by mixed incentives. The decision RT analyses provided additional insight into how 
the counter-emphasis bias actively benefitted task performance, by demonstrating 
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quicker reaction times when decision categories were endorsed under emphasis 
(similar to prior reports, e.g. Han et al., 2010). Collectively, the findings of Chapter 2 
and the present chapter serve to elucidate goal emphasis as an overlooked source 
of strategic control that is reliably indexed by estimates of criterion bias.  
The present study also revealed asymmetries in how goal emphasis impacted on the 
evaluation of specific decision categories. This added insight was afforded by the 
inclusion of the baseline “No token” emphasis condition, in which mixed incentives 
were entirely absent and performance was consequently assumed to be relatively 
emphasis-neutral. In both presented task domains, deviations in performance from 
the baseline No token condition primarily emerged for “Decision A” categories under 
concordant emphasis (i.e. in the Token A condition), with weaker emphasis-driven 
adjustments observed for “Decision B” categories under emphasis (i.e. in the Token 
B condition). Specifically, emphasis shifted criterion bias most prominently in the 
Token A condition (i.e. in a positive direction) and affected decision category 
measures in a similar unilateral fashion (i.e. the only reliable improvement in decision 
accuracy and decision RT occurred for endorsements of “Decision A”  in the Token A 
condition).  
The observed “Decision A” asymmetry is somewhat unexpected, although the fact 
that it manifested across both task domains implies the involvement of a cross-
domain rather than domain-specific factor. One such factor is the ordering of the 
presented response format, which was held constant across task domains and 
phases as “Decision A” assigned to the “yes” response key and “Decision B” 
assigned to the “no” number key. Goal emphasis imparted by the Token A emphasis 
condition might therefore have combined with emphasis imparted by the fixed order 
of the response format might to produce stronger overall emphasis effects on 
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“Decision A” performance. Although speculative, this “response emphasis” 
interpretation of the observed “Decision A” asymmetry is plausible, given both 
evidence of response format emphasis provided by Experiment 3 (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.4.2.) and previously reported biases resulting from similarly subtle aspects 
of test response formats (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Marsh & Hicks, 1998). The 
General Discussion chapter examines this “Decision A” preferential emphasis finding 
in greater detail (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.). 
The present experiment also interrogated the interaction of conjunct manipulations of 
goal emphasis and cued expectation. Pronounced strategic effects of cued 
expectation were recovered, comprising “pro-expectation” shifts in criterion bias, 
which served to increase endorsement of the cued decision, as complemented by 
greater accuracy and reduced RT for endorsements of the cued decision. These 
cue-specific effects are consistent with prior research examining expectancy 
modulations in a number of isolated cognitive domains (O’Connor et al., 2010; 
Posner et al., 1980; Squires et al., 1975), yet are demonstrated in the present study 
to manifest equivalently for the same sample of participants across different 
cognitive domains. More notably, analyses of the cued phase also recovered 
analogous strategic effects of goal emphasis as those evidenced in the uncued 
phase. This finding is most clearly highlighted by criterion bias effects in the cued 
phase, which shifted in independent and opposing directions in accordance with the 
confirmatory “pro-expectation” and disconfirmatory “counter-emphasis” biases 
instilled by the respective manipulations. The results therefore provide compelling 
evidence for the functional role of response criterion as a behavioural index of 
multiple sources of strategic bias, as has been conjectured previously in the fields of 
psychophysics (Swets, 2014) and recognition memory (Benjamin, 2007).  
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A notable feature of the observed strategic effects of both goal emphasis and cued 
expectation manipulations is their persistence across semantic and recognition task 
domains. This cross-domain persistence is particularly notable given the reported 
differences in overall sensitivity across the two task domains (see Section 4.3.1.), 
which has previously been highlighted as an impediment to the recovery of cross-
domain strategic processes (Fleming & Dolan, 2012). Indeed, variation in overall 
sensitivity across the tasks presented in Experiment 4 (Chapter 3) putatively served 
as a major cause of the broad lack of cross-domain effects following the implicit 
emphasis manipulations instantiated. The present findings reveal that more explicit 
manipulations of the test environment are capable of overcoming underlying 
variation in task domain sensitivities to successfully recruit cross-domain control 
processes. The results also extend a recent demonstration of cross-domain effects 
on expectation on bias parameters of the drift diffusion model (White & Poldrack, 
2014) with evidence that cross-domain influences of both expectation and goal 
emphasis are indexed by signal detection estimates of response bias. Criterion bias 
might therefore serve as an alternative behavioural index of cross-domain control – 
one that is less computationally intensive than its diffusion model analogue. 
The cross-domain properties of the observed strategic effects were further examined 
via correlations of emphasis- and expectation-driven bias shifts elicited in each task 
domain. The results revealed a strong positive relationship between the tendency to 
adopt the counter-emphasis bias in the semantic and recognition task domains. 
Counter-emphasis bias shifts were also positively correlated across uncued and 
cued versions of each task domain, thereby highlighting that the integration of goal 
emphasis into ongoing evaluative processing conforms to a stable individual trait. 
However, correlations of the pro-expectation bias revealed only modest positive 
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relationships across semantic and recognition task domains.  Similarly weak 
relationships also emerged from the correlations of counter-emphasis and pro-
expectation bias shifts with psychometric measures of personality. Further research 
involving a larger sample and psychometric battery will therefore be necessary to 
test the reliability of the present individual difference relationships.  
Overall, the present experimental chapter provides behavioural evidence in support 
of a cross-domain cognitive control system that has been widely conjectured yet 
rarely empirically validated (Cabeza et al., 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Fleming 
& Dolan, 2012). The findings from the first three experimental chapters collectively 
emphasise the need for explicit manipulation of environmental factors in successfully 
isolating cross-domain control processes. These insights were incorporated in the 
next chapter, in which I interrogated the neural underpinnings of the behaviourally 
evidenced cross-domain control system via the application of functional 




Chapter 5: A multi-modal neuroimaging approach to the study of 
cross-task control 
 
5.1. Introduction to Experiment 6 
The previous chapters aimed to provide behavioural evidence of a unified cognitive 
system that is engaged whenever evaluation of a stimulus requires greater control, 
irrespective of the specific domain in which that controlled evaluation takes place. 
With a particular focus on episodic memory, the conducted experiments sought to 
isolate processes that likely perform a “general” cross-domain control function from 
those that are specific to the episodic domain. The findings presented thus far 
suggest that signal detection estimates of response criterion (as supplemented by 
measures of decision accuracy and RT) might serve as behavioural correlates of 
cross-domain control processes, recruited both when stimulus evaluation is 
conducted under explicated goals or reward, as well as in the presence of 
expectations cued by the immediate environment. However, these common 
behavioural effects might nevertheless arise from distinct neural computations, and 
direct functional neuroimaging investigation is required to elucidate the emergence of 
cross-domain control function in the brain. The present chapter targeted this aim, 
with a related focus on clarifying the precise functional properties of brain activations 
identified in previous studies of episodic memory, spanning EEG and fMRI 
neuroimaging modalities. 
In research involving the EEG modality, prior studies have examined  event-related 
potentials (ERPs) associated with the “old/new” effect – voltage fluctuations 
emerging at frontal and parietal electrode sites that distinguish correct “old” decisions 
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(“Hits”) from correct “new” ones (“CRs”; Sanquist, Rohrbaugh, Syndulko & Lindsley, 
1980; Warren, 1980). Subsequent research identified two distinct sub-components of 
the old/new effect – an earlier negative deflection with a peak at around 400 ms and 
a frontal-parietal scalp maximum (N400), and a later positive deflection with a peak 
at approximately 600 ms (overlapping into an ensuing slow-wave component) and a 
central-parietal maximum (P600, also termed the “late positive” component or LPC; 
Rugg, Mark, Schloerscheidt, Birch & Allan, 1998). Recognition-specific 
interpretations have related these two components with the dual processes of 
familiarity and recollection respectively, on the basis of selective effects on these 
ERPs following manipulations designed to tap one or the other process (Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Rugg et al., 1998; see Section 1.5. for further details). 
However, this recognition-specific account has been challenged by findings linking 
the constituent recognition ERP components with more general “decision” factors. 
The proposed link between the recognition LPC and recollection has been subject to 
particular scrutiny. For example, Karayanidis and colleagues (Karayanidis, Andrews, 
Ward & McConaghy, 1991) conducted a recognition task in which the interval 
between the encoding and retrieval episodes was varied, under the assumption that 
shorter intervals would lead to stronger encoding. The latency of the N400 
component was reduced for the shorter intervals, consistent with a direct relationship 
between this component and retrieval processes influenced by the interval 
manipulation. Conversely, the morphology of the LPC was unaffected by the shorter 
interval, which merely led to the quicker onset of the LPC as a corollary of the 
reduced latency of the earlier retrieval-related N400. 
Further evidence of a “post-retrieval” role for the LPC was provided by Finnigan and 
colleagues (Finnigan, Humphreys, Dennis & Geffen, 2002), in an experiment 
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manipulating the memory strength of encoded items via study repetition (i.e. “strong” 
old items presented 3 times at study, “weak” old items presented once). Whilst the 
N400 was found to track the memory strength manipulation in a linear fashion (with 
component positivity being greatest for “strong” Hits and lowest for CRs), no such 
clear recognition-specific relationship was observed for the LPC. Rather, LPC 
amplitude was found to increase for correct endorsements of both “old” and “new” 
decision categories, prompting the authors to re-characterise the LPC as an index of 
controlled processes engaged post-retrieval to maximise accuracy. This view is 
supported by prior evidence of a link between LPC positivity and greater old/new 
decision confidence (Rubin, van Petten, Glisky & Newberg, 1999). The overall 
pattern of findings therefore suggests a more “general” control function for the late 
positive component of the old/new ERP effect – one that potentially extends beyond 
the recognition domain. 
Indirect support for a control interpretation of the recognition LPC comes from ERP 
research in a different cognitive domain, centring on a morphologically and 
topographically similar component - the syntactic P600 elicited in studies of semantic 
memory (Coulson, King & Kutas, 1998; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992). Early studies 
reported a positive voltage deflection, peaking at around 600 ms and emerging at 
central-parietal scalp locations, that was enhanced following the detection of syntax 
violations in grammatically incorrect sentences in comparison to grammatically 
correct controls. A number of syntactic violations have been found to modulate this 
LPC component, including garden path sentences (e.g. “The broker persuaded *to 
sell the stock10”; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992) and subject-verb disagreement (e.g. 
“The plane took *we to paradise and back’; Hagoort, Brown & Groothusen, 1993), 
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which encouraged a syntax-specific interpretation of the LPC as a dedicated 
sentence parsing mechanism (Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992).  
However, as with the recognition LPC, challenges to the syntactic LPC’s proposed 
domain specificity have also emerged. Coulson and colleagues (Coulson, King & 
Kutas, 1998) highlighted the potential for grammatically incorrect sentences to serve 
as a syntactic form of response conflict, given that words appearing to generate the 
syntactic anomalies (e.g. “*to” in the above garden path example) stand in violation 
to expectations of grammatical correctness instilled by the sentence beginnings. 
According to this view, the enhanced positivity of the syntactic LPC instead reflects 
the heightened engagement of control to resolve conflict, in analogous fashion to 
ERP control signatures evoked by the detection of infrequent/unexpected targets in 
classic “oddball” paradigms (e.g. Squires, Squires & Hillyard, 1975). Rather than 
arguing for the syntactic LPC as a domain-specific marker of syntax processing, this 
control interpretation brings the LPC component within the purview of the broader P3 
complex (specifically the P3b and ensuing slow wave component), which exhibits a 
highly similar morphology and central-parietal scalp distribution (Polich, 2007; 
Pritchard, 1981; Ruchkin & Sutton, 1983).  
Coulson et al. provided direct evidence of the affiliation between the syntactic LPC 
and the P3 complex in an experiment manipulating both the grammatical correctness 
of sentences (grammatically correct vs. incorrect) and the expectedness of 
encountering either sentence type (expected vs unexpected; see also Hahne & 
Friederici, 1999). For the latter expectedness manipulation, base rates were varied 
blockwise such that grammatically correct and grammatically incorrect sentences 
were differentially associated with either 80% or 20% frequencies of occurrence. The 
authors observed increased LPC positivity effects for both grammaticality (incorrect > 
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correct) and expectedness (unexpected/infrequent > expected/frequent). Further, 
these two effects interacted such that the unexpectedness effect was greater for the 
grammatically incorrect compared to correct sentences, consistent with the authors’ 
proposal of a unified neural generator accounting for both effects.   
A similar control interpretation can be applied to the recognition LPC, given the 
increased goal salience typically inculcated towards “old” decisions by recognition 
task formats, which might similarly lead to a heightening of control reflected in the 
Hits > CRs late positivity enhancement (Neville, Kutas, Chesney & Schmidt, 1986; 
see Chapters 2 and 3 for supportive behavioural evidence of such “old” emphasis 
effects). As a parallel to Coulson et al.’s study involving the syntactic LPC, Herron 
and colleagues (Herron, Quayle & Rugg, 2003) also instantiated orthogonal 
manipulations of recognition-specific (Hit vs. CR items) and domain-general 
conditions (unexpected vs. expected items), and observed a modulation of the slow-
wave extent of the LPC old/new effect by decision unexpectedness (i.e. unexpected 
> expected for both Hits and CRs). Hence, the presented findings highlight the 
sensitivity of late positive ERP components elicited in isolated recognition and 
semantic task domains to factors typically associated with the P3 complex. 
Considered with the overlapping morphological and topographical features of all 
three ERPs, this raises the parsimonious potential for the LPC to serve as a unified 
index of heightened cognitive control demands across diverse task domains. This 
possibility is directly interrogated in the present experimental chapter. 
The process of re-characterising neural signatures initially interpreted as domain-
specific has also extended to the fMRI literature. In fMRI studies of recognition 
memory, reports of old/new effects on the BOLD response implicated a network of 
brain regions that reliably elevated for Hits compared to CRs, encompassing regions 
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of the prefrontal cortex, including medial and lateral PFC, the cingulate cortex, 
including anterior and rostral cingulate regions, the parietal cortex, including the 
inferior and superior parietal lobules, and sub-cortical regions, including the dorsal 
striatum (de Zubicaray, McMahon, Eastburn, Finnigan & Humphreys, 2005; Kim, 
2013; Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson & Buckner, 2000; Spaniol et al., 2009). As with 
the chronology of research perspectives on the equivalent ERP effect, the functional 
significance of the fMRI old/new effect was originally interpreted as signifying the 
successful recovery of memory content specific to old items (termed the “retrieval 
success” effect; de Zubicaray et al., 2005; Konishi et al. 2000; Spaniol et al., 2009), 
followed by later re-interpretations in light of the observed sensitivity of a large 
number of “retrieval success” regions to aspects of memory control (Dobbins et al., 
2002; Kim, 2013).  
One of the clearest control-driven re-characterisations of fMRI retrieval success 
effects was provided by the likelihood cueing paradigm described in previous 
chapters (see Section 1.5. and Section 4.2.3.), wherein activation in a number of 
brain regions previously linked with retrieval success was shown to be preferentially 
sensitive to detecting the mismatch between invalidly cued expectations and the 
actual old/new recognition status of presented test items (O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 
2010). Subsequent research has elucidated more specified sub-functions for 
constituents of the resultant “invalid cueing network”, including the differential 
sensitivity to unexpected “old” and unexpected “new” decisions respectively (Jaeger, 
Konkel & Dobbins, 2013), and a proposed segregation into temporally “early” conflict 
detection and “later” control allocation sub-networks (Mill & O’Connor, under review).  
However, it is thus far unclear as to whether the control functions performed by 
regions of the fMRI invalid cueing effect are specific to the episodic memory domain 
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or more general in character. Indeed, targeted attempts to segregate domain-specific 
from cross-domain control activations have been broadly lacking. Rather, the extant 
literature has primarily focused on task manipulations and analytic techniques that 
isolate control sub-processes within the isolated domains in which they are elicited. 
These approaches have nonetheless ascribed cross-domain or (more generally) 
“cross-task” control properties to brain regions recurrently observed in episodic 
memory tasks, including lateral and medial PFC regions, anterior and rostral 
cingulate regions, and regions of the left parietal lobule (Barredo, Oztekin & Badre, 
2013; Dobbins, Foley, Schacter & Wagner, 2002; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005). A 
similar frontal-parietal network has been implicated in cross-task control processes 
recruited during evaluation of semantic memory (Badre, Poldrack, Paré-Blagoev, 
Insler & Wagner, 2005; Grossman et al., 2006; Wagner, Maril, Bjork & Schacter, 
2001). However, without exposing the same sample of participants to tasks spanning 
different cognitive domains, unequivocal demonstration of a unified control system is 
complicated by the presence of likely between-subject and between-task confounds. 
Further, those studies that have exposed the same sample to tasks in different 
domains have relied on relatively coarse measures of cognitive control. For instance, 
Nyberg and colleagues (2003) conducted PET imaging as participants performed a 
range of tasks spanning episodic, semantic and working memory domains, and 
examined conjunctions of baseline contrasts (e.g. episodic task > fixation) across all 
three task domains to identify likely cross-task control regions. Beyond limitations 
associated with the use of the PET modality (which suffers from lower temporal and 
spatial resolution than fMRI), the simplistic baseline approach is likely to recover a 
large number of general task-positive activations and is therefore less sensitive to 
recovering activations specifically involved in the heightening of control. In a more 
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controlled fMRI study reported by Fleck and colleagues (Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins & 
Cabeza, 2006), participants performed a standard episodic recognition task and a 
visual discrimination task (requiring participants to discriminate which of two coloured 
onscreen segments was larger in size), with the authors localizing cross-task control 
activations on the basis of the conjunction of regions showing greater activation for 
“low” compared to “high” confidence decisions. Employing the low > high confidence 
contrast  in this manner serves as a post-hoc method of identifying brain regions 
linked in a relatively broad sense with some form of conflict and associated control, 
in comparison to the more systematic manipulation of control demands on a trial-by-
trial basis afforded by the likelihood cueing paradigm (O’Connor et al., 2010).  
My aims for the present experimental chapter were hence threefold. Firstly, to probe 
the cross-task properties of the late positive ERP previously elicited in isolated 
episodic recognition and semantic memory domains. Secondly, to segregate brain 
regions that display fMRI BOLD activations consistent with a recognition-specific 
function from those with a function that extends beyond the recognition domain. A 
final aim was to integrate findings from both the EEG/ERP and fMRI modalities to 
provide robust multi-modal neuroimaging support for the existence of a unified cross-
domain control system. These aims were targeted in an experiment that 
simultaneously acquired EEG and fMRI data whilst participants performed a novel 
“match/mismatch” decision-making task designed to systematically manipulate 
control demands across episodic and semantic memory domains. The task format 
was held constant across these two domains, with participants judging whether the 
status of visually presented item stimuli “matched” or “mismatched” with cue screens 
presented on the same trial (with similar cross-domain investigations described in 
Chapters 3 and 4). Following from related findings from the likelihood cueing 
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paradigm and studies of response conflict in the cognitive control literature, it was 
assumed that control demands were heightened in “mismatch” compared to “match” 
trials, given the need for additional controlled processing to resolve the conflict 
between the cue and item.  In addition, the present experiment examined the 
generality of elicited control activations at a further level of specification via 
orthogonal manipulation of the order in which cues and items appeared within the 
course of a given trial. Neural signatures that index the presence of cue-item conflict 
(and associated control demands) should do so irrespective of not only the domain in 
which the item is evaluated but also the order in which the item is presented in 
relation to the cue. Match/mismatch effects were therefore examined both for when 
cues preceded items (the “Cue First” condition) as well as when items preceded 
cues (the “Item First” condition). The adopted task format and multi-modal imaging 
approach enabled a detailed elucidation of the temporal and spatial properties of 
putative “cross-task” control activations. 
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants. The sample comprised 22 right-handed, native English speaking 
participants (12 female; age mean = 23.45, range = 19-32 years) out of a total 
number of 24 who completed the experiment. One participant was excluded for 
failing to respond during the entirety of the Item First condition, and another 
participant was excluded due to excessive artefacts contaminating their EEG data, 
which persisted after offline pre-processing. Informed consent procedures were 
approved by the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee at the 
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University of St Andrews, and the East Scotland Research Ethics Committee, 
Ninewells Hospital and Medical School. 
5.2.2. Stimuli. As in the previous two chapters, word stimuli for the semantic task 
were sampled from pleasant and unpleasant item categories created from the Toglia 
and Battig semantic word norms (Toglia & Battig, 1978). These item categories were 
separated by 1.5 standard deviations in their pleasantness ratings so as to exclude 
words of ambiguous pleasantness proximal to the neutral rating (i.e. “4” on the 7-
point pleasantness scale) and were randomly sampled from at regular intervals in 
collating task wordlists for each participant (sampled pleasant word range: 4.64-6.32; 
unpleasant word range: 1.73-3.36). The two cued semantic task wordlists each 
comprised 128 words (64 pleasant, 64 unpleasant) and a single uncued semantic 
task wordlist comprised 80 words (40 pleasant, 40 unpleasant).  
Recognition task wordlists were created by randomly selecting half of the words 
presented in the preceding semantic phase to form the studied old item category. 
This randomisation was stratified such that old and new recognition item categories 
were equated for the number of pleasant and unpleasant words used to constitute 
them. Hence, 128 words were presented in each cued recognition phase (64 studied 
old, 64 unstudied new) whereas 80 words were presented in the uncued phase (40 
old, 40 new). The experiment was presented and responses recorded using a 
presentation PC running E-prime (Schneider, Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002) that was 
synchronized with the EEG-fMRI apparatus. 
5.2.3. Procedure. Brief practice versions of all task phases were presented during 
EEG cap preparation, after which participants were led to the scanner to undergo a 
sequence of structural scans followed by a 4-minute resting-state scan (fcMRI). 
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Participants then performed variations of the match/mismatch task in separate 
blocks spanning semantic and recognition domains (such that semantic blocks 
served as “study” phases for ensuing recognition blocks; see Figure 5.1.). Task 
format was identical across both domains, with participants deciding whether textual 
cue screens highlighting a specific item category (semantic cues: “pleasant” or 
“unpleasant”; recognition cues: “old” or “new”) matched or mismatched with the 
actual status of word items presented in the same trial (semantic item categories: 
pleasant or unpleasant; recognition item categories: old or new).  
The ordering of cues and items was also varied blockwise, such that cues preceded 
items in the “Cue First” semantic-recognition task phase, and items preceded cues in 
the “Item First” semantic-recognition task phase. To clarify, match/mismatch 
decisions in the Cue First phase therefore emerged from 1) processing the cue 
screen, 2) discriminating the status of the subsequently presented item (as 
determined by the task domain in effect for that block), and 3) assessing whether the 
cue and the discriminated item matched or mismatched. The match/mismatch 
decision process for the Item First condition was identical except for the reversal of 
steps 1) and 2). The critical stage 3 in which the match/mismatch between cues and 
items is actively evaluated is hereafter referred to as the “active decision” period.  
Participants submitted their match/mismatch decisions combined with a high/low 
confidence rating via a single button-box response, submitted using the left hand (1 
= “high confidence match”, 2 = “low confidence match”, 3 = “low confidence 
mismatch”, 4 = “high confidence mismatch”). Participants also performed a single 
“uncued” semantic-recognition task phase, in which discrimination decisions were 
made for items in the absence of cues, with response format adjusted accordingly 
(semantic task format: 1-4 = “high confidence pleasant”-“high confidence 
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unpleasant”; recognition task format: 1-4 = “high confidence old” – “high confidence 






Figure 5.1. Design schematic for cued task trials. Participants decided if cue and item 
screens matched or mismatched across four task blocks, crossing manipulations of the 
cognitive domain in which items were discriminated (Semantic or Recognition) and the order 
in which cues and items were presented (Cue First or Item First). Example trials are depicted 
for all four blocked conditions, with the key in the upper panel defining the possible values of 
cue and item screens in each task domain, and the correct decision in each trial denoted by 
position of the hand icon. Onset of the “active decision” period in each cue-item order 
condition is highlighted by the dashed grey screen border. ‘OA’ = onset asynchrony; ‘λ’ = 
mean of Poisson jitter distribution; ‘ITI’ = inter-trial interval; ‘hi’ = high confidence response 
option; ‘lo’ = low confidence response option.  
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To clarify, the present match/mismatch cueing procedure differed from the previously 
described likelihood cueing paradigm (O’Connor et al., 2010; see Section 4.2.3. and 
Section 5.1.) in that cues across task phases were not explicitly predictive i.e. all 
cues had a 50% chance of matching items. This format led to the heightening of 
control demands in 50% of available trials, compared to the lower 20-25% proportion 
of “invalid cue” trials typically presented in the likelihood cueing paradigm (at the 
commonly adopted 70-75% cue validity level) in which control demands are also 
heightened. Increasing the number of heightened control trials was desirable given 
that the blockwise variations of cue-item ordering and task domain, as well as the 
inclusion of additional resting and uncued task phases, served to increase the overall 
experimental run-time. This precluded the alternative of repeating blocks of the 
likelihood cueing paradigm to raise invalid cue trial counts to a comparable level. 
Rather, the greater number of trials per block afforded by the match/mismatch 
procedure ensured adequate statistical power for the EEG and fMRI analyses, whilst 
permitting additional task manipulations and analyses to also be interrogated. Given 
that cues in the present study were not valid, and hence did not set up expectations 
that could be used strategically to improve task performance, participants might have 
been discouraged from attending to them entirely. However, the match/mismatch 
response format counteracted this possibility, as participants’ final responses had to 
directly reflect the match or mismatch between cues and items, rather than merely 
the status of the items. 
To improve design efficiency in both cued phases, the onset asynchrony (OA) 
between cues and items was jittered on an interval range sampled from a zero-
truncated Poisson distribution, centred on a mean λ of 2s with 1s units of increment 
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(Hagberg, Zito, Patria & Sanes, 2001)11. One set of cue-item jitter values was 
sampled and randomly allocated to trials in  each task phase, so as to ensure that 
the overall run time was the same across task phases for all recruited participants. 
The inter-trial interval (ITI) was also jittered via randomly interspersed blank fixation 
periods of a fixed 3.8s interval, with 26 blank fixation trials presented in each cued 
task phase (16 blank fixations were presented in the uncued phase). Design 
efficiency was further augmented by subjecting participants’ task wordlists to a 
genetic algorithm that determined the optimal ordering of task conditions (Wager & 
Nichols, 2003). 
The uncued task phase always concluded participants’ scanned sessions, with the 
ordering of the preceding Cue First and Item First conditions counterbalanced. 
Analyses described in this experimental chapter are restricted to the cued task 
phases, with scrutiny of the uncued task phase and the resting-state fcMRI phase 
planned for future investigations. 
5.2.4. EEG acquisition and pre-processing. EEG data were acquired with an MR 
compatible system manufactured by Brain Products (Gilching, Germany), comprising 
64 sintered Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes (see Appendix B for the electrode map of this 
EEG system) sampled at 5000 Hz, with a 250 Hz low pass filter (10 second time 
constant, 0.5 microVolt resolution). An additional ECG electrode was placed on the 
lower back to monitor participants’ electrocardiogram. The impedance between all 
EEG electrodes and participants’ scalps was kept below 20 kΩ. Data were acquired 
with the FCz electrode as reference. EEG recordings made inside the MRI scanner 
                                            
11
 Sampling cue-item OA values from the Poisson distribution served to minimize the presentation of 
long-duration jitters in comparison to rectangular and normal distributions sampling methods, whilst 
still maintaining equivalent efficiency to these alternative methods (Hagberg et al., 2001). This was 
advantageous given the need to minimise the overall runtime. 
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room with the MR-compatible EEG cap and amplifier were relayed via fibre optic 
cable to a dedicated PC placed outside the scanner room. 
Offline pre-processing of the EEG signal was undertaken to remove two primary 
sources of artefact introduced by recording in the MR environment – the gradient 
artefact and the pulse artefact (see Figure 5.2. for a schematic representation of 
EEG pre-processing steps conducted for an example participant). Gradient artefacts 
arise from electromotive forces produced by the rapid switching between gradient 
coils during fMRI image acquisition (Allen, Josephs & Turner, 2000). Removal of 
gradient artefacts was facilitated by the high dynamic range of the MR-compatible 
EEG amplifier and a hardware device that synchronised EEG acquisition with the 
MRI system’s gradient clock (Syncbox, manufactured by Brain Products). These 
hardware features respectively enabled the adequate recording of the large gradient 
contaminants of the EEG signal (without signal saturation) and the writing of precise 
timepoints at which each fMRI volume was acquired. The recorded gradient artefacts 
were subsequently removed by average artefact subtraction (AAS; Allen et al., 2000) 
as implemented in Brain Vision Analyzer 2 (Brain Products), using a baseline-
corrected sliding average of the gradient artefact waveform computed over 20 
consecutive fMRI volumes. Dummy scans at the beginning and end of each task 
phase were used to improve stability of the averaged artefact template. Residual 
gradient artefacts were removed by low-pass filtering at a 40 Hz cut-off frequency. 
Subsequent EEG pre-processing steps focused on removal of pulse artefacts. These 
arise from complex effects of cardiac activity on EEG recorded in the MR 
environment, encompassing pulse-related head movement, pulse-related electrode 
displacement and pulsatile movement of blood itself (Debener, Mullinger, Niazy & 
Bowtell, 2008). The appearance of the pulse artefact roughly corresponds to the R-
216 
 
peak of the cardiac cycle, which was precisely recorded by the MR-compatible ECG 
electrode placed on participants’ lower backs. The R-peaks were used in the offline 
removal of pulse artefacts via the optimal basis set method (OBS; Niazy et al., 
2005), as implemented in EEGLAB 12.0 (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) running the 
fMRIB plug-in (Niazy et al., 2005). Residual pulse artefacts in the OBS-corrected 
EEG data were identified by visual inspection of the results of an ensuing temporal 
independent components analysis (ICA; Benar et al., 2003; Debener et al., 2008), 
which was conducted for each individual participant in Brain Vision Analyzer 2 using 
the Infomax algorithm. This process led to the removal of pulse artefact components 
from the back-projected EEG data, as well as other characteristic artefact 
components such as eye movements and eye blinks (Jung et al., 2000). It is 
worthwhile highlighting that jittering of both the cue-probe OA and ITI served to 
reduce the correlation between gradient/pulse artefacts and the task-evoked EEG 
signal, thereby improving the efficacy of the above offline pre-processing steps. The 
gradient- and pulse-corrected EEG data were finally re-referenced to a common 
average and band-pass filtered (0.05-30 Hz). 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) were then calculated from the raw electrode 
channels for the conditions of interest, all of which were time-locked to the “active 
decision” period wherein both cues and items had been presented and participants 
could evaluate the match/mismatch between them. To clarify, the “active decision” 
period in the Cue First condition is marked by appearance of the item, whereas for 
the Item First condition it is appearance of the cue (see Figure 5.1.), and therefore 
active decision ERPs were extracted over 2800 ms post-item and post-cue epochs in 
each respective cue-item order condition. Active decision ERPs were baseline 
corrected to the 200 ms period immediately preceding these epochs and averaged 
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over separate match and mismatch conditions in each cued task phase (for correct 
responses only). Statistical analyses focused on the average amplitude in central 
and parietal channels of a priori interest, as computed over ERP onset periods 
identified in active decision periods in each task phase (see Results, Section 5.3.2. 
for further details). 
5.2.5. Group ICA of EEG data. Analysis of the raw electrode ERPs was 
supplemented by a group ICA approach, as implemented in the EEGIFT toolbox 
(Eichele, Rachakonda, Brakedal, Eikeland & Calhoun, 2011) running in EEGLAB. 
This method seeks to identify independent components common to all sampled 
participants by applying ICA to all aggregated observations at the group level. Group 
ICA enables more effective signal decomposition than ICA applied to individual 
participant datasets, given that the stochastic nature of ICA (i.e. different iterations 
will generate different components, arranged in a different order and with different 
scaling) makes it difficult to identify common components across participants 
(Eichele et al., 2011). Further, the reduced signal to noise ratio of participant-level 
ICA data complicates identification of the task-related components themselves, 
which is of added concern given the significant MR-induced artefacts in 
simultaneously acquired EEG (Wirsich et al., 2014). Given that group ICA uses 
“model-free” methods to isolate task-related components maximally free from 
artefact sources, these analyses were aimed at validating the topography and 
temporal onset of the cross-domain task-related ERPs identified from the raw 
channels.  
Two separate group ICAs were conducted for the Cue First and Item First conditions 
respectively, with semantic and recognition domain phases entered as separate 
sessions within these cue-item order conditions. Each participant’s pre-processed 
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dataset was segmented across the same “active decision” period used in the raw 
electrode ERP analyses, for all trials presented in each task phase. Unlike in the raw 
electrode ERP analyses, participants’ data was not re-referenced to common 
average so as to reduce linear dependencies in the data (which would reduce the 
algorithm’s efficiency in isolating independent components). Datasets were then 
baseline corrected (over the 200 ms period preceding the decision period) and 
smoothed using a sliding 3-trial average, followed by a 2-step reduction to 10 
principle components. The principle components were concatenated across 
participants and the resulting group dataset underwent Infomax temporal ICA, 
recovering 10 independent components trained at a final convergence rate of 10-6. 
The stability of these components was validated by the ICASSO method (Himberg, 
Hyvarinen & Esposito, 2004) over 5 repeated ICA iterations with random initial 
starting points. All resultant group ICA components were found to be stable, in terms 
of both the precision of their clustering across the 5 ICASSO runs and their 
aggregated quality index (Iq). Components were back-projected onto individual 
participants’ data and scaled as standardized z-scores. Task-related components 
were finally identified by examination of the grand average component topographies 





Figure 5.2. EEG pre-processing steps conducted for an example participant. Data are 
shown for central and parietal electrodes of interest over a 100 μV amplitude range for a 10 
second period. Raw data (1. in the figure) was firstly corrected for fMRI gradient artefacts by 
average artefact subtraction (2.), followed by removal of pulse artefacts by optimal basis sets 
(3.). The resultant data underwent temporal ICA to remove residual pulse and other sources 




5.2.6. fMRI acquisition and analysis. fMRI images were acquired via a 3T Siemens 
Trio whole-body MRI scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, Germany) 
using a standard 12 channel receive-only head coil. Task phase functional scans 
were acquired using a descending interleaved echo-planar pulse sequence (TR = 
2000ms, TE = 30ms, 90 degree flip angle, 33 axial slices parallel to the AC-PC 
plane, with 3.5 x 3.5 x 4mm voxel resolution and no inter-slice gap). The 4-minute 
resting-state fcMRI scan was conducted with identical acquisition parameters. Head 
motion was minimized using foam padding. All fMRI data were processed in SPM8 
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London). Slice timing was 
corrected by temporal resampling, followed by rigid body head motion correction. 
Scanned volumes were then spatially normalized to the canonical echo-planar 
template, resampled to 3mm isotropic voxels and spatially smoothed using a 
Gaussian kernel of 6mm full width half maximum. 
The standalone fMRI analyses (detailed in Section 5.3.3.) employed an event-related 
design based on assumptions of the general linear model (GLM; Friston et al., 1995). 
For each participant, a single GLM convolved a series of event onset vectors 
(spanning all cued task phases) with the canonical hemodynamic response function 
to extract voxel-wise BOLD amplitude estimates for conditions of interest. Event 
regressors were specified for correct “match” and “mismatch” decisions in each cued 
task phase, separately for item categories in each task domain. fMRI amplitudes 
were estimated for the same “active decision” period used for the extraction of ERPs 
(i.e. when cue-item match/mismatch was being interrogated; see Section 5.2.4. 
above), which was modelled as a 2000 ms epoch. Incorrect match/mismatch 
decisions in each task phase were modelled as regressors of no interest. The GLM 
also included two regressors for “pre-decision” events in each task phase (i.e. all 
221 
 
cues in the Cue First condition and all items in the Item First condition), irrespective 
of the correctness and match/mismatch status of the trial. 
Group level effects were assessed by treating participants as a random effect and 
brain volumes as a temporally correlated timeseries (Worsley & Friston, 1995). 
Linear contrast images of the mismatch > match effect were specified at the 
participant level and subjected to one-sample t-tests at the group level, against the 
null hypothesis of a zero contrast effect at each voxel. Analyses of mismatch effects 
in the Cue First recognition condition adopted a standard threshold of p < .001 
(uncorrected for multiple comparisons, 5 contiguous voxels). Conjunction analyses 
investigating mismatch effects across cue-item order and task domain conditions 
were thresholded at a combined threshold of p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox. (i.e. 
at individual condition thresholds of p < .1), consistent with prior fMRI studies 
employing a conjunction approach in the study of cognitive control (Badre et al., 
2005; Fleck et al., 2006).  
5.2.7. EEG-fMRI integration. The final analysis stage integrated the simultaneously 
acquired data from both neuroimaging modalities via an EEG-informed fMRI 
approach (Debener et al., 2005; see Section 5.3.4.). A new fMRI GLM was 
constructed with trial-by-trial amplitude averages of the late positive potential 
identified in the ERP analysis entered as parametric modulators of the BOLD 
response (Buchel et al., 1998). At the participant level, event regressors were 
specified for “correct” and “incorrect” decisions for all four cued phases (trials without 
a response were modelled as regressors of no interest), modelled as 2000 ms 
epochs from “active decision” onset (as in the standalone fMRI analyses). Trialwise 
averages of the late positive ERP were entered as 1st-order linear modulators of the 
BOLD response during “correct” and “incorrect” decisions in each task. Linear 
222 
 
contrast images were specified for ERP-modulated “correct” decision events 
collapsed across all 4 cued phases. Group effects were interrogated by one sample 
t-tests conducted on these modulated contrast images, so as to identify spatially 
precise brain regions in which fMRI BOLD changes were reliably predicted by the 
temporally precise late positive ERP component, across all cue-item order and task 
domain conditions. These analyses adopted a relatively liberal threshold of p < .05 
(uncorrected, 5 contiguous voxels), which were nevertheless inclusively masked with 
the results of the standalone fMRI analyses conducted at more typical thresholds 





5.3.1. Behavioural validation of mismatch control.  
The success of the match/mismatch paradigm in systematically manipulating 
cognitive control demands was interrogated in behavioural analyses of the reaction 
time (RT) and response confidence associated with correct decisions. A 2 (cue-item 
order: Cue First or Item First) x 2 (task domain: recognition or semantic) x 2 (match 
status: match or mismatch) repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on RT (see 
Figure 5.3a). A significant main effect of order was observed, such that RT was 
slower in the Cue First (M = 1368.08 ms, SD = 156.21) compared to the Item First 
condition (M = 1035.97 ms, SD = 156.59), F(1,21) = 180.34, p < .001, ηp
2 = .90.  The 
order effect on RT likely resulted from the greater time required to process the status 
of items compared to cues, and the increased time afforded to evaluate the former 
more resource-intensive event in the Item First condition. In this condition, items 
appeared in the initial “pre-decision” period for an average duration of ~2000 ms 
(depending on the Poisson-sampled jitter) and were amenable to further evaluation 
in the ensuing 2000 ms “active decision” period. In comparison, the Cue First 
condition required participants to conduct the item status evaluation entirely in the 
later active decision period. Indeed, this interpretation of the order effect on RT is 
corroborated by the differing temporal onsets of the late positive ERP component 
described in Section 5.3.2. A significant order by task domain interaction was also 
observed, such that RT was slower for the recognition compared to the semantic 
domain in the Cue First condition (recognition RT: M = 1393.76 ms, SD = 155.63; 
semantic RT: M = 1342.41 ms, SD = 180.49), whereas this pattern was reversed in 
the Word First condition (recognition RT: M = 1008.67 ms, SD = 158.77; semantic 
RT: M = 1063.28 ms, SD = 168.57), F(1,21) = 22.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .52. 
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Crucially, there was also a significant main effect of match status, such that RT was 
slower in the mismatch (M = 1245.34 ms, SD = 145.03) compared to the match 
condition (M = 1158.71 ms, SD = 151.17), F(1,21) = 48.89, p < .001, ηp
2 = .70. All 
other main effects and interactions were non-significant (all Fs < 1, except order by 
match interaction, F(1,21) = 1.09, p = .307, ηp
2 = .05). The effect of match status on 
RT highlights that mismatch decisions – irrespective of cue-item order or task 
domain – demonstrated a slowing of reaction time that is a characteristic behavioural 
signifier of heightened control demands.  
The same 2 (order) x 2 (domain) x 2 (match status) ANOVA was conducted for 
response confidence (see Figure 5.3b). The main effect of match status was again 
significant, reflecting an overall reduction in confidence for mismatch (M = 1.80, SD = 
0.15) compared to match decisions (M = 1.85, SD = 0.12), F(1,21) = 15.58, p = .001, 
ηp
2 = .43. All other main and interaction effects were non-significant (main effect of 
order and order by domain interaction, both Fs < 1; main effect of domain, F(1,21) = 
1.57, p = .224, ηp
2 = .07; order by match interaction, F(1,21) = 2.83, p = .107, ηp
2 = 
.12; domain by match interaction, F(1,21) = 1.35, p = .258, ηp
2 = .06; three-way 
interaction, F(1,21) = 2.67, p = .117, ηp
2 = .11). As with the earlier RT analyses, the 
reduced confidence observed for mismatch compared to match decisions serves as 
another characteristic behavioural signifier of the greater control required to make 
the former class of decision. The overall pattern of behavioural effects is consistent 
with heightened effortful processing undertaken to resolve the conflict associated 
with cue-item mismatch, irrespective of the cue-item order and task domain in which 
this mismatch occurs. The behavioural findings therefore validated the control 




Figure 5.3. Behavioural effects of match/mismatch control manipulation on a. reaction time 
(RT) and b. response confidence across task phases. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. “Recog” = recognition task domain, “Semant” = semantic domain.  
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5.3.2. Standalone EEG analyses recover late positive ERP. 
The standalone EEG analyses focused on raw channel ERPs extracted over the 
“active decision” period within each trial, separately for correct “match” and 
“mismatch” decisions. Figure 5.4. illustrates the common “late positive” component 
(LPC) recovered across the presented task phases. Scalp topographies of the 
“mismatch minus match” difference wave revealed a voltage positivity evoked over 
central and parietal electrode sites across all task phases, which emerged over the 
period of putative assessment of cue-item match/mismatch for a duration of 
approximately 600 ms. This temporal profile was confirmed by examination of the 
grand average late positive waveforms, which were pooled across central-parietal 
midline electrodes (CPz, Pz and POz; see Figure 5.4.). The onset of the late positive 
waveform corroborated the earlier main effect of cue-item order on RT, such that the 
ERP onset earlier in the Item First (~400 ms) compared to the Cue First condition 
(~600 ms). As described in the behavioural validation results section (see 5.3.1.), the 
differing onsets likely reflect the quicker completion of item evidence assessment, 
and hence quicker engagement of subsequent cue-item match/mismatch evaluation, 
in the Item First condition. 
The difference wave topographies and grand average waveforms also highlighted 
the sensitivity of the LPC to the match/mismatch manipulation, in the form of an 
increased amplitude positivity for mismatch compared to match decisions. This 
difference was interrogated in formal statistical analyses, wherein the amplitude of 
the pooled late positive ERP was averaged over the relevant onset period in each 
cue-item order condition (i.e. Cue First ERP average: 600-1200 ms; Item First ERP 
average: 400-1000 ms), and subjected to a 2 (cue-item order: Cue First or Item First) 
x 2 (task domain: recognition or semantic) x 2 (match status: match or mismatch) 
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repeated-measures ANOVA. The main effect of match status was significant, 
reflecting the increased LPC amplitude for mismatch (M = 0.76, SD = 0.89) 
compared to match decisions (M = 0.28, SD = 0.79), F(1,21) = 11.60, p = .003, ηp
2 = 
.36. All other main and interaction effects were non-significant, all Fs < 112. The 
standalone EEG analyses therefore recovered a late positive ERP component that 
onset within a sub-epoch of the “active decision” period (one in which controlled cue-
item match/mismatch assessment was most likely to occur) and which showed an 
increased voltage potential for mismatch compared to match decisions across all 
presented task phases. 
Supplementary group ICA analyses were also conducted to validate the 
topographical location and temporal morphology of the LPC component identified in 
the raw channel analyses. All task-related components identified by the separate 
group ICAs applied to the Cue First and Item First conditions are presented in Figure 
5.5. All other group ICA components not displayed pertained to various artefactual 
sources, such as head motion or residual pulse artefact. The group ICA results 
demonstrate that task-related components identified by the “model-free” group ICA 
(i.e. without prioritisation of particular electrode locations) were evoked at similar 
central-parietal scalp locations and with comparable grand average component 
waveforms to the raw channel ERPs (with peak ~600 ms for the Cue First condition 
and ~400 ms for the Item First condition).  
                                            
12
 Separate 2 (cue-item order) x 2 (task domain) x 2 (match status) ANOVAs conducted for the 
individual CPz, Pz and POz electrode channels that were pooled in the main analyses also yielded 
significant main effects of match status, in the absence of any other significant main or interaction 
effects, F(1,21) = 7.26, p = .014, ηp
2
 = .26 (CPz mismatch: M = 0.68, SD = 1.54; match: M = 0.06, SD 
= 1.19), F(1,21) = 10.66, p = .004, ηp
2
 = .34 (Pz mismatch: M = 0.73, SD = 1.23; match: M = 0.39, SD 
= 0.91), and F(1,21) = 5.01, p = .036, ηp
2
 = .19 (POz mismatch: M = 0.73, SD = 1.50; match: M = 
0.39, SD = 1.50) respectively. 
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Given that the group ICAs were trained on each subject’s complete dataset, the 
resulting task-related components were unlikely to reliably differentiate between 
subtler aspects of responding, such as accuracy and match/mismatch status. Hence, 
the trial-by-trial averages of the raw late positive ERP (displaying clear mismatch > 
match effects across all task phases) were used in the integrated EEG-fMRI 




Figure 5.4. Standalone EEG analyses identify late positive ERP across all task phases, 
spanning cue-item order (Cue First, Item First) and task domain conditions (‘Recog’ = 
recognition; ‘Semant’ = semantic). Grand average waveforms are shown for pooled central-
parietal midline electrodes (CPz, Pz and POz), with red waves denoting averaged 
‘mismatch’ decisions and blue waves denoting ‘match’ decisions. Grey rectangles illustrate 
the 600 ms period over which ERP amplitudes were averaged for statistical comparisons. 
Scalp topographies are presented for the difference wave (mismatch – match) calculated 




Figure 5.5. Supplementary group ICA of EEG data recovers central-parietal task 
components, in separate analyses for a. the Cue First condition and b. the Item First 
condition. Left panels present scalp topographies for all task-related independent 
components identified by the Group ICA (scaled in arbitrary units). Right panels present 
grand average waveforms for selected task components (scaled in z-scores), with standard 
error of the mean shaded in grey for each data point.  
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5.3.3. Standalone fMRI analyses recover memory control network.  
An initial standalone fMRI analysis aimed to identify brain regions linked broadly with 
heightened memory control, which were subsequently probed for cross-task function 
in the masking procedures described in the next section. The recognition task in the 
Cue First order condition was the focus of this preliminary analysis, given that its 
format is most similar to the likelihood cueing paradigm (with cues guiding the 
evaluation of ensuing recognition items in both tasks, O’Connor et al., 2010), and 
therefore enabled comparison of fMRI control correlates emerging from the present 
mismatch control manipulation with those associated with the reliably replicated 
invalid cueing effect. Indeed, the mismatch control contrast for the Cue First 
recognition phase (mismatch > match decisions, p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contiguous 
voxels; see Figure 5.6a, see Table 5.1.) yielded a distributed network similar in 
extent and threshold to that observed in previous studies employing the invalid cuing 
contrast (invalid > validly cued items, O’Connor et al., 2010). This “recognition 
mismatch network” prominently encompassed frontal regions, including bilateral 
inferior frontal gyri (IFG, ~BA 45/47), left insula (~BA 47/48), left premotor cortex (BA 
6) and right motor cortex (BA 4). Additional mismatch-sensitive clusters were located 
in the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ, BA 32; just inferior to the pre-SMA) and a large 
swath of the left parietal lobe, centring on the intraparietal sulcus (IPS, BA 7/40). 
Greater activation for mismatch compared to match Cue First recognition decisions 
was also observed in bilateral occipital cortices (~ BA 17/18/19), left precuneus (~ 
BA7), regions of the left dorsal striatum (putamen extending into caudate), right 
temporal cortex (BA 20/21) and right cerebellum. The inverse match > mismatch 
contrast yielded no suprathreshold clusters at the same threshold. Considered with 
the behavioural analyses described earlier, the standalone fMRI analyses of the Cue 
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First recognition phase suggest that the heightened control demands associated with 
correctly identifying cue-item mismatch engaged a number of brain regions that have 
been reliably observed in previous studies of recognition memory control. 
Further standalone fMRI analyses sought to segregate the recognition mismatch 
network into regions that likely serve a cognitive control function specific to the Cue 
First recognition task, and those that serve a more “general” cross-task function 
(irrespective of the cue-item order and task domain in which control is heightened). A 
conjunction analysis was conducted to identify regions in which fMRI BOLD 
amplitude increased for the mismatch > match contrast across all four presented 
task phases (combined p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contiguous voxels). Figure 5.6b 
shows the result of inclusively masking this cross-task conjunction with the initial Cue 
First recognition mismatch contrast (see Table 5.1. also). Recognition mismatch 
regions with likely cross-task control properties were largely left-lateralised, with 
prominent segregation observed in the RCZ and left IPS clusters. The cross-task 
fMRI conjunction is examined further in the ensuing section as part of a 
comprehensive examination of the precise control functions subserved by regions of 
the recognition mismatch network, which encompasses integration with the late 






Figure 5.6. Standalone fMRI analyses recovering recognition mismatch network. a. All 
regions demonstrating significant activation in the mismatch control contrast of the Cue First 
recognition task (mismatch > match decision trials; p < .001, uncorrected, 5 contiguous 
voxels). b. The same mismatch contrast in a. masked by the results of a conjunction 
analysis of mismatch > match effects across all four task phases (combined p < .001, 5 
contig. vox.). Regions active in both the Cue First recognition mismatch contrast and the 
cross-task conjunction are shown in red, whereas regions solely active in the Cue First 
recognition contrast are shown in green. X, Y and Z coordinates are provided in MNI space.  
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5.3.4. Integrated EEG-fMRI isolates reliable cross-task control regions. 
The approach adopted in the integration of the EEG and fMRI data followed from the 
observation that whilst the late positive ERP reliably increased for mismatch 
compared to “match” decisions, it nevertheless demonstrated a voltage potential 
increase relative to baseline for both decision categories (see Section 5.3.2; see 
Figure 5.4.). The control process underpinned by the late positive component is 
hence likely engaged for both decision categories, albeit to an enhanced degree 
when making mismatch decisions. fMRI BOLD activation correlated with the ERP 
would be at a risk of cancelling out if both decision types were modelled separately 
due to shared variance between the two regressors. A simplified model was 
therefore adopted, wherein “correct” decisions irrespective of match/mismatch status 
were parametrically modulated by trialwise estimates of the late positive ERP 
(averaged over the 600 ms sub-epoch used in the standalone ERP analyses). The 
resultant activation map yielded brain regions in which BOLD amplitude was 
predicted by variations in the late positive ERP (thresholded at p < .05 uncorrected, 5 
contig. vox.). The ERP modulation map and the earlier fMRI cross-task conjunction 
map (combined p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox.) were then utilised in a series of 
masking procedures centring on the core recognition mismatch control contrast (Cue 
First recognition mismatch > match, p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox.), so as to 
elucidate memory control regions with reliable cross-task control functions. 
To validate the above approach in isolating cross-task control activations, it is 
worthwhile highlighting that inclusively masking the recognition mismatch > match 
contrast with the negative ERP modulation map yielded no suprathreshold clusters. 
This demonstrates that parametric relationships between the late positive ERP and 
the fMRI mismatch control effects were exclusive to the positive modulation. Further, 
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inclusively masking the same positive ERP modulation map with the inverse Cue 
First recognition match > mismatch contrast (itself emerging at a lower threshold of p 
< .05 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox.) also yielded no suprathreshold clusters. This latter 
finding confirms that the relationship between the late positive ERP and the 
standalone fMRI analyses was preferentially sensitive to the fMRI mismatch > match 
contrast that identified brain regions underlying aspects of cognitive control.  
The results of the masking procedures are rendered in Figure 5.7. and indexed in 
Table 5.1. Panel a. of the figure depicts mismatch-sensitive regions that were 
exclusive to the Cue First recognition phase, and not active in either the fMRI cross-
task conjunction or the ERP parametric modulation. These “recognition-specific” 
regions included the entirety of the occipital mismatch cluster, including bilateral 
lingual gyrus (~ BA 18/19) and left precuneus (BA 7), as well as the left IFG (BA 
45/47), left insula (BA 47/48), right temporal pole (BA 20/21) and right primary motor 
cortex (BA 4). The control function of these regions is likely confined to the detection 
of cue-item mismatch specifically when items are evaluated in the recognition 
memory domain. 
Panel 7b depicts recognition mismatch regions that demonstrated masked activation 
patterns consistent with some form of general cross-task function. Regions overlaid 
in dark blue are those that were active in both the recognition mismatch contrast and 
the fMRI cross-task conjunction, but that did not correlate with the late positive ERP. 
This pattern of overlap was observed in right cerebellum, left IFG (~ BA 47) and left 
premotor cortex (BA 6). These regions potentially perform a cross-task control 
function, albeit one that does not directly relate to the late positive ERP evoked over 
the 600 ms sub-epoch within the active decision period. The light blue overlay 
highlights recognition mismatch regions that positively correlated with the late 
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positive ERP (at a combined threshold of p < .00005, 5 contig. vox.), but which were 
not active in the cross-task fMRI conjunction. Regions displaying this particular 
masking pattern included right IFG (~ BA 45), left insula (~ BA 47), left premotor (BA 
6) and left dorsal striatum. These regions also potentially perform a cross-task 
function, although this function is likely not primarily sensitive to processes that 
differentiate mismatch from match decisions. 
Finally, regions overlaid in red in Figure 7b are those that were active in the 
recognition mismatch contrast, the fMRI cross-task conjunction and the positive ERP 
modulation. This confluence of activation masks emerged in two clusters localized in 
the RCZ (BA 32) and the IPS (~ BA 7/40) respectively. These “cross-task” clusters 
were reliably engaged when control demands were heightened in recognition and 
semantic domains, irrespective of whether cues or items were presented first. 
Further, the observed association with the ERP modulation links the spatially precise 
fMRI localization of these cross-task regions with a precise temporal engagement at 
the 600Ms period in which the late positive ERP was evoked (with onset 600Ms for 
the Cue First phase, and 400 Ms for the Item First phase). It is worthwhile 
highlighting that the larger regions in which these cross-task clusters were located 
were in fact split by their affiliation to the various masking procedures. The cross-
task RCZ cluster was flanked by a posterior ERP modulation-inclusive cluster 
(shown in light blue) and an anterior fMRI conjunction-inclusive cluster (shown in 
dark blue), whereas the cross-task IPS cluster was solely flanked by an anterior fMRI 
conjunction-inclusive cluster. These activation patterns allude to the potential 
sensitivity of even broader regions of the rostral cingulate and left parietal lobe to 




Figure 5.7. Integrated EEG-fMRI analyses segregate recognition-specific and cross-task 
control regions. Activation maps show the results of masking the recognition mismatch 
network emerging from the Cue First mismatch > match contrast (p < .001 uncorrected, 5 
contig. vox.) with the fMRI cross-task conjunction (mismatch > match across all 4 presented 
phases, combined p < .001 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox.; “fMRI conjunct”) and the late positive 
ERP parametric modulation (positive modulation, p < .05 uncorrected, 5 contig. vox.; “ERP 
mod”). a. Regions solely active in the Cue First recognition mismatch > match contrast (i.e. 
non-overlapping with both fMRI conjunction and ERP modulation maps) are displayed in 
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green. b. Regions active in both the recognition mismatch contrast and various combinations 
of the fMRI conjunction and ERP modulation maps, with regions overlapping solely with the 
fMRI conjunction shown in navy blue, those overlapping solely with the ERP modulation 
shown in light blue, and those inclusive to both masks shown in red. X, Y and Z coordinates 
are provided in MNI space. ‘Excl.’, exclusive mask; ‘incl.’, inclusive mask; ‘RCZ’, rostral 




Table 5.1. Regions active in the fMRI mismatch > match contrast for the Cue First 
recognition phase (p < .001, 5 contiguous voxels), broken down by their association with 
masking procedures involving the fMRI cross-task mismatch > match conjunction (“fMRI 
conjunct”; combined p < .001, 5 contig. vox.) and the positive EEG-fMRI parametric 
modulation (“ERP mod”; p < .05, 5 contig. vox.).  
Contrast Region Lat. BA x y z Vox. Z score 
Excluding fMRI conjunct and ERP mod 
 Occipital        
  Calcarine/Lingual L 17/18 -3 -82 4 57 4.38 
  Precuneus L 7 -3 -73 43 83 4.09 
  Lingual R 18/19 18 -82 -8 46 3.76 
  Superior Occipital L 19 -18 -82 19 19 3.71 
  Middle Occipital L 19 -33 -67 37 7 3.53 
 Cingulate        
  RCZ/ACC L 32 -9 20 43 19 4.31 
 Frontal        
  IFG L 47 -48 44 -8 78 4.26 
  IFG R 45/47 48 17 4 144 4.09 
  Insula L 48 -36 14 -5 13 3.45 
  IFG L 45 -54 17 2 19 3.43 
  Insula L 47 -33 20 -2 5 3.26 
  Primary motor R 4 48 -16 61 6 3.18 
 Limbic        
  Putamen L - -30 2 4 14 4.10 
 Cerebellum        
  Ansiform R - 33 -55 -35 7 3.68 
  Ansiform R - 24 -67 -32 7 3.49 
 Temporal        
  TC R 20 42 -25 -11 13 3.53 
  Superior TC R 21 48 -1 -11 6 3.44 
 Parietal        
  IPS L 7/40 -30 -52 40 8 3.51 
  Postcentral gyrus R 43 66 -4 19 10 3.49 
Including fMRI conjunct, excluding ERP mod 
 Cerebellum        
  Ansiform R - 33 -58 -35 22 3.99 
 Parietal        
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  IPS L 7/40 -30 -61 37 59 3.96 
 Cingulate        
  RCZ/ACC L 32 -9 23 43 16 3.85 
 Frontal        
  IFG L 47 -27 26 -11 7 3.67 
  Premotor L 6 -36 2 49 18 3.62 
Including ERP mod, excluding fMRI conjunct 
 Frontal        
  IFG R 45 45 17 4 36 4.24 
  Premotor L 6 -24 -7 52 15 4.05 
  Insula L 47 -30 23 4 5 3.38 
 Limbic        
  Putamen/Caudate L - -24 -1 7 17 4.13 
 Cingulate        
  RCZ - 32 0 8 52 6 3.47 
Including fMRI conjunct and ERP mod 
 Cingulate        
  RCZ L 32 3 11 52 11 3.81 
 Parietal        
  IPS L 7/40 -27 -55 49 7 3.24 
Note: x, y, and z coordinates refer to cluster maxima. Lat., Laterality; BA, approximate Brodmann’s 
area; Vox., number of significant voxels; RCZ, rostral cingulate zone; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; TC, 




The present multimodal neuroimaging study focused on a research question that is 
often conjectured but rarely empirically tested – is the engagement of cognitive 
control across diverse task contexts mediated by common neural substrates? The 
adopted design exposed the same sample of participants to cued tasks that differed 
according to both the domain under evaluation (episodic or semantic) and the 
ordering of task events (Cue First or Item First), but which were identical in terms of 
sensorimotor input and the precise form of control manipulation. Behavioural 
analyses revealed a slowing of RT and reduction in response confidence when cues 
and items mismatched across all task phases, consistent with the hypothesised 
increase in control demands for the former category. Standalone EEG analyses 
revealed a late positive ERP component (LPC) that manifested across all task 
phases at similar central-parietal scalp locations and onset at the period of putative 
controlled cue-item match/mismatch assessment. The evoked LPC also reliably 
indexed the control manipulation in the form of an increased positive slow-wave 
component for mismatch decisions. The ERP findings were used to clarify the 
properties of a core “mismatch control network” identified in standalone fMRI 
analyses of the Cue First recognition phase, which was comparable in extent and 
threshold to previous recognition control effects. Masking procedures involving this 
mismatch control network, and combinations of the conjunction of fMRI mismatch 
effects across all four task phases, and the positive parametric modulation of the 
fMRI response by trialwise LPC amplitudes, collectively segregated brain regions 
underpinning cross-task control from those associated with recognition-specific 
control. The findings raise important refinements to prior interpretations of neural 
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responses elicited in isolated episodic and semantic memory domains, as well as in 
the wider field of cognitive control. 
The results speak directly to prior equivocation in ERP studies of episodic and 
semantic memory. Research in these isolated domains has documented ERP 
components with highly similar topographical and morphological properties to the 
presently observed LPC, which have nevertheless been linked with disparate 
domain-specific functions. LPC-like components elicited in recognition tasks have 
been characterised as markers of the recollection of episodic details (Rugg & 
Curran, 2007; Rugg et al., 1998), whereas LPC-like components elicited in semantic 
tasks have been associated with syntactic parsing mechanisms (Hagoort, Brown & 
Groothusen, 1993; Osterhout & Holcomb, 1992). These domain-specific 
interpretations have been challenged by reports of the sensitivity of both recognition 
and syntactic LPCs to the detection of expectancy violations (Coulson et al., 1998; 
Herron et al., 2003). The resolution of conflict associated with unexpected events 
has long been considered a core cognitive control process, and one that is typically 
associated with the P3 complex (Squires et al., 1975). Indeed, the P3b and ensuing 
slow-wave sub-components of the P3 complex also share topographical and 
morphological features with the previous and presently observed LPCs, raising the 
possibility that each ERP indexes a common process (as was noted by Coulson et 
al., 1998).  
The results suggest that this common process is likely a “general” feature of 
cognitive control, as indicated by the modulation of the LPC in response to the 
conflict generated by cue-item mismatch across different task phases. The findings 
therefore highlight the virtue of going beyond the traditional paradigms in which P3-
like components are elicited (e.g. the oddball paradigm and the go/no-go paradigm) 
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so as to more effectively characterise their oft-conjectured involvement in domain-
general processes (Polich, 2007; Pritchard, 1981). The overall pattern of ERP effects 
favours a functional link between the LPC and cognitive control processes recruited 
in the resolution of conflict, irrespective of the specific task context in which this 
conflict arises. This interpretation further implies that the recognition LPC, syntactic 
LPC and the P3 LPC are all electrophysiological markers of a common cross-task 
control process.  
The findings suggest similar refinements to previously reported fMRI effects. Mere 
identification of the mismatch control network in the Cue First recognition phase 
adds to growing evidence that a number of regions previously linked with episodic 
“retrieval success” effects are in fact sensitive to aspects of memory control (Dobbins 
et al., 2002; Han, Huettel, Raposo, Adcock & Dobbins, 2010; O’Connor et al., 2010). 
The ensuing masking procedures enabled the specification of more precise sub-
functions for regions within this core memory control network. Regions associated 
with a “recognition-specific” role demonstrated an increased BOLD response for 
mismatch compared to match decisions, which did not generalise to the other task 
phases and did not correlate with the control processes captured by the LPC 
amplitudes entered as parametric modulators. This exclusive activation pattern likely 
reflects an involvement in controlled episodic retrieval processes, engaged in an 
attempt to confirm the recognition status of items that appeared to generate 
mismatch conflict. Indeed, a number of brain regions identified as “recognition-
specific” in the present analyses have been reliably linked with controlled retrieval 
and source monitoring processes in previous studies, including the precuneus 
(Dobbins et al., 2002; Lundstrom, Ingvar & Petersson, 2005), regions of the 
ventrolateral PFC (IFG and insula; Barredo et al., 2013; Dobbins et al., 2002; 
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Dobbins & Wagner, 2005) and temporal cortex (Dobbins et al., 2002; Dobbins & 
Wagner, 2005).  The fact that these retrieval-related processes did not generalise to 
the other task phases serves to validate the proposed dichotomy between “retrieval 
control” and “decision control” outlined in the introductory chapter (see Section 1.3.).  
fMRI control activations that were not confined to the Cue First recognition task were 
identified by the various inclusive masks. Recognition mismatch control regions that 
were also active in the fMRI cross-task mismatch conjunction, but that did not 
correlate with the LPC parameters, were likely involved in cross-task control 
processes that were not primarily engaged over the onset period of the LPC effect. 
Such processes might contribute to inhibition of the cued response, which putatively 
would begin at the appearance of the item at the beginning of the “active decision” 
period, preceding the period of cue-item match/mismatch assessment linked with the 
LPC. This speculative interpretation finds some support from prior studies linking 
response inhibition with both cerebellar (e.g. Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya 
& Gabrieli, 2002a) and premotor regions (e.g. Ridderinkhof, Wery, van den 
Wildenberg, Segalowitz & Carter, 2004) that emerged in this particular masking 
scheme.  
Interpreting the functional role of regions observed in the other “partial” inclusive 
masking pattern, identifying recognition mismatch regions that overlapped with the 
LPC modulation map but not the fMRI mismatch conjunction, is more complicated. 
These regions were putatively driven by a process indexed by the LPC, albeit one 
that does not serve as a primary contributor to the ERP’s observed sensitivity to 
cross-task mismatch control effects. As noted in the results Section 5.3.4., the ERP 
analyses revealed that while LPC amplitude was greater for mismatch compared to 
match decisions, the component still visibly deviated from baseline for match 
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decisions, suggesting some sensitivity to general task-positive processes common to 
both decision categories. Considering that prior research involving intracranial 
recordings has sourced P3-like components with a large network of underlying 
neural generators, exhibiting a substantial degree of functional heterogeneity among 
them (Friedman, Cycowicz & Gaeta, 2001), it is likely that processes other than 
those directly driving the mismatch > match effects are also reflected to some degree 
in trialwise LPC amplitudes. One such process might be the likelihood of reward 
attainment, which would explain the emergence in this LPC-inclusive mask of a 
dorsal striatal region reliably associated with reward in prior research (e.g. Knutson, 
Fong, Adams, Varner & Hommer, 2001). This view might also explain the selective 
involvement of the striatum in the Cue First recognition phase, given prior reports 
linking activity in this region with processes underlying the increased salience 
imparted to “old” decisions by typical recognition task formats (Han et al., 2010). 
Contrasting the nuances of the above “partial” masking patterns, recognition 
mismatch regions displaying the most reliable cross-task control properties were 
identified in fairly unambiguous fashion – namely as those regions present in all 
three activation maps.  The confluence of masks recovered fMRI activations in two 
regions – the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) – 
that elevated for mismatch compared to match decisions across all task domain and 
cue-item order conditions, and which also correlated with the LPC component shown 
to be sensitive to cross-task control effects in of itself. Relating the engagement of 
the RCZ and IPS regions with the precise temporal scale of the correlated LPC effect 
suggests that the integrated EEG-fMRI cross-task activation emerged between 400-
600 ms following onset of the active decision period and lasted for a duration of 
approximately 600 ms. This temporal profile suggests that the cross-task control 
246 
 
processes mediated by the RCZ and IPS were putatively engaged after initial cue- or 
item-specific processing had been completed (depending on the order condition), 
with an emergence over the period in which cue-item match/mismatch was being 
actively evaluated prior to commission of a response. The clear elucidation of a 
cross-task function for these two regions should clarify the nature of their recurrent 
involvement in prior studies of recognition memory control (Barredo et al., 2013; 
Dobbins et al., 2002; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; O’Connor et al., 2010).  
Despite the conjunct elicitation of RCZ and IPS regions in the present cross-task 
analyses, prior research suggests these two regions might perform subtly distinct 
sub-functions within the broader service of cognitive control. For instance, the 
reliable involvement of the RCZ in resolving various forms of response conflict 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004) has been more specifically linked with the 
process of selecting a response amongst competing alternatives (Rushworth, 
Walton, Kennerley & Bannerman, 2004; Mueller, Brass, Waszak & Prinz, 2007). This 
response selection role is supported by the anatomical connectivity of RCZ with 
downstream pre-SMA and primary motor cortices, as well as a direct efferent to the 
spinal cord, all of which serve as possible pathways via which the actions selected 
by the RCZ might be translated into overt motor responses (Ball et al., 1999; Dum & 
Strick, 1991).  
In comparison, the role of the IPS in mediating cross-task control might involve the 
complementary representation and maintenance of available response options in 
working memory. Support for this representational function comes from 
neuropsychological studies in which patients with IPS lesions were found to exhibit 
pronounced working memory deficits in tasks involving spatial memory (Gillebert et 
al., 2011) and arithmetic operations (Rivera, Reiss, Eckert & Menon, 2005). Indeed, 
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a representational role for the IPS and adjacent left parietal lobe regions has also 
been repeatedly conjectured in functional neuroimaging studies of recognition control 
(Barredo et al., 2013; Dobbins et al., 2002; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005). In a recent 
variant of the likelihood cueing paradigm, Jaeger and colleagues (2013) highlighted 
the potential cross-task character of the IPS representation function, observing 
activation in this region for the detection of invalidly cued recognition items 
irrespective of the actual old/new status of the item (contrasting proximal left parietal 
regions which showed item-specific invalid cueing effects). The notion that the IPS 
represents and maintains information that is ultimately selected by the RCZ is 
supported by the findings of Bunge and colleagues (2002a), who successfully 
dissociated working memory operations linked to the IPS from response selection 
processes associated with the RCZ in the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 
1974). Future research will undoubtedly be required to interrogate this proposed 
differentiation between maintenance and selection functions of the IPS and RCZ 
cross-task regions respectively. 
In conclusion, the presented multi-modal neuroimaging experiment enabled the 
precise functional specification of memory control correlates with reliable cross-
domain properties, both in time (via association with an ERP that onset between 
400-600 ms during the active decision period for a duration of ~ 600 ms) and space 
(localized with fMRI to rostral cingulate and intraparietal sulcus regions). The findings 
highlight the virtue of employing simultaneous EEG-fMRI to recover a spatially and 
temporally rich dataset capable of providing novel insights into the study of episodic 
and non-episodic control processes. Indeed, this rich dataset will be explored in 
future analyses seeking to elucidate the large-scale network connectivity dynamics 
underpinning the observed regional effects, as well as aim to examine the thus far 
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overlooked uncued phase (see Chapter 7, Section 7.4. for further details.). 
Connectivity methods might be especially useful in clarifying the functional 
significance of the overlap amongst the various masked effects visible at cortical 
sites proximal to both the cross-task RCZ and IPS clusters. Nevertheless, the 
described analyses have provided an insight into the emergence of memory control 
processes with cross-domain properties in cortical brain regions. The final 
experimental chapter employed a different functional neuroimaging modality – high 
resolution infra-red pupillometry – to complement the emergent understanding of 
cortical dynamics, with insight into the involvement of neuromodulatory brainstem 




Chapter 6: Probing the autonomic correlates of memory control 
using pupillometry 
 
6.1. Introduction to Experiment 7 
The previous chapter examined the cortical dynamics underpinning the allocation of 
cognitive control across diverse task contexts, encompassing different domains of 
evaluation and different orderings of control-inducing events. The simultaneous 
EEG-fMRI method revealed the temporal signature of this cross-task control function 
– linked with onset of a late positive ERP component – which was spatially sourced 
to regions of the cingulate cortex (rostral cingulate zone, RCZ) and left parietal lobe 
(intraparietal sulcus, IPS). The findings clarified the functional significance of 
electrophysiological and hemodynamic signatures of episodic memory control, which 
have been subject to considerable speculation in prior research (Barredo, Oztekin & 
Badre, 2013; Dobbins, Foley, Schacter & Wagner, 2002; Finnigan, Humphreys, 
Dennis & Geffen, 2002).  
The aim of the present chapter was to complement this emerging cortical control 
system with insight into the autonomic systems with which it putatively interacts to 
facilitate adaptive responses to environmentally induced conflict. Burgeoning 
research has linked such on-task autonomic changes with neuromodulatory activity 
of the brainstem locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system (LC-NE; Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005), as evidenced by animal research documenting the increased 
activation of individual LC neurons to motivationally salient events (Aston-Jones & 
Bloom, 1981) and the concomitant release of NE in distributed cortical sites via 
efferent projections (Abercrombie, Keller & Zigmond, 1988). Whilst these autonomic 
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changes have traditionally been interpreted as signifying general physiological 
arousal (Berridge & Waterhouse, 2003), more recent accounts suggest a role for the 
LC-NE system in providing a “boosting” function more intimately tied with cognitive 
processing (Servan-Schreiber, Printz & Cohen, 1990). In this view, the LC-NE 
system increases the responsivity or “gain” of cortical control networks in light of 
environmental factors, such as changes to goal state and heightened response 
conflict (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; Nieuwenhuis, de Geus & Aston-Jones, 2010). 
Increasing evidence therefore suggests that the LC-NE neuromodulatory system 
serves a seminal role in complementing cortical processing to regulate adaptive 
behaviour. However, the precise nature of this adaptive cortical-autonomic system 
interaction and the mechanisms of its engagement across different cognitive 
domains are in need of further interrogation. 
In investigating the role of the LC-NE system in episodic memory control (the 
cognitive domain of primary interest in this thesis), the present experimental chapter 
led to my use of another functional neuroimaging modality - high resolution infra-red 
eye-tracking. This followed from considerable evidence suggesting that pupil 
diameter serves as a physiological index of LC-NE activity (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 
2005; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2010). For example, single-cell recordings in primates 
have highlighted the strong, positive relationship between LC neuronal discharge 
and increases in pupil diameter (Rajkowski, Rubiak, Aston-Jones, 1993). 
Furthermore, human pupillometry research spanning almost fifty years has 
established increased pupillary dilation (PD) as a correlate of heightened cognitive 
processing in diverse task domains, including mental arithmetic (Hess & Polt, 1964), 
working memory (Kahneman & Beatty, 1966), perceptual decision-making 
(Kahneman & Beatty, 1967), semantic decision-making (Ahern & Beatty, 1981) and 
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economic decision-making (Fiedler & Glockner, 2012). Interpretations of the PD 
response have traditionally focused on theories of processing load, with pupil 
diameter proposed as an index of the amount of effort or “cognitive load” allocated in 
ongoing processing (Beatty, 1982; Kahneman, 1973).  
Similar load theories have been extended to emerging findings from pupillometry 
research into episodic recognition memory, which report an increased PD for the 
presentation of studied old compared to unstudied new items at test (Gardner, Mo & 
Borrego, 1974; Goldinger & Papesh, 2012; Heaver & Hutton, 2011; Naber, Frässle, 
Rutishauser & Einhäuser, 2013; Otero, Weekes & Hutton, 2011; Papesh, Goldinger 
& Hout, 2012; Vo et al., 2008).  Termed the “pupil old/new effect”, the increase in 
recognition PD has been interpreted as a neurophysiological correlate of the 
heightened cognitive load associated with processing retrieved memory content 
(Goldinger & Papesh, 2012; Papesh et al., 2012; Vo et al., 2008). The content-
related account of pupil old/new effects raises clear parallels with analogous 
“retrieval success” interpretations of old/new effects in other functional neuroimaging 
modalities, as described in the previous chapter (Konishi, Wheeler Donaldson & 
Buckner, 2000; Rugg & Curran, 2007). To reiterate, this view attributes the 
heightened neural response for the correct identification of old items (“Hits”) 
compared to new items (“CRs”) to the successful recovery of memory content, but 
has been challenged by studies controlling for strategic control processes that 
overtly contribute to evaluative outcomes. Of these processes, systematic 
manipulation of participants’ expectations of encountering old or new test items has 
been shown to both modulate event-related potential signatures of retrieval success 
(Herron, Quayle & Rugg, 2003) and fMRI BOLD activation in brain regions previously 
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associated with retrieval success (Herron, Henson & Rugg, 2004; Jaeger, Konkel & 
Dobbins, 2013; O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 2010). 
The potential for memory expectation to exert similar influences on the pupil old/new 
effect has thus far been overlooked, despite the documented sensitivity of the PD 
response to expectancy violations in non-episodic task domains. The link between 
PD and expectation follows from its early identification as part of the group of 
neurophysiological changes associated with orienting to change in the environment 
(Sokolov, 1963). Increased PD has also been reliably observed in the detection of 
infrequent (i.e. unexpected) “target” stimuli embedded in a stream of frequent “lures” 
in the oddball paradigm (Friedman, Hakerem, Sutton & Fleiss, 1973; Van Olst, 
Heemstra & Kortenaar, 1979). More recent research has implicated PD as a specific 
index of “surprise” resulting from the countermanding of prior expectations 
(Preuschoff, ‘t Hart & Enhauser, 2011; De Gee, Knapen & Donner, 2014). Hence, 
unconstrained expectations operating in prior studies of recognition memory might 
have served as covert contributors to the pupil old/new effect, in which case the 
observed recognition PD would serve not as a signifier of retrieval success per se, 
but rather as an index of controlled processing undertaken when mnemonic item 
evidence conflicts with prior expectations. 
The present experiment sought to directly interrogate the influence of memory 
expectation on the pupil old/new effect, as systematically manipulated by the 
likelihood cueing paradigm described in previous chapters (e.g. O’Connor et al., 
2010). Participants underwent high-resolution infra-red eye-tracking whilst making 
recognition decisions for old and new test items that were either expected or 
unexpected based on the validity of anticipatory cues (e.g. expected old trial: “likely 
old” cue followed by an old item; unexpected old trial: “likely new” cue followed by an 
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old item). Based on the findings summarised above, we anticipated an increased PD 
following encounters with unexpected recognition test items i.e. those instances 
when participants countermanded invalid cues. We also interrogated more specific 
PD effects; namely, whether pupillary responses were exclusive to unexpected 
novelty or unexpected familiarity, and whether they tracked response accuracy under 
these situations. This focus followed from a recent fMRI study (Jaeger et al., 2013) 
which split the invalid cueing effect into three functionally distinct sub-networks, 
respectively comprising regions that activated for unexpected familiarity, unexpected 
novelty, and unexpected events irrespective of memory status.  
In this endeavour, analyses of the mean PD amplitude were complemented by multi-
level modelling (MLM) techniques that sought to disentangle the contributions of 
different cognitive processes to changes in the trial-by-trial PD. Similar attempts to 
separate the cognitive constituents of the PD response have emerged recently in 
research into predictive rule-learning (Nassar et al., 2012) and visual perception (de 
Gee et al., 2014). MLM provides a particularly effective method of separating 
components of the PD response, given that it explicitly models participant-level 
variation (i.e. as a random effect), thereby enabling more efficient partitioning of 
variance that aids segregation of task-evoked cognitive processes (Hayes, 2006). 
Overall, the findings provide novel evidence in support of link between pupil dilation 
and two functionally dissociable memory control sub-processes, namely unexpected 





6.2.1. Participants. The sample comprised 34 participants (22 female; mean age = 
24.8 years, range = 18-37 years) out of a total number of 40 who completed the 
experiment13. Three participants were excluded for artifacts contaminating more than 
20% of their eye-tracking data, 2 for falling asleep during the experiment, and 1 due 
to a computer malfunction All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and 
abstained from caffeine in the hour immediately preceding their participation (as 
caffeine intake leads to tonic pupil dilation; Tryon, 1975). Informed consent was 
obtained in compliance with Washington University’s human subjects guidelines, 
with all participants compensated at a rate of $10/hour. 
6.2.2. Stimuli. Word stimuli were sampled from a departmental pool of 1216 
(Kucera-Francis corpus frequency = 8.85), yielding five, 360 item wordlists to which 
participants were randomly assigned. Word presentation order within these five 
wordlists was randomised across participants. Word length was controlled by 
excluding words less than four letters and greater than 10 letters in length, which 
served to minimise luminance differences across presented words (which could 
introduce confounding variation on pupil dilation). Each participant completed three 
study-test blocks, with 60 words presented at study and 120 words at test (the latter 
constituting 60 studied old words and 60 unstudied new words). 
6.2.3. Procedure. The experiment was conducted on a standard PC running E-
Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA) that synchronized 
with both the participant display PC and another PC running the eye-tracker 
                                            
13
 I conducted the present experiment during a 2 month research placement at Washington University 
in St Louis, under the supervision of Professor Ian Dobbins. The placement was funded by a 
SINAPSE Early Career Researcher Exchange Award. 
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recording software. Following the full setup of the eye-tracker (detailed below), 
participants were presented with onscreen instructions and a brief practice phase. A 
self-paced syllable counting task constituted the study phase, with response options 
‘1’, ‘2’ and ‘3+’, to facilitate incidental encoding of subsequent old items (see Figure 
6.1. for a design schematic). The test phase followed immediately, with participants 
deciding if words appearing onscreen were studied (old) or unstudied (new) for a 
randomized list containing equal proportions of old and new probe items. Each test 
trial commenced with anticipatory cues as to the likely old/new status of ensuing 
probes. These took the form of “Likely Old” (LO) and “Likely New” (LN) cue types, 
which were each valid on approximately 70% of trials. Participants were informed of 
the cues’ validity and encouraged to use them to guide their recognition decisions. 
On a subset of trials, participants were provided non-informative cues of the form 
“Likely ???” (“uncued” trials, UC) that assessed behavioural and eye-tracking 
responses in the absence of cued information. All cues appeared in isolation for 2 s 
at the start of each trial, followed by appearance of both the test item and a response 
prompt for 3.5 s, and finally a 2 s fixation cross period (See Figure 6.1.). Hence, 
each test phase comprised a total of 120 cued test trials, of which 70 were validly 
cued, 30 invalidly cued and 20 uncued. Participants completed three study-test block 
runs in total. 
6.2.4. Eye-tracking data collection. Pupillometry data were recorded using an 
Eyelink 1000 infrared eye-tracker (SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, ON, Canada) 
running Eyelink software (v 4.48), sampling at 1000 Hz and at spatial resolution 
<0.01° root mean square. The eye-tracker was placed centrally under the 
presentation monitor at a fixed distance 60 cm from each participant. Participants 
were seated on a comfortable chair that included an adjustable headrest to minimize 
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head movement. The experiment was displayed in a room maintained at a constant 
low level of ambient illumination. Calibration and validation of gaze direction was 
conducted at the start of each participant’s session. Pupil data was acquired at study 
and test across all three blocks. The data was pre-processed using in-house 
software written in Java (Oracle Corporation, Redwood Shores, CA, USA). The pupil 
data were corrected for blinks and other sources of signal dropout by linear 
interpolation, and were subsequently downsampled to 20 Hz. As mentioned, 
participants with signal dropout in excess of 20% were excluded from the analysis. 
The pupil data was extracted as the percent signal change from a baseline mean of 
the 200 ms fixation period preceding the onset of each trial. Separate analyses were 
conducted for the mean trial-locked (i.e. locked to cue onset) and mean response-
locked pupil dilation, as well as a linear decomposition of the dilation response 
during the probe epoch that informed the final multi-level model analyses (see 




Figure 6.1. Design schematic for the presently employed likelihood cueing paradigm. Study 
comprised a syllable counting task for 60 presented words. At test, participants decided if 
presented words were studied old or unstudied new, for a wordlist comprising 60 old and 60 
new words. Each test trial was preceded by appearance of anticipatory cues of the form 
“Likely Old” and “Likely New”, which were valid in predicting the status of ensuing test items 
on ~70% of trials. Uninformative cues of the type “Likely ???” were also presented on a 





6.3.1. Behavioural validation of likelihood cueing manipulation. The cueing 
manipulation was validated by behavioural analyses of sensitivity (d') and response 
criterion (c) estimated from the signal detection model14 (Green & Swets, 1966; 
Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was firstly 
conducted on d' with cue type as the factor (“likely old”, LO; “likely new”, LN; “likely 
???”, UC), yielding a non-significant main effect, F < 1. Participants’ sensitivity in 
discriminating between old and new probe items was not influenced by the cueing 
manipulation (LO cue d' M = 1.48, SD = 0.39; LN cue d' M = 1.49, SD = 0.44; UC 
cue d' M = 1.50, SD = 0.57). The same one-way ANOVA on c did yield a significant 
main effect of cue type in the anticipated direction, such that criterion placement was 
most liberal in the LO cue condition (M = -0.25, SD = 0.32), most conservative in the 
LN cue condition (M = 0.27, SD = 0.28), and relatively neutral in the uncued 
condition (M = 0.01, SD = 0.30), F(2,64)=37.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .54. Criterion 
placement was confirmed to significantly differ between these individual cue types by 
Tukey’s Highest Significant Difference (HSD), all ps < .001. As with the variant of the 
likelihood cueing paradigm employed in Chapter 4 (see Section 4.3.3.1.) and prior 
research involving the same paradigm (e.g. O’Connor et al., 2010), the cueing 
manipulation shifted criterion bias so as to increase confirmation of the cued 
decision, without impacting on sensitivity. 
                                            
14
 One further subject was removed from the d′ and c analyses for not committing any incorrect “old” 
decisions (i.e. false alarms) in one of the cueing conditions, prohibiting the calculation of these 
measures for the cued phase. This participant was included in supporting analyses of the uncued 
trials as sufficient data was available. Whereas the protocol for dealing with such instances of missing 
data in previous experimental chapters has been to apply the Snodgrass & Corwin (1988) correction 
for errorless responding, this method was not favoured by the lab where I was placed at Washington 
University, and I hence did not apply it in this chapter. 
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6.3.2. Mean trial-locked pupil dilation following informative cues. Pupillometry 
analyses were first conducted on the pupil dilation (PD) response time-locked to the 
onset of each trial (i.e. appearance of the cue) and averaged for the informative cue 
conditions (i.e. “Likely Old”, LO, and “Likely New”, LN). To probe the selectivity of the 
PD response to processes directly contributing to correct decisions (as integrally 
proposed by “retrieval success” accounts), these trial-locked mean PD responses 
were calculated separately for correct and incorrect trials. Figure 2 plots the results 
of these analyses, with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for each timepoint in 
the mean PD plots shaded in grey. These intervals were calculated for each 
timepoint of the PD response via a resampling by replacement procedure 
implemented in the R statistical program (R Project for Statistical Computing, 
http://www.r-project.org/), wherein each PD timepoint was reconstituted over 34 
random samples taken from participants’ mean PD timecourses. The final 
confidence intervals were calculated from the standard deviation across 1000 
iterations of this resampling by replacement procedure.  
The resultant plots in Figure 6.2. clearly demonstrate the lack of any difference in the 
PD response between “old” and “new” decisions in the “Likely Old” cue condition that 
led subjects to expect old items, irrespective of decision correctness (Figure 6.2., left 
columns). In contrast, a pronounced difference was observed in the “Likely New” 
cueing condition that instilled expectations of encountering new items, with an 
increased PD response for “old” compared to “new” decisions (Figure 6.2., right 
columns). This elevated PD response onset several hundred milliseconds after 
appearance of the old item and lasted for the remainder of the trial. Furthermore, the 
dilation occurred for correct decisions (correct “old” i.e. “hits” > correct “new” i.e. 
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“correct rejections”, CRs) as well as incorrect decisions (incorrect “old” i.e. “false 
alarms”, FAs > incorrect “new” i.e. “misses”).  
This visible difference under the LN cue was substantiated by submitting the mean 
PD response during the probe epoch (2000-5500 ms) to a 2 (cue type: LO or LN) x 2 
(decision: “old” or “new”) ANOVA, conducted separately for correct and incorrect 
decisions. The ANOVA for correct decisions (Figure 2, upper panel) revealed 
significant main effects of decision and cue type, which were tempered by a 
significant decision by cue interaction, F(1,33) = 9.64,  p = .004, ηp
2 =.23, F(1,33) = 
4.83, p = .035, ηp
2 =.13, and F(1,33) = 7.23, p = .011, ηp
2 =.18 respectively. 
Consistent with Figure 6.2., Tukey’s HSD confirmed that the pattern of ANOVA 
results reflected a significant increase in PD for Hits compared to CRs only under the 
LN cue (p =.002), with no reliable difference observed for the LO cue (p ~ 1). The 
same ANOVA conducted for incorrect responses (Figure 6.2., lower panel) yielded 
only an interaction of decision by cue type, F(1,32) = 4.61, p = .039, ηp
2 = .13. The 
interaction was in the same direction as that observed for correct decisions, such 
that an elevated PD response for FAs compared to misses verged on significance 
under the LN cue (p = .055), but was clearly non-significant under the  LO cue (p > 
.95, via Tukey’s HSD). 
Overall, the trial-locked mean PD analyses reveal the high selectivity of the 
recognition dilation response, which differentiates “old” from “new” decisions only 
when familiarity is unexpectedly encountered in the environment (i.e. in the LN cue 
condition). The high dependency of the PD response on this specific form of 
expectation, and its emergence for both correct and incorrect decisions, both stand 
in opposition to prior reports implicating pupil dilation as a general marker of the 
successful retrieval of old item content.  
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Figure 6.2. Trial-locked pupil dilation (PD) across cued trial types (left column = “Likely Old” 
cue, right column = “Likely New”) and decision correctness (upper panel = correct 
responses, lower panel = errors).  For all plots, blue lines denote the PD response during 
“old” decisions and red lines indicate PD during “new” decisions. The upper left panel also 
depicts the temporal onset of events within each trial (cue, probe and fixation epochs). Light 
grey areas denote the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of the mean response across 
the 34 subjects, established at each sampled time point using 1000 replications.   
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6.3.3. Mean trial-locked pupil dilation following uninformative cues. Analyses of 
the trial-locked mean PD response were also conducted for the uncued condition 
(i.e. “Likely ???”, UC), wherein participants made recognition decisions in the 
absence of explicitly cued expectations. Figure 6.3. shows the PD response for 
uncued “old” and “new” decisions, averaged separately for correct (upper panel) and 
incorrect trials (lower panel). The bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals 
demonstrate that the uncued plots are noisier than the cued trial plots, and this is 
particularly apparent in the early period of incorrect uncued trials. Nevertheless, the 
upper panel depicting correct responses suggests an elevated PD response for hits 
compared to CRs during the probe epoch, although comparison of the mean 
response during this period did not yield significance, t(33) = 1.37, p = .18, d = 0.24. 
Consistent with the lower panel of Figure 6.3., the PD response for incorrect “old” 
and “new” decisions also did not significantly differ, t < 1.  
One explanation of the lack of reliable differentiation between “old” and “new” 
decisions in the uncued condition is that these trials were overall lower in number 
than the informative cue conditions, and therefore subject to greater noise 
contamination. However, this view is challenged by the fact that trial counts were on 
average even lower for incorrect responses under the LN cue (mean number of 
incorrect LN cue trials = 30.97; mean number of correct UC trials = 43.47), yet a 
clear PD response difference was observed in this condition, t(33)= 2.62, p = .013, d 
= 0.50 (FAs > misses; see Figure 6.2., lower right). Hence, the lack of a reliable PD 
difference in the uncued condition might instead arise from a general weakening of 
the dilation response due to the lack of experimental control over participants’ 
expectations. In support of this view, the previous analyses of the informative cue 
conditions demonstrated that the PD response is minimal when observers are cued 
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to expect old items and instilled with a confirmatory “old” bias (under LN cues, see 
Figure 6.2.). Similar expectations and resulting confirmatory “old” strategic biases 
are likely to have operated in unconstrained fashion the uncued phase, and therefore 
contributed to the general diminishment of the averaged PD response for this 
condition. These analyses therefore provide further support for the critical 






Figure 6.3. Trial-locked pupil dilation across uncued trial types for correct decisions (upper 
panel) and errors (lower panel).  Blue lines denote PD response during “old” decisions and 
red lines represent the response for “new” decisions. The upper panel also depicts the 
temporal onset of events within each trial (cue, probe and fixation epochs). Light grey areas 
denote the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval of each PD response across the 34 
subjects, established at each time point using 1000 replications. ‘CRs’, correct rejections; 




6.3.4. Mean response-locked pupil dilation following informative cues. The 
ensuing analyses focused on pupil dilation during the LN cue condition so as to 
further elucidate the temporal emergence of the unexpected familiarity effect. The 
mean response-locked PD response was calculated for the LN cue condition, 
spanning the 1500 ms period either side of participants’ overt response. Figure 6.4. 
plots the results of these response-locked analyses, separately for correct (upper 
panel) and incorrect decisions (lower panel). The bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals in the figure indicate that the elevated PD response to unexpected “old” 
decisions onsets comfortably prior to commission of the actual response.  
To confirm this impression, correct and incorrect decision trials were collapsed 
(given that prior analyses showed unexpected familiarity effects persisted regardless 
of decision correctness), and a series of paired samples t-tests were conducted to 
compare “old” and “new” decision  mean response-locked PDs at each timepoint (at 
50 ms sampling intervals). Type I error was controlled by adjusting p-values using 
the false discovery procedure (FDR; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Figure 6.5. plots 
the results of these FDR analyses, which reveal that the earliest reliable difference in 
the PD response emerged 450 ms before the participants’ button-press response. 
These analyses suggest that the unexpected familiarity PD response is closely tied 
to cognitive processes directly involved in the active decision-making process, which 




Figure 6.4. Response-locked PD response under the “Likely New” cue for correct decisions 
(upper panel) and errors (lower panel).  Blue lines represent the PD response during “old” 
decisions whereas red lines indicate PD during “new” decisions. The vertical line marks the 
response of the participants at 0 seconds. Light grey areas denote the bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval of each response across the 34 subjects, established at each time point 





Figure 6.5. False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted p-values of the paired samples t-tests 
comparing response-locked pupil dilation for “old” versus “new” decisions under the “Likely 
New” cue condition (collapsed across correctness; sampled at 50 ms intervals). Participants’ 
responses onset at 0 seconds on the x axis and the horizontal line denotes the adopted 




6.3.5. Multi-level modelling of trial-by-trial pupil dilation. The mean PD response 
analyses presented thus far suggest that pupil dilation during the evaluation of 
episodic memory is critically dependent on the experience of unexpected familiarity. 
This PD effect is observable irrespective of whether the experience of unexpected 
familiarity is accurate or not, as it occurs for both hits and FAs made under the LN 
cue. However, inspection of the trial-locked PD response plots in Figure 6.2. reveals 
a subtle differentiation between the PD morphologies for these categories of “old” 
decision. This is more clearly demonstrated in Figure 6.6., which plots the mean PD 
response during the LN cue for correct and incorrect “old” decisions time-locked to 
appearance of the probe. Although both hits and FAs displayed an increased 
amplitude that onsets around 1750 ms after appearance of the probe, the PD 
response for FAs returned to baseline at a slower rate than that for hits.  
This variation in the morphology of the trailing PD slope might be related to the 
significant reduction in reaction time observed for hits (M = 1443.93 ms, SD = 
237.74) compared to FAs (M = 1616.45 ms, SD = 291.75), t(33) = 3.19, p =.003, d = 
0.55. Indeed, FAs are typically associated with slower reaction times and lower 
response confidence (e.g. Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976) – both characteristic 
behavioural signifiers of heightened response conflict and associated decision 
uncertainty (see also Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1.). The visibly greater positivity of the 
trailing PD slope for FAs compared to hits might therefore relate to the greater 
uncertainty associated with the former decision category. In this view, the more 
sustained positivity of the false alarm PD slope reflects a slower, more uncertain 
decision process, whereas the quicker return to baseline of the hit PD (i.e. with a 
more negative slope) reflects a quicker, less uncertain process. The variation in PD 
morphology between correct and incorrect “old” decisions made in the LN cue 
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condition therefore suggests that the early amplitude of the dilation response and its 
later trailing slope might index different cognitive processes – namely unexpected 
familiarity and decision uncertainty respectively. 
To test this process differentiation, a multi-level modelling (MLM) approach was 
adopted in which the early amplitude and trailing slope components of the PD 
response were contrasted by their ability to predict behaviour at the trial level. 
Measures of these PD components were firstly obtained via a simple linear 
regression fitted to the PD response over a period beginning 1750 ms in the probe 
epoch and ending at its offset (3500 ms after probe onset). This decomposed the 
trialwise PD response into an early amplitude estimate (corresponding to the 
intercept of the regression) and a later slope estimate (the slope of the regression), 
which were both entered in a series of MLMs predicting three aspects of behaviour – 
reaction time, accuracy (dummy-coded as 1 = “correct”, 0 = “incorrect”) and decision 
type (coded as 1 = “old”, 0 = “new”). Figure 6.7. shows the distribution of early 
amplitude and trailing slope estimates obtained from this linear decomposition – with 
both distributions spanning a range of positive and negative values obscured by the 
mean PD plots. The MLM method optimally models participant-level variation as a 
random effect (with a varying intercept component), and therefore serves as an 
improved method of isolating cognitive processes indexed by the PD response than 
multiple regression (in which participant-level variation is imperfectly modelled as a 
fixed effect).  Furthermore, modelling at the single trial level ensured that any 
observed link between components of the PD response and aspects of behaviour 
could not be attributed to the averaging process (which is more greatly distorted by 
outliers and RT variability). The lme4 and lmerTest packages in the R statistical 






Figure 6.6. Comparison of the PD response for correct (solid line) and incorrect (dashed 
line) “old” decisions under the Likely New cue condition, locked to the onset of the probe at 0 
seconds.  The dilation responses appear to differ in the rate at which the early amplitude 
elevation, triggered by unexpectedly familiar items, returns to baseline.  These 
morphological differences suggest that errors are associated with more positive-going PD 
slopes, raising the potential for the early amplitude and trailing slope of the dilation response 






Figure 6.7. Distribution of trial-wise “early amplitude” and “trailing slope” values obtained 
from simple linear decomposition of the pupillary dilation response during the probe period 





Reaction Time MLM 
Table 6.1. displays the results of all MLM analyses. The first MLM predicted trialwise 
reaction time by the early amplitude (“Early Amplitude” in the table) and trailing slope 
components of the dilation response (“Trailing Slope”), separately for each 
informative cue condition (“Likely Old” and “Likely New”). Under both cue types, the 
trailing slope reliably and positively predicted reaction time whilst the early amplitude 
did not. Consistent with Figures 6.2. and 6.6., this finding confirms that greater 
positivity of the PD slope reflects an increasingly slow, uncertain decision process. In 
contrast, no relationship between the RT measure of decision uncertainty and the 
early amplitude of the PD response was observed.  
Accuracy MLM 
The next MLM focused on predicting trialwise accuracy, under the hypothesis that 
the PD slope would reliably anticipate the commission of errors. Indeed, the 
accuracy MLM converged with the reaction time MLM, with the trailing slope found to 
reliably and negatively predict accuracy, reflecting a link between greater PD slope 
positivity and a greater likelihood of incorrect responding for both informative cue 
types. Conversely, the early amplitude of the PD response did not predict accuracy. 
The PD components therefore dissociated across two separate behavioural 
measures of uncertainty, with increasingly positive slopes selectively linked to both 
slower reaction times and incorrect decisions. 
Decision Type MLM 
The final MLM included decision type (“old” or “new”) as the outcome variable and 
directly tested the hypothesis that the early amplitude component of the PD 
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response would exclusively predict the rendering of “old” decisions under the LN cue 
– consistent with the unexpected familiarity effect recovered in the mean PD 
response analyses. In support of this prediction, the results in Table 6.1. 
demonstrate that the early PD amplitude reliably and positively predicted “old” 
responding only in the LN cue condition (in which familiarity was unexpectedly 
encountered). No relationship between the early amplitude component and decision 
type was observed in the LO cue condition (in which familiarity was expected). 
Interestingly, the PD slope component was also reliably predictive of decision type 
across both cueing conditions although in inverse fashion. Under the LN cue, the 
MLM estimate was positive (linking increased PD with “old” responding) whereas 
under the LO cue it was negative (linking increased PD with “new” responding). This 
finding is consistent with the proposed sensitivity of the PD slope to general decision 
uncertainty, given that slope positivity increased when making decisions that were in 
conflict with the available cue (i.e. for “old” decisions under LN cues, and “new” 
decisions under LO cues), and hence associated with greater uncertainty.  
Overall, the MLM analyses confirmed the hypothesis that separate morphological 
components of the recognition PD response represent different memory control sub-
processes. The early amplitude of the probe-provoked PD response was found to 
exclusively predict the experience of unexpected familiarity (i.e. an increase in early 
PD amplitude during the LN cue predicted an increased likelihood of responding 
“old”) and the later trailing slope predicted decision uncertainty (i.e. greater slope 





Table 6.1. Multi-level modelling of behavioral variables by pupil dilation components. 
PREDICTING REACTION TIME 
Likely Old Cues Estimate SE ~df t p-value 
 Trailing Slope* 0.730 0.069 4821 10.59 <.001 
 Early Amplitude 0.001 0.002 4821 0.43 .664 
Likely New Cues      
 Trailing Slope* 0.712 0.068 3930 10.51 <.001 
 Early Amplitude 0.001 0.002 3934 0.89 .375 
PREDICTING ACCURACY 
Likely Old Cues Estimate SE ~df t p-value 
 Trailing Slope* -0.080 0.029 4764 -2.77 .006 
 Early Amplitude 0.000 0.001 4733 0.03 .973 
Likely New Cues      
 Trailing Slope* -0.118 0.029 4650 -4.13 <.001 
 Early Amplitude -0.001 0.001 4661 -0.87 .387 
PREDICTING DECISION TYPE 
Likely Old Cues Estimate SE ~df t p-value 
 Trailing Slope* -0.085 0.032 4820 -2.61 .009 
 Early Amplitude 0.000 0.001 4819 -0.23 .817 
Likely New Cues      
 Trailing Slope* 0.174 0.032 4769 5.35 <.001 
 Early Amplitude* 0.005 0.001 4775 6.78 <.001 
Note: Displayed are the results of trialwise multi-level modelling analyses involving the 
linearly decomposed ‘early amplitude’ and later ‘trailing slope’ components of the pupil 
dilation response (from 1750-3500 ms post probe-onset). Asterisks denote multi-level model 
estimates that are significantly different from 0 via one-sample t-tests; ‘SE’, standard error of 





The present experiment probed the relationship between memory control processes 
and autonomic nervous system activity, as indexed by changes in pupil dilation. The 
findings complement the insight into cortical memory control systems provided in the 
previous chapter, whilst also refining understanding of the general cognitive 
underpinnings of the pupil dilation response itself. The results of this first attempt at 
explicitly manipulating mnemonic expectation in a pupillometry study of recognition 
memory pose another challenge to the “retrieval success” interpretation of old/new 
functional neuroimaging effects. Rather than directly signalling the successful 
recovery of episodic content for old items, the observed pattern of trial-locked PD 
response instead favoured a highly specific role in signalling unexpected familiarity 
(with dilation amplitude increasing exclusively for “old” decisions made under “Likely 
New” cues). The subsequent multi-level modelling of the trialwise PD response 
revealed that the averaged dilation response in fact reflects the contribution of two 
dissociable memory control sub-processes, each associated with a distinct feature of 
PD morphology; namely, unexpected familiarity linked to an early amplitude 
component, and general decision uncertainty linked to a later trailing slope 
component. The findings raise a number of implications for prevailing theories of 
adaptive memory function and its autonomic correlates. 
The prevailing view is that the recognition pupil dilation response is critically linked to 
the heightened cognitive load associated with processing successfully retrieved 
episodic content (Goldinger & Papesh, 2012; Papesh et al., 2012; Vo et al., 2008). 
The present experiment suggests that this basic interpretation is untenable, given 
that the pupil old/new effect was fully eliminated when observers were cued to 
expect familiar materials (i.e. under the LO cue). Rather, the amplitude of the mean 
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trial-locked PD response only reliably increased when familiarity was unexpectedly 
experienced in the test environment (i.e. under the LN cue; see Section 6.3.2. and 
Figure 2).  Additionally, this PD response was evoked for both correct and incorrect 
unexpected “old” decisions, providing further evidence against a role in representing 
processes that directly contribute to successful or accurate recognition decision-
making. To the extent that mnemonic expectations were not under experimenter 
control in previous recognition pupillometry studies, and have been shown to vary 
with aspects of standard recognition testing environments (Hicks & Marsh, 1999; see 
also Chapters 2, 3 and 4) and as a function of individual differences (Aminoff et al., 
2012), the preferential sensitivity of the PD response to unexpected familiarity has 
been hitherto unnoticed. The findings therefore coalesce with research challenging 
the retrieval success interpretation of recognition old/new effects spanning a number 
of functional neuroimaging modalities (Herron et al., 2003; Herron et al., 2004; 
Jaeger et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 2010), including the multi-modal neuroimaging 
experiment described in the previous chapter. 
The highly specific nature of the observed expectancy violation effect also suggests 
a number of refinements to conceptions of the general cognitive underpinnings of the 
PD response.  For instance, previous assertion that the PD response primarily 
reflects “post-decision” consolidation processes (e.g. Einhauser, Koch & Carter, 
2010) cannot be considered to apply here, as the increased dilation to unexpected 
familiarity began comfortably prior to commission of the physical response (as 
revealed by the response-locked analyses in Section 6.3.4). The results also show 
that changes in pupil dilation cannot solely reflect task effort or difficulty (e.g. Beatty, 
1982), given that the MLMs revealed the insensitivity of the early amplitude 
component to decision uncertainty, as reflected in slower reaction times and more 
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error-prone decision-making (see Table 1).  Rather, this early amplitude component 
was functionally dissociated from the later trailing slope of the PD response, which 
did show a positive relationship with behavioural markers of uncertainty (i.e. slow 
responding, erroneous responding, and responding under cue-item conflict). 
Furthermore, the specificity of the unexpected familiarity response also casts doubt 
on prior suggestion that pupil dilation serves as a “general” expectation violation or 
“surprise” signal (Friedman et al., 1973; Preuschoff et al., 2011; van Olst et al., 
1979). The present data instead accords with fMRI evidence of distinct neural 
signatures underlying different expectancy violation sub-processes (Jaeger et al., 
2013; O’Connor et al., 2010). In support of this, a recent fMRI study by Jaeger and 
colleagues (2013) isolated three distinct cortical networks underlying the invalid 
cueing effect (i.e. evoked when memory decisions are made against cued 
expectations), two of which mirror the observed early amplitude and trailing slope 
components of the PD response. With relevance to the former component, the 
authors identified an “unexpected familiarity” network that activated only when “old” 
decisions were made under LN cues, comprising prefrontal, left lateral parietal and 
posterior cingulate regions. These regions have been reliably linked with effortful 
source monitoring operations (e.g. Dobbins et al., 2002), leading Jaeger et al. to 
suggest that encounters with unexpectedly familiar items trigger controlled source 
memory operations that attempt to identify their episodic origin. Whilst the adaptive 
value of engaging this confirmatory source monitoring process would be high when 
confronted with an unexpectedly familiar stimulus, no such benefit would be 
associated with the engagement of similar operations for unexpectedly novel stimuli, 
given that these present no potential to retrieve further episodic content. The source 
monitoring interpretation of the unexpected familiarity effect is therefore able to 
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account for the complete insensitivity of the observed PD response to experiences of 
novelty, whether expected/unexpected or accurate/inaccurate. Although future 
research will be necessary to test this source monitoring interpretation of the early 
amplitude response, the present findings nevertheless highlight fundamental 
differences in how unanticipated familiarity and novelty are oriented towards in the 
environment. 
Regarding the trailing slope component of the PD response, Jaeger and colleagues 
(2013) also identified a more “general” expectancy violation response, in which 
BOLD activation increased whenever decisions were made under conflict with 
available cues, irrespective of old/new status. This network comprised bilateral 
intraparietal, lateral and medial prefrontal regions, consistent with the literature 
linking these regions to the engagement of cognitive control under different forms of 
response conflict (Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002; 
Kouneiher, Charron & Koechlin, 2009; Miller & Cohen, 2001; see also Section 1.2.). 
Whilst the early amplitude component is proposed to underlie source monitoring 
operations aimed at confirming the sense of familiarity, the later slope component 
might be linked with cognitive control processes performing a similar cross-domain 
function as scrutinized in Chapters 4 and 5. This function pertains to the controlled 
evaluation of information in favour of both the expected decision (associated with the 
anticipatory cue) and the actual strength of the retrieved memory evidence, so as to 
diagnose the eventual response. 
Indeed, the demonstration of a reliable effect of decision uncertainty on the PD 
response addresses an enduring ambiguity as to whether pupil dilation is sensitive to 
uncertainty at all. This is as the link between pupil size and uncertainty has thus far 
not been reliably substantiated, with some prior studies reporting an increase in pupil 
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size under uncertain task conditions (Nassar et al., 2012; Friedman et al., 1973; 
Satterthwaite et al., 2007) whereas others have failed to elicit any clear relationship 
with uncertainty (Schacht, Dimigen & Sommer, 2010) or one that is moderated by 
other cognitive factors (Preuschoff et al., 2011). Indeed, when considering the mean 
dilation response over the entire probe epoch in the present study (and ignoring its 
morphological components), the only reliable effect recovered was the PD response 
for unexpected familiarity. The direction of this mean PD response was also 
converse to what one would predict based purely on an uncertainty account, given 
that “new” decisions are typically associated with less confidence and slower 
reaction times (and hence more putative uncertainty) than “old” decisions (Otero et 
al., 2011; Ratcliff & Murdock, 1976). Rather, the influence of judgment uncertainty 
was only successfully isolated in the present study by decomposing the trial-wise 
dilation response into early amplitude and trailing slope components, and 
subsequently using MLM analyses to elucidate their separate influences on 
behaviour.  This represents a different approach to elucidating the contribution of 
decision uncertainty from previous pupillometry studies relying on process 
dissociations between pre-trial baseline PD and task-evoked PD effects (e.g. Nassar 
et al., 2012).  
Overall, the findings highlight that the PD response is not a “process-pure” measure 
of cognitive processing, and instead reveal for the first time that different 
morphological aspects of the same task-evoked PD response are representative of 
different cognitive processes. Interpreting the precise functions sub-served by the 
dissociable early amplitude and trailing slope PD components requires further 
research (see Chapter 7, Section 7.5 for further details.), however previous findings 
would indicate that the former relates to source monitoring operations whereas the 
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latter relates to evaluative control processes (with potentially cross-domain 
properties). Both processes are putatively required to generate an adaptive response 
to conditions of environmental conflict. This interpretation is also parsimonious with 
the previously outlined dichotomy between domain-specific “retrieval control” 
processes and cross-domain “decision control” processes (see Chapter 1). 
Irrespective of the validity of these more precise characterisations, the present data 
clearly indicate that two aspects of memory control are dissociable by their 
autonomic nervous system correlates. These dissociable correlates potentially reflect 
the gain modulation of distinct cortical networks via upstream projections of the LC-
NE neuromodulatory system that is strongly associated with the pupil dilation 
response (as outlined in the introduction; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005).  
This final experimental chapter serves as the culmination of the interrogation of 
memory control processes conducted during the course of my PhD, incorporating 
behavioural and functional neuroimaging experiments spanning episodic and non-
episodic task domains. The overarching themes emerging from these empirical 




Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
7.1. Overview 
The primary aim of this thesis was to investigate the behavioural indices and 
functional neuroimaging correlates underpinning the regulation of episodic memory 
control. The preceding experimental chapters were motivated by a desire to go 
beyond the traditional research focus on characterising the nature of retrieval output, 
and scrutinize factors that constrain these retrieval processes in light of immediate 
environmental demands. This endeavour sought to bring the laboratory study of 
episodic memory more in keeping with real-world evaluative experience, in which the 
assessment of the strength of retrieved memories interacts with varying strategic 
influences in the test environment – cued expectations and emphasised goals 
prominent among them – to determine eventual memory decisions. An auxiliary aim 
was to segregate control processes that operate specifically in episodic memory 
(“domain-specific” control) from those that extend beyond this cognitive domain 
(“cross-domain” or “cross-task” control). The conducted experiments therefore 
employed a number of behavioural and functional neuroimaging approaches, 
spanning episodic and non-episodic evaluative domains. The key findings from each 
empirical chapter are summarised in Table 7.1., and discussed in greater detail in 





Table 7.1. Summary of experimental chapters presented in this thesis, detailing the implemented methods, evidence domains under 
evaluation, strategic control manipulations and major findings.  
Chapter no. Experiment no. Method Domain Manipulation Major findings 
2 1-3 Behavioural Episodic recognition 
only 
Implicit goal emphasis  
(“old?” vs “new?”) 
Question format instils a “counter-emphasis 
bias”, reducing endorsements of the 
decision emphasised by the question 





Implicit goal emphasis (e.g. 
“old?” vs “new?”) 
Question format reduces the proportion of 
emphasised decisions made at low 
confidence, across different cognitive 
domains 
4 5 Behavioural Episodic recognition 
and semantic 
judgment 
Explicit goal emphasis (e.g. 
“old” token vs “new” token vs 
No token emphasis) and 
cued expectation (e.g. “likely 
old” vs “likely new” cues) 
Explicit goal emphasis and cued 
expectation lead to independent and 
opposing biases (acting in disconfirmatory 
“counter-emphasis” and confirmatory “pro-
expectation” directions respectively), which 
manifest across different cognitive domains 
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(e.g. for “old” cues and “new” 
cues that matched status of 
presented items on 50% of 
trials) 
Cue-item conflict, instantiated across 
episodic and semantic domains, and across 
“cue first” and “item first” orders, elevates 
the amplitude of the late positive ERP 
component (LPC) and BOLD activation in 
the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
6 7 Pupillometry Episodic recognition 
only 
Cued expectation ( “likely 
old” vs “likely new” vs “likely 
???” at ~70% validity) 
Control recruited under violations of 
memory expectation leads to two separable 
effects on autonomic activity, as reflected in 
components of the pupil dilation (PD) 
response – an amplitude elevation 
associated with the experience of 
unexpected familiarity, and a slope 





7.2. Environmental goal emphasis influences overt recognition performance 
One of the main experimental aims outlined in the introductory chapter (Section 1.4.) 
was to examine how different aspects of the test environment influence memory 
evaluation via the instilment of higher-order strategies. This follows from a traditional 
neglect in interrogating such strategic effects in the field of episodic memory, which 
has predominantly focused on characterising retrieval output processes that underlie 
the assessment of memory strength (viz. the single process vs. dual process debate; 
Squire, Wixted & Clark, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002). Those studies that have examined 
strategic influences on memory evaluation have focused almost exclusively on the 
effects of environmentally cued expectations, which provoke confirmatory biases that 
increase the likelihood of endorsing the expected decision (Ratcliff, Sheu & 
Gronlund, 1992; O’Connor, Han & Dobbins, 2010; Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). As 
demonstrated in the introductory chapter (see Section 1.1.), cued expectation is but 
one aspect of the test environment capable of influencing the outcomes of memory 
evaluation, with environmentally emphasised goals serving as another prominent 
strategic influence. 
It was in rectifying the broad neglect in researching goal emphasis strategies that a 
subtle aspect of the test environment was empirically scrutinised, namely the format 
of the question presented to prompt an evaluation of episodic recognition. The 
experiments of Chapter 2 examined whether goal salience was imparted to available 
decision categories (“old” or “new”) merely by virtue of which of these was 
emphasised by the wording of the test question. Evidence of this question emphasis 
effect was provided across three separate experiments, in the form of shifts in SDT 
criterion that reflected a reduced likelihood of endorsing the decision category 
emphasised by the question. The direction of criterion bias was converse to 
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expectation-driven biases observed in recognition memory, as well as question 
format biases in other fields, such as the acquiescence bias in questionnaire 
responding (“yea-responding”; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003) and 
the Loftus framing effect in eyewitness testimony (Loftus, 1996; see Section 2.5.). 
These previously reported biases all act in confirmatory directions, and hence the 
observation of a novel disconfirmatory criterion shift supports a role for SDT criterion 
as a general index of various environmental strategies (Hirshman, 1995; Benjamin, 
2007).  
The conducted experiments not only demonstrated the reliability of the question 
emphasis bias (which was replicated in Experiments 2 and 3, as well as in an 
independent online study; Mill & O’Connor, 2014, Experiment 1, see Appendix A), 
but also clarified its core strategic underpinnings. Experiment 2 yielded an 
enhancement of the question emphasis bias under low levels of memory strength, 
consistent with the up-regulation of a higher-order strategy in the presence of weakly 
diagnostic memory evidence (see the ensuing section for further discussion of this 
effect). Experiment 3 tested two competing interpretations of the precise mechanism 
underlying the question bias – a habitual (potentially non-strategic) tendency to 
respond “no”, and an emphasis effect imparted by the combination of question 
format and available response options – finding support for the latter goal-driven 
mechanism. Furthermore, the criterion effects were complemented by analyses of 
decision accuracy, which linked the reduced likelihood of endorsing emphasised 
decisions with the greater accuracy of these decisions when made (although see the 
following section for possible asymmetries in how emphasis impacts on particular 
decision categories). Indeed, both the criterion bias and decision accuracy effects 
observed following the “implicit” goal emphasis manipulations of Chapter 2 were 
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paralleled by the findings of Experiment 5 (Chapter 4), in which goal emphasis was 
manipulated by the “explicit” provision of monetary mixed incentives. The overall 
pattern of findings highlights the salient influence of environmentally emphasised 
goals in constraining the outcome of memory evaluation – both when such emphasis 
is imparted by implicit aspects of the test format and by explicit mention of reward. 
The results also illustrate response bias as an important cognitive factor in its own 
right, rather than as a nuisance variable obscuring memory strength processes 
indexed by d' sensitivity (as assumed in early retrieval output research, e.g. 
Blackwell, 1963). 
The observed goal-driven shifts in criterion bias therefore serve as a formalized 
index of the strategic mechanisms alluded to in Koriat & Goldsmith’s influential 
memory control model (1996; see Section 1.3.). This stipulates that the primary 
method by which cognitive control is heightened over episodic memory is by 
maximising the quality rather than the quantity of endorsed memories, as evidenced 
by the previously reported inability to increase the number of memories generated 
during a recall test under performance incentives (Nilsson, 1987), which contrasts 
with the ability to regulate the quality of memory decisions in “free” compared to 
“forced” recall report procedures (Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996). This finding is 
paralleled by the present effects of implicit and explicit goal emphasis on SDT 
criterion and decision accuracy, which also reflect a reduction in the frequency of 
emphasised responding so as to maximise accuracy. Environmental sources of goal 
emphasis therefore instil a higher-order strategy encouraging more cautious use of 
available memory strength evidence, which was highlighted in the introductory 
chapter as a salient form of “decision control” exerted over real-world memory 
evaluation (see Section 1.3.).  
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It is worthwhile highlighting that d' sensitivity was largely unaffected by both implicit 
and explicit manipulation of goal emphasis, consistent with its proposed role within 
the SDT framework in indexing the strength of retrieved memories (Glanzer & 
Adams, 1985; Lockhart, Craik & Jacoby, 1976; see Section 1.4.). However, the 
results provide some indication of an improvement in sensitivity under “old” 
emphasis, both following implicit question emphasis (Section 2.3.2.1.) and explicit 
mixed incentives manipulations (Section 4.3.2.1.). Complementary decision accuracy 
results suggested an overall performance improvement under “old” emphasis, raising 
the potential involvement of source monitoring processes underpinning the controlled 
search for specific details of an encoding event (Johnson, Hashtroudi & Lindsay, 
1993; Jacoby, Kelley & McElree, 1999). Source monitoring processes might 
conceivably be heightened when the need to diagnose “old” decisions is emphasised 
by implicit and explicit factors within the immediate environment. Indeed, previous 
studies have documented the heightening of source monitoring under often subtle 
manipulations of test format, such as when retrieval is framed as a source memory 
rather than old/new recognition test (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989), and when the 
response format contains more “old” than “new” options (Marsh & Hicks, 1998; 
Dobbins & McCarthy, 2008; see also Section 2.5.). Hence, future research will be 
required to determine whether source monitoring mechanisms associated with 
heightening the control over the direct act of retrieval (i.e. “retrieval control”) are 
indexed by the SDT sensitivity parameter. Another possibility is that the present “old” 
emphasis effects on sensitivity uncover nuances in memory control that are 
imperfectly captured by the SDT model. Indeed, applications of the drift diffusion 
model to recognition memory have operationalized two distinct bias parameters, 
which have been dissociated by their involvement in source monitoring/retrieval 
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control and strategic/decision control processes respectively (Ratcliff, 1978; White & 
Poldrack, 2014). It might therefore be of future interest to probe the correspondence 
of goal emphasis effects on bias parameters in the SDT and drift diffusion models. 
Future research might also directly interrogate the application of goal emphasis 
effects in real-world eyewitness testimony. With particular relevance to the implicit 
question emphasis effects of Chapter 2, laboratory studies might examine whether 
asking differently worded questions does bias memory evaluation in more naturalistic 
renditions of eyewitness testimony (e.g. in virtual reality courtroom paradigms, 
Bailenson et al., 2008). It would also be worthwhile to probe the involvement of other 
higher-order strategies documented in the field of cognitive control in episodic 
memory evaluation, such as sequential dependencies between particular memory 
events (Mozer, Kinoshita & Shettel, 2007) and the monitoring of recognition 
performance accuracy (Kerns et al., 2004).  
Nevertheless, the present findings highlight an overlooked source of strategic bias 
embedded in standard laboratory recognition testing environments, which was linked 
through systematic investigation with goal and reward-related processes involved in 
memory control. SDT criterion served a crucial role in revealing these behavioural 
effects (as supplemented by decision accuracy measures), and the potential for 
criterion to index similar strategic control processes beyond the specific domain of 




7.3. Response criterion as a behavioural index of cross-domain control 
Another aim of the conducted behavioural experiments was to examine whether 
environmental manipulations that instilled higher-order strategies during episodic 
evaluation also introduced analogous effects in non-episodic domains. This was part 
of a wider aim of my PhD to probe the existence of a cognitive system with “cross-
domain” properties, capable of integrating strategic influences into the evaluation of 
different evidence domains (see Section 1.6.). Such a cross-domain system has 
been implicated in a number of theoretical models, spanning attention (Cabeza, 
Ciaramelli, Olson & Moscovitch, 2008; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), metacognition 
(Fleming & Dolan, 2012) and cognitive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & 
Cohen, 2001; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone & Nieuwenhuis, 2004), although rarely 
empirically verified. The present behavioural studies therefore examined the 
potential cross-domain effects of implicit (Experiment 4, see Table 7.1.) and explicit 
manipulations of goal emphasis (Experiment 5), as well as environmentally cued 
expectations (Experiment 5). Insight into this cross-domain system would yield 
reciprocal clarification as to whether control processes underlying strategic effects in 
episodic memory are specific to this domain or more “general” in their operation, 
which has been the subject of ongoing debate in the literature (Barredo, Oztekin & 
Badre, 2013; Fleck, Daselaar, Dobbins & Cabeza, 2006; White & Poldrack, 2014). 
However, the question emphasis manipulations of Experiment 4 failed to yield 
reliable cross-domain effects on “primary” measures of yes/no decision performance 
(SDT criterion, decision accuracy and a newly introduced measure of decision RT). 
A likely cause of these broadly weak effects is the “implicit” nature of the question 
format manipulation, which even in Chapter 2 yielded numerically small (albeit 
statistically reliable in Experiments 2 and 3) strategic adjustments in behavioural 
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performance. The small nature of the question emphasis effect was likely 
exacerbated in Experiment 4 by exposing participants to tasks involving varying 
levels of overall evidence strength, which might have reduced both the scope for 
strategic influences in cases of high overall sensitivity (as in the colour task) and the 
potential influence of strategies related to evidence monitoring. The latter evidence-
based strategies have been demonstrated to impact on criterion in a previous 
recognition study (Hirshman, 1995), in which manipulations influencing the 
perception of “strong” and “weak” encoding events respectively instilled 
disconfirmatory and confirmatory “old” response biases. Similar biases engaged by 
assessments of the varying evidence domains in Experiment 4 might have 
contaminated the question emphasis effects of primary interest. 
Indeed, when the variation in evidence strength across tasks was controlled in the 
“secondary” response confidence analyses of Experiment 4, a reliable cross-domain 
reduction in “low” confidence decisions made under emphasis emerged. Under the 
assumption that “low” confidence decisions reflect low levels of evidence strength 
(following from assumptions in previous functional neuroimaging studies, Fleck et al., 
2006; Fleming, Huijgen & Dolan, 2012), these confidence shifts parallel the observed 
enhancement of the question emphasis bias under shallow levels-of-processing in 
the Experiment 2 recognition task (see Section 7.2.). Collectively, the findings 
suggest that both effects might be driven by a cross-domain mechanism sensitive to 
the up-regulation of higher-order strategies under evidence uncertainty (Benjamin, 
2007; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982).  
In comparison to the modest effects of Experiment 4, the more “explicit” manipulation 
of goal emphasis in Experiment 5 (via mixed incentives; see Table 7.1.) led to the 
instilment of a stronger goal emphasis strategy that was reflected in reliable 
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“counter-emphasis” criterion shifts across episodic and semantic domains. 
Furthermore, this cross-domain goal emphasis effect was isolated in the presence of 
orthogonal manipulation of cued expectation. Both resultant “counter-emphasis” and 
“pro-expectation” biases exerted independent and opposing strategic effects on 
response criterion, highlighting the sensitivity of this behavioural measure to various 
environmentally provoked strategies. The findings of Experiment 4 and 5 also 
confirm that only explicit environmental manipulations sufficiently motivate 
participants to adopt higher-order strategies across different cognitive domains. 
Participants’ willingness to adopt higher-order strategies has been previously 
highlighted as a primary mediator of the modest biases observed even after explicit 
manipulations (e.g. expectation via base rate manipulations, Stretch & Wixted, 
1998b). Furthermore, the demonstration of equivalent strategic effects across 
different task domains supports a role for criterion as a behavioural index of cross-
domain control – a  function that has been consistently speculated in formalizations 
of the signal detection framework in memory and perceptual domains (Benjamin, 
2007; Swets, 2014), although rarely tested by exposing the same sample of subjects 
to different evaluative domains. 
Whilst SDT criterion was the focal index of cross-domain processes in Experiment 5, 
supplementary analyses of decision accuracy and decision RT elucidated more 
nuanced strategic effects. For instance, the pattern of criterion effects in both tasks 
suggested a deviation in bias from the neutral emphasis condition (i.e. “No token” 
emphasis) primarily when “Decision A” categories were emphasised by congruent 
incentives (i.e. “pleasant” semantic decisions and “old” recognition decisions). The 
decision accuracy and RT results corroborated this finding, by demonstrating that 
only “Decision A” categories were associated with reliable increases in accuracy and 
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decreases in RT under concordant emphasis, whereas the alternative “unpleasant” 
and “new” decisions were less reliably affected. Two potential causes can be 
suggested for these preferential “Decision A” effects. Firstly, the evaluations of “old” 
and “pleasant” decisions might engage fundamentally different evidence strength 
processes than their respective “Decision B” alternatives. This interpretation is 
plausible for the “old” emphasis effects observed in the recognition task, given prior 
suggestion that a primary method of heightening episodic memory control is by 
prioritising the recovery of recollected content (which is specific to old items; Jacoby 
et al., 1999; see Section 1.3.). However, no recollection-type process has been 
linked with the evaluation of “pleasant” semantic decisions, and hence the fact that 
“Decision A” effects were common to both tasks challenges this evidence-based 
interpretation. 
A second more plausible explanation is linked to the static response format 
maintained throughout Experiment 5, with “Decision A” assigned to the “yes” 
response key and “Decision B” assigned to the “no” key. The fixed assignment of 
“Decision A” categories to “yes” response status raises the potential for additional 
emphasis imparted by the response format to these decision categories. Hence, the 
effect of the “Token A” incentives conditions and the static “yes” assignment to 
“Decision A” might have combined additively to enhance the goal salience ascribed 
to “Decision A” categories. In support of this “response emphasis” view, Experiment 
3 (see Section 2.4.2.) demonstrated that it was the combination of available question 
and response formats that mediated goal emphasis effects. Furthermore, a recent 
pupillometry study reported an exclusive increase in pupil dilation (and underlying 
autonomic nervous system activity) when participants performing a visual 
discrimination task countermanded a pre-potent bias against responding “yes” (de 
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Gee, Knapen & Donner, 2014). This “counter-yes” bias acted in a similar 
disconfirmatory direction as the present “Decision A” emphasis effects and hence 
might represent the instilment of a common goal-driven strategy (see Section 7.5. for 
further details). Despite these supportive findings, the response emphasis 
interpretation would benefit from direct investigation of whether ascribing “yes” status 
to “Decision B” categories leads to a reversal in preferential token emphasis effects. 
Nevertheless, the observed decision emphasis asymmetries allude to further 
strategic influences engaged by subtle aspects of the test environment. The findings 
also highlight the virtue of examining effects of the same environmental 
manipulations across different task domains, so as to adjudicate between domain-
specific and domain-general characterisations of strategic biases.  
The decision accuracy and decision RT analyses of Experiment 5 also illuminate a 
subtle differentiation in the cross-domain control processes engaged by the counter-
emphasis and pro-expectation biases. The pattern of criterion shifts underlying both 
environmentally provoked strategies suggests a common heightening of control over 
the decision category associated with a disconfirmatory bias. To clarify, both “old” 
decisions made under “old” emphasis and “old” decisions made under “likely new” 
expectations are made under a positive shift in criterion, and hence likely require 
greater cognitive control to countermand the instilled disconfirmatory “old” response 
tendencies. However, “old” decisions made under emphasis were associated with 
greater accuracy and quicker reaction times, whereas “old” decisions made in 
violation of expectations were associated with reduced accuracy and slower reaction 
times. Similar response profiles have been reported under analogous manipulation 
of higher-order goals (Small et al., 2005; Han et al., 2010) and expectations 
respectively (Corbetta, Kincade, Ollinger, McAvoy & Shulman, 2000; O’Connor et al., 
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2010). These findings raise the potential for cross-domain effects associated with 
goal emphasis and cued expectation to be mediated by at least partially distinct 
cognitive control processes. 
In characterising this potential distinction, one possibility is that goal emphasis is 
mediated by a sustained or “proactive” control process, monitoring for evidence in 
favour of a rewarded or goal salient decision, whereas expectancy violation is 
characterised by a phasic or “reactive” control process, engaged under conflict 
between accumulated evidence and environmentally provoked strategies. This 
dichotomy would explain the different decision accuracy/RT profiles underlying 
emphasis- and expectation-driven biases, and is consistent with equivalent “dual 
process” stipulations of a number of cognitive control frameworks (Aston-Jones & 
Cohen, 2005; Braver, 2012; Corbetta, Patel & Shulman, 2008). Functional 
neuroimaging methods would be useful in probing the application of dual process 
control frameworks to the present cross-domain strategies. Whilst the findings of 
Experiment 6 provided insight into the neural substrates of expectancy violation-like 
control engagements (i.e. under cue-item conflict, see the ensuing section for further 
details), time constraints imposed by my PhD prevented similar functional 
neuroimaging investigation of goal emphasis processes. Hence, it remains for future 
research to probe the overlap of neural substrates underlying emphasis- and 
expectation-driven control, and how these neural patterns might relate to the 
common and distinct behavioural profiles reported in this section. 
To summarise, the findings of Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrate that cross-domain 
effects of environmentally provoked strategies are isolable in overt behaviour, 
especially following explicit manipulations. The latter experiment also demonstrated 
that different strategies associated with goal emphasis and cued expectation 
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respectively lead to independent and opposing effects on SDT criterion, across 
different cognitive domains. This strengthens the functional role ascribed to criterion 
as a behavioural index of cross-domain control, although a more complete insight 
into the engaged strategies was furnished by complementary analyses of decision 
accuracy and decision RT. Whilst these latter analyses highlight nuances in the 
precise control processes engaged by the emphasis- and expectation-driven 
strategies warranting future exploration, these behavioural experiments nonetheless 
laid important foundations for the functional neuroimaging studies conducted during 
my PhD. The final two sections discuss the main findings emerging from these 
studies.  
 
7.4. Multi-modal neuroimaging isolates the cortical correlates of memory 
control 
The investigation of memory control processes conducted in the preceding 
behavioural experiments was extended in the functional neuroimaging approach of 
Experiment 6. The primary motivation of this experiment was to elucidate the precise 
functions of neural activations linked in previous research to broad aspects of 
episodic memory control. More specifically, the experiment sought to separate the 
neural substrates of memory control processes that operated exclusively in the 
episodic domain (“domain-specific” or “recognition-specific” control) from those that 
performed a more general function in the service of cognitive control (“cross-domain” 
or “cross-task” control). This followed from findings of the previously described 
behavioural experiments, which despite demonstrating cross-domain strategic 
effects isolable in over behaviour, were unable to clarify whether these common 
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behavioural effects arose from common or distinct neural computations. A multi-
modal neuroimaging approach was hence adopted wherein EEG and fMRI data 
were simultaneously acquired as participants performed discrimination tasks, 
spanning semantic and episodic recognition domains, in which cognitive control was 
manipulated by the match/mismatch procedure (see Table 7.1.). This multi-modal 
approach enabled investigation of electrophysiological and hemodynamic correlates 
that have been debated as to their domain-specificity or generality.  
Analyses of the standalone EEG data focused on an ERP component scrutinised in 
research into both recognition and semantic memory – the late positive potential 
(LPC). In both these domains, ERP studies have sought to adjudicate between 
“domain-specific” and “domain-general” interpretations of the LPC, with a domain-
specific function of the recognition LPC suggested in signalling the recollection of 
study details (as a sub-component of the ERP “retrieval success” effect; Rugg & 
Curran, 2007), whereas the suggested domain-specific function of the semantic LPC 
involves the signalling of syntactic violations (Hagoort, Brown & Groothusen, 1993; 
see Section 5.1.). The EEG results of Experiment 6 challenge these domain-specific 
accounts, by demonstrating the positive modulation of an LPC-like component for 
“mismatch” compared to “match” decisions across all presented task domains (see 
Section 5.3.2.; see Figure 5.4.). Considered with prior reports linking both the 
semantic and episodic LPCs with more general control processes recruited under 
expectancy violation (Coulson, King & Kutas, 1998; Herron, Quayle & Rugg, 2003), 
the observed pattern of results favours a unified function for the LPC in the controlled 
resolution of cue-item conflict, irrespective of the specific context in which it arises.  
The results raise the possibility that previous elicitations of the LPC in recognition 
and semantic domains in fact represented variants of the P3 complex (specifically 
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the P3b), which displays a similar topography and temporal morphology and has 
long been linked with cross-domain control demands (Polich, 2007; Pritchard, 1981). 
As a supplementary point, the present findings also suggest that P3-like components 
are engaged in the absence of expectation manipulations, thereby addressing a 
previously noted ambiguity as to whether reported control ERPs are critically 
dependent on expectancy violation events (e.g. Polich, 2007). It is also worth 
highlighting that the refinement of prevailing understandings of these ERPs might 
have been critically enabled by deviation from the more standard paradigms used in 
the study of control, such as the oddball, go/no-go and Stroop tasks. In venturing 
beyond the short duration, fast presentation format of these tasks, the present 
match/mismatch paradigm enabled a longer evaluative window that led to the full 
emergence of cognitive control sub-processes and their underlying ERP 
components. This is in keeping with a speculated link between the P3/LPC 
component and relatively “slow-release” neuromodulatory effects of the locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine system (LC-NE) on cortical regions (Nieuwenhuis, de Gee 
& Aston-Jones, 2010), which is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
It is notable that the present EEG analyses failed to identify any other ERP 
components sensitive to the cross-task mismatch manipulation, suggesting that the 
LPC might be the exclusive electrophysiological index of “general” control processes. 
This was confirmed by the group ICA analyses, which decomposed the EEG data 
into maximally independent signal components that were not biased by any a priori 
focus on particular electrode sites or trial epochs (see Section 5.2.5 and 5.3.2. for 
further details). The only task-relevant components recovered by this “model-free” 
method were topographically and morphologically similar to the LPC identified in the 
electrode ERP analyses. The absence of the frontal-central N400 from both analyses 
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is particularly noteworthy, given that it has been observed as the “early” component 
of both recognition retrieval success (Rugg & Curran, 2007) and syntactic parsing 
violation effects (Coulson et al., 1998) generating the respective LPCs (see Section 
5.1.). These findings imply a more specific role for the N400, confined either to the 
semantic or episodic domains, or to the “cue first” or “item first” conflict ordering 
conditions. A role in domain-specific evidence processing is supported by prior 
reports linking the recognition N400 with the linear tracking of memory strength 
(Finnigan, Humphreys, Dennis & Geffen, 2002; Karayanidis, Andrews, Ward & 
McConaghy, 1991), and the semantic N400 with the detection of ungrammatical 
sentences (Coulson et al., 1998). In moving beyond the primary emphasis of 
Experiment 6 in examining cross-task control processes, future analyses in the 
present EEG dataset might explore the conditions that generate the N400 and other 
potential domain- or order-specific ERP components. 
The standalone fMRI analyses targeted a similar refinement of BOLD activation 
patterns previously interpreted as domain-specific. These analyses focused on 
mismatch control effects in the recognition “cue first” phase, which enabled 
comparison with the analogous “invalid cueing” effect in the more widely studied 
likelihood cueing paradigm, given that both serve to isolate memory control 
processes engaged when items appear to conflict with prior cues (Jaeger, Konkel & 
Dobbins, 2013; O’Connor et al., 2010). The resultant “recognition mismatch” network 
overlapped appreciably with regions previously linked with the retrieval success 
effect, including anterior and rostral cingulate regions, medial and lateral PFC 
regions, left parietal regions and striatal regions (de Zubicaray, McMahon, Eastburn, 
Finnigan & Humphreys, 2005; Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson & Buckner, 2000; 
Spaniol et al., 2009). The present findings therefore coalesce with findings from the 
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likelihood cueing paradigm in highlighting the sensitivity of these retrieval success 
regions to manipulations of memory control.  
With more careful comparison of the present episodic mismatch contrast and a 
previous version of the invalid cueing contrast (see Figure 7.1.), it is apparent that 
the extent of the activation is somewhat reduced in the former compared to the latter, 
especially over medial and dorsolateral PFC, and sub-cortical regions. Indeed, future 
research might more directly interrogate these differences between mismatch control 
and invalid cueing effects, as a means of elucidating potential differences in the 
engagement of control in the presence and absence of expectation. Despite these 
noted differences, common memory control activations in these two paradigms were 
located in regions of the cingulate cortex, left parietal cortex, posterior 





Figure 7.1. Comparison of recognition control networks recovered in different fMRI 
paradigms. a. Activation map for the “invalid cueing” effect (correct invalid cue trials > correct 
valid cue trials, overlaid in green) observed in the likelihood cueing paradigm, rendered with 
data provided by Akira O’Connor (from O’Connor et al., 2010). b. Activation map for the 
“mismatch control” effect (correct mismatch > correct match trials, overlaid in yellow) 
observed in the “cue first” recognition phase of the match/mismatch paradigm (Experiment 
6). All activations are overlaid at a threshold of p < .001, 5 contiguous voxels.  
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The recognition control network identified in the standalone fMRI analyses was then 
parcellated into more precise functional components by a series of masking 
analyses, involving both the fMRI cross-task mismatch conjunction and the EEG-
fMRI parametric modulation analysis (yielding regions that correlated with the cross-
task LPC ERP). Recognition control regions that were exclusive to both these masks 
were hence considered as reliable substrates of “recognition-specific” memory 
control processes (see Figure 5.7a and Table 5.1.). These regions prominently 
encompassed occipital, ventrolateral PFC and temporal cortex clusters, and were 
linked with domain-specific source monitoring processes engaged under 
environmental conflict in an attempt to verify details of prior occurrence (consistent 
with previous reports; Barredo, Oztekin & Badre, 2013; Dobbins, Foley, Schacter & 
Wagner, 2002; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005). The imaging analyses of Experiment 6 
therefore provide empirical grounds for the distinction between “retrieval control” 
processes (underpinned by the “recognition-specific” control regions) and “decision 
control” processes (underpinned by regions active to varying degrees with the two 
cross-task control masks) raised in the introductory chapter (see Section 1.3.). 
Of the recognition mismatch regions that showed some form of inclusivity with the 
fMRI conjunction and EEG-fMRI modulation maps (see Figure 5.7b), two regions 
were found to be active in both masks and therefore deemed the most reliable 
cortical substrates of cross-task control – the rostral cingulate zone (RCZ) and the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS). Similar “general” control functions have been suggested 
previously for the identified RCZ and IPS regions, with the RCZ emerging in an fMRI 
meta-analysis as the region commonly engaged by diverse manipulations of 
response conflict (Ridderinkhof et al., 2004), and the IPS highlighted as a “general” 
component of the invalid cueing effect, capable of signalling mnemonic expectancy 
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violation irrespective of the old/new status of the violating item (Jaeger et al., 2013). 
Interestingly, the meta-analysis conducted by Ridderinkhof and colleagues (2004) 
also identified the N2 ERP component as a potential electrophysiological correlate of 
fMRI BOLD activation changes in the RCZ. The present integration of the EEG and 
fMRI data instead suggests that the late positive component of the P3 complex is a 
more likely ERP correlate of cross-task control. 
Although the RCZ and IPS regions were conjunctly identified in the cross-task 
analyses of Experiment 6, the potential for both to perform subtly different roles 
within this overarching control involvement persists. One possibility is that the RCZ 
generates a “top-down” signal that evaluates and selects between representations of 
available response options in the IPS (as has been suggested previously, Brass, 
Ullsperger, Knoesche, von Cramon & Phillips, 2005; Bunge, Dudukovic, Thomason, 
Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2002a). This selection/representation dichotomy is in keeping with 
prior functional neuroimaging research in humans linking the RCZ with response 
selection or executive control (Rushworth, Walton, Kennerley & Bannerman, 2004; 
Mueller, Brass, Waszak & Prinz, 2007) and the IPS with working memory operations 
(Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Gillebert et al., 2011; see Section 5.4. for further details). 
Indeed, a plausible anatomical pathway by which such a signal might be relayed 
between the RCZ and the IPS via sub-cortical structures is outlined in the next 
section. Future research is undoubtedly required to elucidate the core function of the 
RCZ-IPS interaction, and how it relates to another suggested control pathway 
extending from the mPFC and associated cingulate structures to lateral PFC regions 
(Kouneiher, Charron & Koechlin, 2009; Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). Exploring the 
potential for both pathways to mediate different components of the retrieval 
control/decision control dichotomy (see Section 1.3.) would have clear pertinence in 
303 
 
extending the findings of my PhD research, with the RCZ-lateral PFC pathway 
perhaps involved in the former class of domain-specific evidence operations (such 
as episodic source monitoring) and the RCZ-IPS pathway involved in the latter 
domain-general processes that diagnose the eventual response. 
Planned future analyses of functional connectivity in the present match/mismatch 
task might also clarify the specific roles of the RCZ and IPS, as well as the 
mechanisms of their interaction in the service of cross-task control. This follows from 
recent evidence suggesting that regional fMRI activations actually reflect on-task 
changes amongst large-scale functional connectivity networks, linked with flexible 
and integrative functions within cognitive control (Cole et al., 2013). Indeed, both of 
the identified cross-task control regions have demonstrated intriguingly ambiguous 
patterns of functional connectivity in prior research, as mapped using “task-free” 
resting-state methods (fcMRI). Specifically, the RCZ has been variously identified as 
part of the frontal-parietal control network (Vincent et al., 2008) and the cingulo-
opercular control network (Dosenbach et al., 2006), whereas the IPS has been 
identified both as part of the dorsal attention network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; 
Fox, Snyder, Zacks & Raichle, 2006) and at the overlap between this network and 
the frontal-parietal control network (Vincent et al., 2008). The position of these cross-
task control regions at the overlap of resting-state networks identified as functionally 
distinct is in keeping with an integrative function necessary to facilitate the 
engagement of control across diverse task contexts.  
Future analyses might therefore investigate the affiliation of the RCZ and IPS regions 
to wider functional connectivity networks, and explore their potential operation as 
cortical “hubs”, in which regional activation coordinates the activity of more 
specialised functional networks (Cole et al., 2013). Such a hub scheme might 
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mediate both the engagement of mnemonic source monitoring operations (involving 
lateral PFC, as alluded to earlier in this section), and the generation of the motor 
response subsequent to its selection by the RCZ-IPS, with both processes  
facilitating adaptive responses to environmentally induced conflict. Furthermore, 
devising innovative ways of integrating the EEG data with these fMRI connectivity 
approaches might yield novel insight into the temporal emergence of the speculated 
large-scale network dynamics, which would not be feasible if relying on either 
imaging modality in isolation. 
To summarise, the multi-modal imaging approach adopted in Experiment 6 yielded 
evidence in favour of the cross-domain (and cross-task) control system alluded to in 
the earlier behavioural experiments (see Section 7.2. and 7.3.) – one that mediates 
an adaptive response to various forms of conflict arising between item evidence and 
the environment. The findings demonstrate the virtue in actively manipulating control 
demands across different task contexts presented to the same sample of subjects, 
which permits functional inferences that are left ambiguous in studies of isolated task 
domains. The results also highlight how the present simultaneous EEG-fMRI method 
overcame limitations specific to each isolated modality, both by effectively improving 
the poor temporal resolution of the fMRI analyses down to a 400-600ms range 
(linked with emergence of the LPC ERP), and by overcoming the “inverse problem” 
of localizing the neural generators of scalp-evoked EEG effects. This insight into the 
precise functional properties of cortical activations was complemented in Experiment 
7 by scrutiny of changes in autonomic nervous system activity that have also been 
implicated in adaptive control. The major findings from this final experiment, and their 
relation to the presented EEG-fMRI effects, are discussed in the next section. 
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7.5. Pupillometry reveals the autonomic correlates of memory control 
In investigating the autonomic correlates of memory control, Experiment 7 employed 
another method of functional neuroimaging – high resolution infra-red pupillometry 
(see Table 7.1.). This approach follows from single-cell research in animals which 
established a reliable link between pupil dilation and autonomic nervous system 
activity mediated by the neuromodulatory locus coeruleus-norepinephrine system 
(LC-NE, Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; see Section 6.1. for further details). The 
routine involvement of autonomic nervous system changes in cognition has been 
demonstrated by almost 50 years of human pupillometry research, which has linked 
increased pupillary dilation (PD) with diverse forms of processing (Beatty, 1982; 
Kahneman, 1973; Nassar et al., 2012), including episodic recognition memory 
(Gardner, Mo & Borrego, 1974; Goldinger & Papesh, 2012). As with prevailing 
interpretations of recognition findings in EEG and fMRI imaging modalities 
(summarised in the previous section), research into the recognition PD response has 
also posited pupil dilation as an index of retrieval success, following from the 
reported increase in dilation for correct “old” compared to “new” decisions (Goldinger 
& Papesh, 2012; Papesh, Goldinger & Hout, 2012; Vo et al., 2008). It was therefore 
the primary aim of Experiment 7 to determine whether systematic manipulation of 
control demands during a recognition pupillometry experiment would lead to a 
challenge against recognition-specific interpretations of the evoked PD. 
Experiment 7 employed a variant of the previously described likelihood cueing 
paradigm (O’Connor et al., 2010) to probe the sensitivity of the recognition PD 
response to memory control processes engaged under expectancy violation-induced 
conflict. Analyses of the mean trial-locked dilation response demonstrated that the 
amplitude of the recognition PD was exclusively elevated by the experience of 
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unexpected familiarity (i.e. making an “old” decision under a “likely new” cue), with 
no reliable amplitude elevation observed for any other configuration of decision type 
or cue type. The amplitude effect was also evoked irrespective of whether the 
experience of unexpected familiarity was accurate or not. Both the primary sensitivity 
of the PD response to a specific form of expectancy violation and its complete 
insensitivity to decision accuracy run contrary to predictions based on retrieval 
success. Rather, the findings imply that unconstrained expectations operating in 
previous recognition pupillometry studies may have instilled covert strategic biases 
that gave rise to old/new effects, consistent with prior research involving the 
likelihood cueing paradigm (Jaeger et al., 2013; O’Connor et al., 2010) and the 
behavioural experiments presented in earlier sections (Section 7.2. and 7.3.). The 
pupillometry findings therefore combine with the findings of Experiment 6 (described 
in the previous section) in posing a challenge to the retrieval success account, 
spanning EEG, fMRI and pupillometry neuroimaging modalities. 
The highly specific nature of the observed mean PD response also contests prior 
assertion that pupil dilation signals a general form of expectancy violation or 
“surprise” (Friedman, Hakerem, Sutton & Fleiss, 1973; Preuschoff, ‘t Hart & 
Enhauser, 2011; Van Olst, Heemstra & Kortenaar, 1979). Rather, the present 
findings accord with recent fMRI evidence suggesting that functionally distinct brain 
networks mediate responses to different forms of mnemonic expectancy violation, 
respectively encompassing unexpected familiarity, unexpected novelty and more 
“general” violation responses (Jaeger et al., 2013). The unexpected familiarity 
network identified by Jaeger and colleagues spanned a number of regions linked 
previously with aspects of source monitoring, including prefrontal, left lateral parietal 
and posterior cingulate regions. A similar interpretation can be extended to the 
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present unexpected familiarity effect on PD, such that greater dilation amplitude 
reflects source monitoring operations engaged to resolve cue-item conflict. A role in 
source monitoring might explain the observed insensitivity of the PD response to 
unexpected novelty, given that the engagement of an effortful search for details of 
prior occurrence would be futile for stimuli perceived as novel. This source 
monitoring interpretation raises potential overlap with the “recognition-specific” 
control regions identified in Experiment 6 (see previous section), which were 
highlighted as neural correlates of similar “retrieval control” processes. 
However, an alternative to the source monitoring account is that the specificity of the 
expectancy violation response to “old” decisions reflects the greater goal emphasis 
imparted towards them by aspects of the test environment. The influence of such 
unconstrained sources of goal emphasis was highlighted by the behavioural findings 
of Experiments 1-3 (see Section 7.2.), which documented shifts in criterion bias that 
instilled disconfirmatory strategies towards emphasised decisions. Whilst the 
propensity to instil goal emphasis biases was minimized in Experiment 7 by the 
complete removal of a question prompt, implicit emphasis might nevertheless have 
been imparted by the fixed assignment of “old” decisions to the “yes” response 
category. Such “response emphasis” effects were speculated to account for the bias 
asymmetries observed in Experiment 5 (see Section 7.3.), in which goal emphasis-
driven adjustments in performance impacted primarily on how “old” decisions were 
evaluated. Indeed, a recent pupillometry study provides support for the involvement 
of a “yes” emphasis effect, by reporting that PD response during a visual 
discrimination task elevated exclusively for those participants who countermanded a 
disconfirmatory bias against responding “yes” (i.e. a “counter-yes” bias; de Gee et 
al., 2014). Hence, adjudicating between the competing source monitoring and “old” 
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decision salience accounts of the unexpected familiarity effect would require future 
pupillometry studies to concurrently manipulate goal emphasis and cued expectation 
(as in Experiment 5), so as to ascertain whether imparting goal salience to “new” 
decisions leads to a reversal in expectancy effects on the PD. 
Further analyses of the pupillometry data aimed to segregate the contribution of 
functionally distinct memory control processes to the evoked PD response via a 
multi-level modelling approach (MLM). The MLM analyses yielded a clear functional 
segregation of the trialwise dilation response into an intercept component, which 
exclusively predicted the experience of unexpected familiarity (i.e. with greater 
intercept predicting an increased likelihood of responding “old” to a “likely new” cue), 
and slope component, which predicted various indices of general decision 
uncertainty (i.e. with greater slope positivity correlating with slower RT, erroneous 
responding and the presence of cue-item conflict). The isolation of this latter 
autonomic correlate corroborates the significant mediating influence of decision 
uncertainty on aspects of memory control, as highlighted by the findings of 
Experiment 2 (see Section 7.2.) and Experiment 4 (see Section 7.3.). The observed 
link between PD slope and uncertainty also serves to address a debate extending 
beyond the episodic memory domain as to whether uncertainty is indexed in any 
form by the PD response (Nassar et al., 2012; Schacht, Dimigen & Sommer, 2010; 
see Section 6.4. for further details). As such, the finding that separate morphological 
components of the same task-evoked pupillary dilation represent functionally distint 
cognitive processes may have wide relevance for pupillometry research. 
It is also worthwhile highlighting the morphological similarities between the mean PD 
response evoked in Experiment 7 and the grand averaged late positive ERP 
component identified in Experiment 6 (see Figure 7.2.), which both demonstrate a 
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slow-wave positivity that is elevated by heightened control demands. This 
correspondence is not without precedent, given prior speculation that the task-
evoked PD response and the P3 ERP complex (with which the observed LPC 
component is likely affiliated, see Section 7.4.) are both linked as respective 
autonomic and cortical correlates of a unified cognitive control process (Nieuwenhuis 
et al., 2010). The findings of Experiments 6 and 7 suggest grounds for further 
refinement of this link, such that the amplitude of the specific LPC sub-component of 
the P3 and the specific trailing slope of the PD response might reflect a common 
heightening of memory control under conflict and associated uncertainty. Future 
pupillometry studies spanning cognitive domains beyond episodic memory will be 
necessary to determine whether the implied overlap between the LPC and PD slope 





Figure 7.2. Comparison of morphological aspects of presented ERP and pupillometry 
effects. a. Mean item-locked waveform of the late positive ERP component (LPC) sensitive 
to cross-task mismatch control effects in Experiment 6, focusing on the LPC evoked in the 
“cue first” recognition phase. b. Mean cue-locked waveform of the pupil dilation response 
(PD) evoked by unexpected familiarity in Experiment 7 i.e. “old” decisions made under 
“Likely New” cues. Dashed lines represent the point of probe onset in each plot, and grey 
rectangles highlight the common slow-wave positivity underlying heightened control effects 
in each imaging modality. “Hits”, correct “old” decisions; “CRs”, correct “new” decisions.  
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The overlap between findings of the presented pupillometry and EEG-fMRI 
experiments is furthered by prior suggestion that the resolution of cue-item conflict is 
critically underpinned by the activation of the dorsal attention network, of which the 
intraparietal sulcus region identified in the cross-task analyses of Experiment 6 is 
considered a key component (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Corbetta et al., 2008). 
Crucially, the mechanisms by which the dorsal attention network is capable of 
resolving conflict has been associated with a neuromodulatory “reset” signal output 
by the pupil-linked LC-NE system, which serves to reconfigure the expected 
response maintained by brain regions in the dorsal attention network in light of 
conflicting information (Bouret & Sarah, 2005; Corbetta et al., 2008). Furthermore, 
the rostral cingulate zone region isolated as the other “cross-task” control region in 
Experiment 6 projects directly to the LC-NE system (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005; 
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2010).  
Collectively, the overlap between the EEG-fMRI and pupillometry effects can be 
captured by an anatomical pathway suggested to regulate the controlled resolution 
of conflict, wherein a “top-down” signal generated by the RCZ projects to the LC-NE 
brainstem system, which in turn releases norepinephrine to boost the selection of an 
appropriate response represented in the IPS. In this model, the greater positivity of 
the PD slope reflects a longer period of norepinephrine gain modulation, and hence 
likely greater co-activation of the RCZ and IPS, as engendered by the greater 
presence of conflict and associated heightening of control. This suggested neural 
activation stream could be more directly interrogated by multi-modal approaches 
involving simultaneous pupillometry-fMRI or simultaneous pupillometry-EEG 
methods. The former would be capable of linking the task-evoked PD response to 
activity changes in spatially precise cortical regions, whereas the latter might clarify 
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the temporal ordering by which pupil-linked arousal systems and EEG-fMRI-linked 
cortical systems interact (i.e. whether in concurrent or sequential fashion).  
Overall, the pupillometry results of Experiment 7 provide further insight into the 
adaptive processing that underlies memory control. Despite the need for future 
corroboration, the collective findings of Experiments 6 and 7 favour the definition of 
an anatomically and functionally plausible neural pathway, by which controlled 
responses under evaluative conflict are generated by complementary cortical and 
autonomic processes. 
 
7.6. Conclusion  
The focus of this discussion chapter has been on summarising the major findings of 
my PhD research, as well as describing implications for prevailing theories of 
memory and cognitive control, and suggesting some avenues for future research. To 
highlight the significance of the presented empirical findings, let us re-consider the 
real-world scenarios introduced in Chapter 1 (see Section 1.1.).  
Beginning in this instance with the goal emphasis scenarios (reprised here in Figure 
7.3.), one can now furnish additional details of the core memory control processes 
driving the different evaluative outcomes in the supermarket and eyewitness testing 
environments. Whilst individuals under evaluation in both real-world environments 
were stated to evoke an equivalently “weak” level of memory evidence (likely 
characterised by reduced signal detection sensitivity), the greater perceived 
consequences of making “old” decisions in the eyewitness compared to the 
supermarket scenario was assumed to heighten goal emphasis towards this decision 
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category. Considering the findings of Experiments 1-3 and Experiment 5 
(summarised in Section 7.2. of this chapter), it is likely that the heightening of goal 
emphasis in the eyewitness testing scenario is underpinned by instilment of a 
“counter-emphasis” bias, indexed by a positive shift in signal detection criterion, and 
leading to a strategic reduction in the likelihood of recognising the individual as “old”. 
This disconfirmatory bias against responding “old” is likely to facilitate improved 
accuracy and speed of endorsement for those “old” decisions that are acted upon, in 
keeping with the heightening of evaluative caution in the eyewitness environment. 
These goal emphasis strategies will be especially pronounced if the evaluation of 
“old” decisions is selectively emphasised by aspects of the test environment, such as 
the framing of questions posed to the observer by the supervising police officer. 
These updated scenarios should highlight the improved understanding of goal- and 





Figure 7.3. Schematic representation of the two scenarios used to demonstrate the 
influence of environmentally emphasised goals on real world memory evaluation. a. 
Supermarket scenario in which the scope for reward and punishment is reduced (i.e. low 
goal emphasis). b. Eyewitness scenario in which the scope for reward and punishment is 
increased (i.e. high goal emphasis). In both scenarios, a light blue observer is evaluating a 
recognised ‘old’ or unrecognised ‘new’ decision for an individual in red for whom available 
memory evidence is equivalently weak. The variation in goal emphasis information across 
the two scenarios disposes the observer towards different strategies - an increased 
likelihood of responding ‘old’ in the supermarket scenario (liberal ‘old’ bias) and a reduced 
likelihood of responding ‘old’ in the eyewitness scenario (conservative ‘old’ bias). 
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Turning now to the bus recognition scenario depicted in Figure 7.4., the findings of 
Experiments 5-7 clarify how environmentally cued expectations interact with the 
assessment of memory evidence in diagnosing memory decision outcomes. 
Considering Passenger A, who evoked in the observer a “weak” level of memory 
evidence and the absence of an expectation of being encountered in the bus 
environment, the resultant memory evaluation is likely to involve a high degree of 
uncertainty. This uncertainty is putatively reflected in poor signal detection sensitivity 
and the lack of a confirmatory “old” criterion shift, leading to a characteristic slowing 
in reaction time and reduction in decision accuracy. Although it is unclear whether 
the cross-task memory control substrates of Experiment 6 are engaged in the 
evaluation of Passenger A (given that these were linked with the resolution of 
uncertainty rather than uncertainty per se), an increasingly positive slope of the 
observer’s pupil dilation response can be more confidently asserted during this 
period of uncertain evaluation. Conversely, the overall “certainty” of the evaluation of 
Passenger B, who evoked a strong level of memory evidence and a prior 
expectation, is likely reflected in both greater sensitivity and a confirmatory “pro-
expectation” criterion shift, leading to an increase in the accuracy and speed of 
diagnosing an “old” decision. These overt behavioural characteristics are 
underpinned by the reduced amplitude of the late positive ERP, reduced activity in 
the fMRI recognition control network, and reduced amplitude of the evoked pupil 
dilation response, consistent with the commission of an expected “old” decision. 
Passenger C evoked in the observer a strong level of memory evidence in the 
absence of any expectation of meeting on the bus. This recognition scenario 
therefore involves a degree of conflict between the decision suggested by the 
environmental expectation (“not old” or “new”) and that suggested by the retrieved 
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evidence (“old”). Hence, the greater sensitivity of the observer in this particular 
evaluative event overcomes the absence of any clear criterial tendency to respond 
“old”. Furthermore, the resolution of evidence-expectation mismatch is likely to 
engage the LPC and the fMRI recognition control network, as well as generate an 
amplitude elevation of the dilation response in light of the experience of unexpected 
familiarity. The final evaluation of Passenger D (the bus conductor) is also 
characterised by a degree of conflict, albeit one that eventually concludes with 
endorsement of a prior expectation. Hence, poor sensitivity is overcome by a strong 
“pro-expectation” criterion shift, leading to the endorsement of an “old” decision. As 
with passenger B, activation of the cortical correlates of memory control will likely be 
reduced in this scenario, although the slope of the pupil dilation response might 





Figure 7.4. Schematic representation of the bus scenario used to demonstrate the influence 
of environmentally cued expectations on real-world memory evaluation. The passenger in 
light blue is evaluating recognised ‘old’ or unrecognised ‘new’ decisions for passengers A, B, 
C and D; each of whom is associated with a different combination of evoked memory 
strength and the presence/absence of expectations of making ‘old’ decisions, with both 




Overall, the above augmentation of the introductory real-world examples should 
highlight the focus of this thesis in clarifying how retrieved memory evidence and 
various forms of environmental strategies interact in the evaluation of past 
experience. Whilst both real-world scenarios centre on evaluation in the episodic 
domain, findings from the empirical chapters should clarify that the assimilation of 
environmental goals and expectations into the ongoing analysis of memory evidence 
is mediated to a large extent by cognitive control processes with cross-domain 
properties. Collectively, the conducted experiments have illumined the workings of 
this adaptive control system, evidenced through behaviour and functional 
neuroimaging indices of central and autonomic nervous system activity, which is 
capable of impacting on episodic memory and beyond. Whilst future research will 
undoubtedly be necessary to clarify the mechanics of this system, the evidence 
provided in support of its mere existence nevertheless provides an insight into 
integrative and domain-general processes that likely perform a fundamental role in 
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Map of electrode locations in the BrainCap MR EEG system (manufactured by Brain 
Products) used for simultaneous EEG-fMRI recordings in Chapter 5 (Experiment 6).  
 
 
